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PRELIMINARY MENORANDUM
Conference of March 17, 1978
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 77-1105
HERBERT (asserted libelee)

Cert. to CA 2 (Kaufman, Oakes (cone.),
Neskill (dissenting )y-

v.

--

LANDO & WALLACE (reporters)
1. Summary.

Fed/Civil

Timely (90th day on
Sunday)

Does the First Amendment extend a privilege

against disclosure of a reporter's editorial decisions and

..

frame of mind when sought by a defamation plaintiff under a
~

New York Times standard?
2. Facts.

~ lonel

Anthony Herbert was relieved of his

command in Viet Nam after criticizing his superiors for insensi-

-2-

tivity to atrocities committed against Viet Cong prisoners.
The Army claimed his removal was due to a poor efficiency
report filed by his superior, a Colonel Franklin whom Herbert '
accused of having been told about the atrocities and doing
nothing.

Colonel Franklin denied having been told.

Colonel

Herbert's military record prior to this time was unblemished
\ and distinguished.

__ _

Following his removal, several
news stories were run about
,........_....
Herbert.

The Army developed the evidence against the superiors

charged by Herbert, but found no basis for any charges.

The

tide of news stories then turned against Herbert, with the
insinuation growing that Herbert had manufactured the atrocities

(

story in order to cover for his own dismissal.

Barry Lando,

a CBS news producer, had previously run a news story emphasizing
Herbert's side of the story; in 1972, he began to dig into the
evidence on the other perspective.

He interviewed Herbert and

his two superior officers, and several others including a
Captain in Herbert's command upon whom Herbert had relied for
verification, and some of the soldiers who served under Herbert.

!

Lando used as part of his outline for research the book written
by .H erber:t about his Viet Nam experiences, "Sqldier."
... '--I:'"ando, in cooperation with Mike Wallace of CBS 1 "60 Minutes",
put together a----------------------------------------~--special show of "60 Minutes" entitled "The Selling of
Colonel Herbert."

The show aired on February 4, 1973.

Its

conclusion was that Herbert had not been a good officer, had

-3-

(

himself been capable of cruelty, and had developed this story
of covering up atrocities as an excuse for his
command.

r~moval

from

Herbert's reputation was damaged, and the sales

of his book suffered, for which he sued Lando, Wallace, and
CBS (also Atlantic Monthly on the basis of a subsequent article
based on Lando's research, but Atlantic Monthly is not in the
present case).

Suit was brought in federal district court in

New York under diversity jurisdiction.
In developing his case, Herbert recognizes that he is subject
to the New York Times and St. Amant standard.

He commenced extensive

discovery against Lando, Wallace, and CBS, and received a wealth
of background material used by the newsmen in their research.
He also sought information about Lando and Wallace ,.s frame of
mind, recognizing that he had to prove that the falsities they
broadcast were either known to be false, or were matters about
which the newsmen were recklessly unconcerned.

CA 2 phrases the

_/f.r? ,~bc::r-r 's

five areas ofJinquiry along these lines as follows:
l\ l)Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations

regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued,
in connection with the '60 Minutes' segment and the Atlantic
Monthly article;
2) Lando's conclusions about

facts

imparted by

interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the
veracity of persons interviewed;
3) The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that
he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons,
information or events;

}

..

-44) Conversations between Lando and Wallace about
matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast
publication; and
5) Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision
to include or exclude certain material.

!I

(App. of petition at 20a).
The cert. petition adds some specificity to these inquiries.
Colonel Franklin had admitted that a second interview had taken
/1

place with Lando, at which he stated that he often tuned out
when Colonel Herbert talked to him.

It'

A Captain Donovan ·had

told Lando in two sworn statements that Herbert had reported

(

the war crimes to brigade headquarters.

Captain Hill had

also sworn that Herbert made such a report, and added that he
thought the report was made to Franklin.

Mike Wallace stated

on the program that "none [of the men who served with Herbert]
was certain that he actually reported [the February 14th killings]."
(petn. at 10).

The purpose of discovery, Herbert argued to the

District Court, was to find out why Lando and Wallace made no
mention of these sources that corroborated his story, and also
to find out the extent of research Lando conducted along lines that
might have been favorable to Herbert.
The District Court granted the discovery order, but certified
the question for interlocutory appeal.
3. Opinion below (1 concurrence, 1 dissent).

CA 2 reversed,

and remanded the case to continue without the proposed discovery.

( '
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Judge Kaufman wrote for the court.

He said that there had been

much discovery of information already provided, and that the
instant inquiries were directed only to the reporters' state
of mind.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 681 (1972), was

relied on for the proposition that "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
New York Time3 v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was premised on
the

recog~ition

that a free press required restrictions on

interference in the form of private law suits against newsmen,
even if this meant
published.
("

that falsehoods would occasionally be

The standard of knowing falsity or reckless disregard

could be proven by circumstantial evidence; it was necessary to
the preservation of press freedom as recognized in New York Times
and Branzburg that the thought processes of newsmen not be opened
up to compulsory disclosure.

Subsequent case law in Columbia

Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (19 :
and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
has recognized that the editorial policy of a newspaper cannot
be interfered with; and from that it follows that editorial
decisions on what leads to pursue, and what slant a story should
take, must also be free from inspection.
continually returns to the

argument

Judge Kaufman's opinion

that newsmen's conversations

around the copy desk would necessarily be more stilted and less
free-wheeling (with concomitant damage to the First Amendment
free press protection) if newsmen knew that such discussion would

-

-6be discoverable by a private party plaintiff.
Judge Oakes' concurrence recognizes that the decision
"breaks new ground" in First Amendment law.
\

He is aware that •

in some cases, the power of newspapers results in an unfairness
if sources are not revealed in private litigation, citing

-----------------------------------------v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir.

Car~y

concurring),

-

1974)(MacKinnon, J.,

-----

but concludes that inspection into thought
,....__,.,.,.

processes (as opposed to sources)

--ddress by Hr.

-would weaken

___.

the foundations

of the entire free press.

Much of Judge Oakes' opinion is

based on an

Justice Stewar"!)at Yale Law School,

"Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975), in which freedom
of the press is recognized as involving more than mere freedom
/

I

of speech.

The

s~parate

protection afforded by the First Amendme nt

for the press must mean, at the least, that editorial choices
cannot be pried into at the whim of a private plaintiff.
Judge Meskill's dissent agrees that allowing the di s covery
sought here will result in a chill of some kinds of editorial
function.

That

is

a correct result, he maintains, because

the type of editorial function that will be chilled should be
chilled; namely, the calculation of how to present a malicious
libel.

-

Branzburg offers no support to the majority; the dictum

quoted by Judge Kaufman does not refute the fact that the Court
held disclosure of sources was required in the criminal context.
And the Branzburg Court explicitly fore s aw some of the problems
c) $)t'(tll.)1

ct

now presented--wher7[a "proper editorial function" might resist
other proper needs for discovery.

Branzburg stayed out of the

-7-

(

line-drawing by denying a privilege, and the CA 2 should have
done the same in this case.
4. Contentions.

The petition hammers away at the difference

between inquiries into frame of mind, and

---------------------------------

editorial judgements or obtaining sources.

interference with

'

Only the newsman

is ---------------------------------------involved when an inquiry into frameof mind is made; there
is no threat that a source of information will dry up upon
disclosure.

Petitioner emphasizes that a reckless or calculated

falsehood is not entitled to First Amendment protection, and that
this Court held so in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
No chill will result, except of malicious thought processes.
New York Times will protect from liability any evidence of
(

mere negligence.

Branzburg has been stood on its head by CA 2;

it holds that some editorial processes must yield to other
legitimate policies.

Petitioner continually stresses that the

scope of his questions is limited; he merely wants to know why
Lando and Wallace chose not to include segments of testimony
supporting his view, why they mentioned a first interview with
Colonel Franklin but not a second which greatly weakened his
denial of Herbert's charge, and why they spent so much investigative
effort disproving Herbert and so little checking into his support.
Petitioner's final argument is that CA 2 has now announced a rule
of great uncertainty; no one knows what is meant by "editorial
process"

and it is now impossible to predict what editorial

choices are open to discovery (such as sources) and which are

·-

not.

-8-

The response spends most of its effort on a ripeness
argument.

The case is presently on interlocutory appeal.

It is more than possible that Herbert will be able to prove
his case of malice on the basis of circumstantial evidence
already made avail.1ble to him.

The mere fact that Herbert's

side of the story was not pursued, and that favorable references
in interviews were excised, could prove a case of knowing
falsehood or reckless disregard.
Further, Herbert's theory is closer to equal time than

--

to a ban on falsehood; he alleges mostly that CBS only presented
one side, not that what was presented was in itself inaccurate.
A test of editorial privilege should await a more conventional
I

I

plaintiff's theory.

And finally, there are no other circuits

that have ruled on this question.

Proper exercise of this

Court's certiorari discretion should require a development of
this question among the circuits.
5. Discussion.
importance.

The question presented is one of great

New York Times restricted libel plaintiffs to cases

of malice, and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), held
that proof in such cases had to incorporate a demonstration of
subjective state of mind.
against a libelee.

---

.-.

Those are awfully strong restrictions

To impose the further rule that no discovery

directed to the editorial process will be permitted would preclude
entirely any libel action by a public figure in a great number of
cases.
CA 2 has not produced a compelling opinion.

The stretch

(

-9from Miami Herald

and CBS, which struck down government

compulsions that certain material be carried, to the conclusion
that no discovery be permitted into how an editorial choice is made
of what material will be carried, requires a crucial intermediate
st~p.

That step is the premise that mere disclosure of editorial

choice processes will chill those functions so severely that
it would be tantamount to telling newspapers and television
stations what to print and broadcast.

That additional premise

is not compellingly valid on its face, and might well be
demonstrated

fals~

it is disclosed that Lando and Wallace

carried on a conversation in which they said there was no more
news value in defending Herbert, and that they ought to dig
(

instead for evidence condemning him, the respondents argue that
further freedom of discussion around editorial tables would
be chilled.

That is a deceptive argument, since it incorporates

two quite different theories.

The first is that proof o f such

a conversation would demonstrate wanton disregard of the truth,
resulting in a judgment for plaintiff, and a chill stemming from
the damages assessed.

The second is that the mere disclosure

of the conversation will chill free editorial discussions in
the future.

The first argument is invalid.

dissent was addressed to

th~

Judge Meskill's

notion, and he quite correctly

concludes that no chill results unless there is proof of wanton
disregard of truth or of actual malice.
is a desirable

outcome:~The

Chilling in those cases

second argument has been ·dealt a

-10The~ying

severe blow already in Branzburg.

up of news sources

is demonstrably a more likely outcome from disclosure (or the
Hli?.. ol ry1YI<J u jJ of
mere potential of disclosure) tha~editor~al discussions. But
even if such discussions are inhibited, there are competing
interests; one of the most important of

wh~ch

(though perhaps

not as important as enforcement of the criminal law), is the

..

protection of victims of libel.

Respondents have not proven

'

that this chill will result; they rely instead on the more
obvious outcome of the first kind of chill detailed above.
Once the two arguments are separated, however, it is apparent
that respondents have a difficult task to demonstrate 1) that
such a chill is an actual liklihood, and 2) that if it occurs,
(

'

-.-/

it outweighs the private libelee's rights.
The ripeness of the case, however, is in serious question.
"'-as

,..-.

...

In a matter of this importance, it should not be necessary to
wait for a conflict among the circu:its, but in this very case,
the trial has yet

to go

forward.

It is quite clear that

Herbert already has on hand a large amount of information showing
what CBS, Lando, and Wallace were intending.

If he prevails,

not only will the case be moot, but it could be a useful indication
that other cases of New York Times libel can be proven without
discovery of editorial decision-making.

For that reason, I

recommend against a grant of cert. at this time.

2/28/78

Campbell

Op. in petn.

There is a response.
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underlying many of this Court's First Amendment decisions.
Briefly summarizing the facts, Herbert came to national
attention as the result of his charges that the Army had tried to
thwart his efforts to deter war crimes committed by soldiers in
the field in Viet Nam.

When this affair surfaced in 1971,

Herbert received substantial favorable publicity.

In February

1973, however, CBS broadcast a program narrated by respondent
Mike Wallace suggesting that Herbert had lied about his efforts
to bring his complaints to the Army's attention and that Herbert
himself had committed or condoned various brutal acts against
Vietnamese captives.

Respondent Lando, the producer of the

program, subsequently wrote an article for Atlantic Monthly
repeating the attacks on Herbert.

Pretrial discovery turned up

evidence indicating that CBS chose not to broadcast certain
material that supported Herbert's version of the facts, and tha

--------

Lando and Wallace had made statements to representatives of the
Pentagon suggesting they had entered into the project with the
intent to "debunk" Herbert.
In the course of a deposition, counsel for Herbert
sought to inquire into the basis for various editorial decisions
made by Lando in the course of his work on the program.

When

Lando declined to answer these questions, counsel moved for a
Rule 37 order to compel response.

The district court concluded

that answers to the questions were relevant to the issue of
Lando's awareness of the likelihood that the broadcast and
subsequent article conveyed false information, the predicate for

~

"':'

3.

recovery under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) .1

q~~

Under the normal rules of discovery the questions

therefore were proper and required a response.

The court

~
~

~
~

declined to recognize the privilege asserted by Lando and granted'
the motion to compel.

In light of the First Amendment

implications of the question and a finding that appellate
resolution of the matter would

advance~ he

litigation by aiding

discovery, however, the court certified an interlocutory appeal
of the order under

§

1292(b).

A divided court of appeals reversed.
Cir. 1977).

568 F.2d 974 (2d

According to Judge Kaufman, this Court

"has repeatedly recognized the essentially tripartite
aspect of the press's work and function in:
(1)
acquiring information,
(2) 'processing' that
information and (3) disseminating the information."
Id. at 976.

u.s.
u.s.

Citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418

241 (1974), and

CB~

v. Democratic National Committee, 412

94 (1973), as authority for the proposition that the First
,.

Amendment protects the editorial, "information processing"
function of the press from government regulation, Judge Kaufman
concluded that this protection extended to compelled disclosure
"of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or

I

not to print."

Judge Kaufman recognized that this limitation

interfered with a public person's right to recovery damages for
defamation upon proof of actual

1. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
Herbert concedes that he is a "public figure" for
purposes of applying Sullivan's "actual malice"
requirement.

4.

malice, but reasoned that as the privilege was only a procedural
restriction and did not alter the substantive standard for
recovery, it did not conflict with Sullivan.2
Jurisdiction
Although the issue is not briefed, and as far as I can
tell was not even argued before the court of appeals, I raise as
a preliminary matter the question of jurisdiction.

Section

1292(b) permits a district court to certify an order presenting
"a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion" when "an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation."

The district court reasoned that the "controlling

2. The
o inion of Jud e Oakes is noteworthy
in two respec s.
It places particu ar empha sis on what
is perceived as special protection accorded the press
under the First Amendment, citing as authority Justice
Stewart's article, "Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J.
631 (1975), and treats the "prior restraint" doctrine
stemming from Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 u.s.
697 (1931) , as-a-function olel of the free press and
~ot th~ ee~ e ~ ch _gua ~ nte ~ o
the 1rs
en ment.
Secon a , 1t aes cr iEes~ compe i1 ed disclosure relating to
the editorial process as a form of prior restraint,
inasmuch as "meddling with press freedoms after the
printing or programming has occurred operates as a 7 7
'prior restraint' on future editorial decisions by ·
virtue [of] the chilling effect created by that
interference." 568 F.2d at 990 n.21.
Jud e Meskill's dissent states its basic premise as
follows:
v1ously, sue a review has a 'chilling' or
deterrent effect.
It is supposed to. The publication
of lies should be discouraged." Id. at 995. He also
points out with respect to Judge Oakes' position that
"[i]f we distinguish between institutional and personal
rights to liberty of the press and place the former in a
preferred position, then we necessarily place the latter
in a subordinate position." Id. at 997.

5.

question" test was met here because the issue presented had
intrinsic importance in light of the First Amendment
repercussions.

This seems
to- me dubious,
as I had thought the
c:=..
_....
..,
~

degree to which a question was "controlling" depended on its
relation to the merits of the particular case, not on its general
societal importance.

This reservation may be quibbling, but I

have greater doubts about the degree to which an appeal of a
discovery order ever can "materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation."

Of course every erroneous ruling

may invite reversal on appeal, thus protracting the litigation,
but this is true of many orders.

And delaying the litigation

during an appeal, which is the inevitable consequence of
certification, runs contrary to the purpose of § 1292(b).
On balance, it seems to me desirable to resolve the
merits of this case rather than take a too strict view of §
1292(b).

Although one could be forgiven for suspecting that the

district court and the court of appeals here have been more
interested in getting their views on this concededly important
issue onto the record than in helping these parties resolve their
differences in a timely fashion, this kind of abuse, if it even
is one, must be rare.

The courts of appeals always have the

option of declining a§ 1292(b) appeal, and this mechanism alone
seems a sufficient check on most temptations to pass the buck on
hard questions.

I raise the issue now only out of an excess of

caution, as a decision on the merits of this case undoubtedly
will stand as approving sub silentio the expansive interpretation
of § 1292(b) adopted below.

6.

First Amendment Protection of the Press
Whether or not the "press" enjoys special protection
under the First Amendment, a variety of problems with which this
/1

-

Court has wrestled seem to occur most often in the context of the
.,
\\
publication process. For purposes of analysis I have divided the
~

cases dealing with these problems into three categories:
(_/)
governmental constraints on the c9ntent_ of publications~
governmental constraints on the(?bollection of information for
.

.

l3)

.

.

pu b l1cat1on~ and governmental constra1nts on the select1on o
information for publication.

f

These categories are equivalent to

those used by the court below.
Constraints on Content

1.

In discussing the extent of First Amendment protection
against government control over the content of published matter,
\\

it is important to distinguish between ~forms of regulation.

The

First Amendment is implicated most clearly where the government
seeks to prevent a publication from ever reaching its audience.
In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283

u.s.

697 (1931), the

leading case in the development of modern prior restraint
doctrine, Minnesota sought to enjoin further publication of a
"malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper."

Chief Justice

Hughes, writing for the majority, ruled that the injunction fell
within the core area of state activity that the First Amendment
was designed to limit.

The history of the struggle for liberty

of the press in England and this country and consistent
interpretation of the Constitution since its adoption reinforced

.

•.

7.

the proposition that "In determining the extent of the
constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication."
at 713.

Id.

Those instances where prior restraints existed

represented "exceptional cases" that illustrated the general
rule.

Malicious and libelous attacks on public officials did not

fall into such an exception.
"The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the
less necessary the immunity of the press from previous
restraint in dealing with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is
the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional
privilege."
Id. at 720.

The publishers of libels against public officials

must be free to broadcast their charges without state
interference, subject to a subsequent accounting for those
statements that the

stat:rc~to
~

have been wrongful.

After Near the concept that the First Amendment bore
down most heavily when a prior restraint on communication was
involved became a commonplace in constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971);
(1963).

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372

u.s.

58, 70

A recent illustration of this principle at work is New

York Times Co. v. United States, 403
"Pentagon Papers" case.

u.s.

713 (1971), the

The government argued that continued

publication of excerpts from stolen government documents would
present a "grave and irreparable danger" to the nation's

8.

interests in the prosecution of the Vietnam war.

The Court

refused to permit an injunction to issue but split on the grounds
for decision.

Justices Black and Douglas stated that no prior

restraint on publication ever could satisfy the First Amendment. ,
Justice Brennan indicated he would sustain a prior restraint only
upon "governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, and immediately cause the occurence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea."
Id. at 726-27.

Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall chose a

narrower ground, ruling that Congress had not provided for an
injunctive procedure to guard against publications of this type
but had enacted criminal penalties for publications that
endangered the national security.

They therefore were reluctant

to imply a right to equitable relief in the face of this apparent
election of remedies by Congress.

Justices Stewart and White

emphasized, however, that criminal penalties quite properly could
be applied to conduct of the nature engaged in by the Times and
Post, and Justice Marshall seemed to make the same point, albeit
more obliquely.

The Chief Justice and Justices Harlan and

Blackmun would have sustained either an injunction or subsequent
penalties.
Although the special circumstances of New York Times Co.
and the fact that each Justice wrote a separate opinion make it
difficult to generalize about that decision, it seems clear that
a majority of the Court reaffirmed Near in two important
respects.

First, before the government can seek through

injunction, censorship, or other prior restraint to bar a

9.

publication from reaching the public it must establish that a
grave danger to the nation's interests would occur immediately as
the result of the dissemination of the publication.

Second, a

publication which cannot be subjected to prior restraiQt

----------~---------------------~--------~------------------

nonetheless may be regulated through appropriate subsequent
penalties.

----

These principles are not inconsistent;

rather they

reflect a qalculated balance of First Amendment and
interests.

-

governmen~-.;d

Although both prior restraints and subsequent

punishment diminish the amount of information that reaches

~

t~
~

public, it seems reasonable to believe that subsequent punishment
reduces the flow of information to a lesser degree.

Further,

because prior restraints constrict speech on the basis of
assumptions about what effect the speech will have, while
subsequent punishment cannot be levied until the assumed danger
has been realized and its effect manifested, one also might
believe that subsequent restraints are more accurate in
distinguishing genuinely undesirable speech from that which only
seems threatening.

Finally, when only subsequent punishment is

permitted, the decision whether to publish is left to the
publisher enabling the person or entity with an interest in
disseminating the speech to assess for itself whether the risks
attendant to publication are acceptable.

This feature is

consistent with the emphasis on individual responsibility and
self reliance that underlies our system of government.
The constraints on subsequent punishment of various

10.
kinds of publications are quite different, and vary according to
the nature of the speech being regulated.

See, ·e.g., Ohralik v.

Ohio State Bar Association, 46 U.S.L.W. 4511 (May 30,
1978) (commercial speech);
(1973) (obscene speech).

Miller v. California, 413

u.s.

15

In the area of defamation, the

boundaries of appropriate subsequent relief are defined by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
Robert Welch, Inc., 418

u.s.

u.s.

254 (1964), and Gertz v.

323 (1974).

Sullivan involved a

defamation suit against a newspaper and four individuals brought
by a state official.

This Court reversed a judgment against the

newspaper, holding that a rule of strict liability for all untrue
defamatory statements concerning public officials violated the
First Amendment.

In order to protect the "profound national

commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open" that represented "the
central meaning of the First Amendment," greater protection was
required for the accused defamer than a defense of truth.

Two

reasons were advanced for immunizing from civil liability false
and defamatory speech concerning public officials:

"[a]llowance

of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be
deterred;" and "[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about
'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.'"

.

-~~·

.

.

• t

''

11.

The Sullivan Court did not immunize all defamatory
speech about public officials, however, although Justices Black,
Douglas, and Goldberg supported that position in separate
opinions.

Instead the Court ruled that a public official could
,,

II

recover upon proof "with convincing clarity" of actual malice,
defined as knowled e that the defamatory statement was false or
of whether it was false or not.

Upon an

independent review of the record, the Court determined that such
a showing had not been made and reversed the judgment.
Sullivan was followed by Curtis Publishing Co. v.
388

u.s.

~utts,

130 (1967), and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.

29 (1971), both of which were decided without any opinion
obtaining the support of the majority of the Court.

In Gertz v.

Robert Welch, Inc., supra, a majority position finally developed
to define the extent of First Amendment protection of defamatory
speech in situations not covered by Sullivan.

Gertz reaffirmed

the holding of Butts that the Sullivan actual malice requirement
applied when a "public figure" as well as a "public official"
~-~

sought to recover for damage to reputation, but it rejected the
position of the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that actual

~--,_

malice also was required when the injury occurred as the result
of discussion of a "public issue".

Instead, the Court held that

"so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
418

•

I

u.s.

at 347.

12.

Unlike Sullivan, which assumed a state interest in
protection of reputation without discussing its aspects, Gertz
was explicit in describing the balancing process that an
application of First Amendment protection to defamation entails. ,
Your opinion for the Court began by describing the First
Amendment interests at stake:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an op1nion may seem, we
depend
its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
s_tatements of fa q_,t. Neither t'he '"Inten tiO nal l i e nor the
careless error materially advances society's interest in
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public
issues • • . . They belong to that category of utterances
which 'are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
mo r a 1 i t y • ' "

tor

-

Id. at 339-40 (citations omitted).

Juxtaposed against these

values was "the legitimate state
,..., interest underlying the law of
libel" embodied in "compensation of individuals for the harm
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."

Id. at 341.

The

holding in Gertz, as that in Sullivan, represented an
[ accomodation of these competing values.

-:6-c••!S=~ ~ .J.!:P ··~~"'

The net result of ~ear, New York TTrnes, -sullivan, and
Gertz is a set of fairly well defined limits on the power of
states to regulate published speech according to its defamatory
cont~n

t.

~.,.----

Injunctions, censorship, and other forms of control

advance of publication for all practical purposes are never
allowed.

Once a defamatory publication has been made, however,

13.
the states may protect individuals who have been harmed thereby
through compensation for damages, as long as certain constraints
are observed.

In the case of public figure plaintiffs, a showing

of "actual malice" must be made through "clearly convincing"
evidence;

with private plaintiffs, a showing of negligence is

enough.
l

2.

L

,,

Constraints on the Collection of Information
Quite a different balance has been struck with regard to

governmental interference with the collection of information by
individuals.

As a theoretical matter, the right to inform

oneself is an important aspect of the freedom of communication
protected by the First Amendment:
be unfettered;
Post Co., 417

"[P]ublic debate must not only

it must also be informed."

u.s.

Saxbe v. Washington

843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).

The assertion of this right, however, involves practical problems
not presented by the right not to be constrained in what one
says.

The gathering of information can involve intrusion on both

the private affairs of individual citizens and the functions of
government.

At some point intrusion becomes interference.

Further, the nature of newsgathering involves active conduct,
making it much harder to make the distinction between speech and
action that has been an important, although not determinative,

-----

---------

factor in other First Amendment contexts.

Indeed, almost any

action might be justified as an attempt to obtain experience.
These considerations have led the Court to take a rather chary
approach to the extension of First Amendment protection to
information gathering.

14.

In several cases persons have attempted to use the right
to gather information as a sword to obtain access to protected or
concealed material.

In every instance a majority of the Court

has rebuffed these attempts, although you have written two

~

dissents and joined in another which would have accorded some

~

First Amendment protection to this activity.

In Zemel v.

381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court rejected an attack on a government
ban on travel to Cuba.

The Court recognized that the

~

Rusk, ~~

~

~.
collection ~~~

of information was implicated but did not regard this interest as
therefore paramount.
"We must agree that the Secretary's refusal to validate
passports for Cuba renders less than wholly free the
flow of information concerning that country. While we
further agree that this is a factor to be considered in
determining whether appellant has been denied due
process of law, we cannot accept the contention of
appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is
involved. For to the extent that the Secretary's
refusal to validate passports for Cuba acts as an
inhibition (and it would be unrealistic to assume that
it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are
few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.
For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into
the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities
to gather information he might find relavant to his
opinion of the way the country is being run, but that
does not make entry into the White House a First
Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information."
Id. at 16-17.
Zemel did not hold, however, that all gathering of
information lost First Amendment protection because it involved
action;

rather, the Court ruled that conduct otherwise properly

subject to government control did not become exempt from

(:'

.

iO

-
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regulation because it involved information gathering.

But this

distinction has been blurred by three more recent decisions, in
each of which you dissented.

In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817

(1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S 843 (1974), the
Court struck down assertions of the right to collect information
by news organizations rather than private citizens.

The Court

upheld bans on prearranged inmate interviews with the press as a
legitimate exercise of the government's power to maintain order
and discipline in prisons.

Because the bans did not deny to the

press information available to the general public, they did not
bridge the protections accorded that institution under the First
Amendment.

~s~

In dissent, you argued that the majority had disregarded
A

the function of the press as agent for the public at large and
that function's implication of First Amendment concerns
encompassing the receipt of information and ideas.
"An informed public depends on accurate and effective
reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain
for himself the information needed for the intelligent
discharge of his political responsibilities. For most
citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with
newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking
out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the
public at large. It is the means by which the people
receive that free flow of information and ideas
essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling
the public to assert meaningful control over the
political process, the press performs a crucial function
in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment.
417

u.s.

at 863.

Rather than use nondiscrimination as a

talisman, you would have inquired further into the extent that
restrictions on the press would interfere with public access to
information about prisons.

·.

j
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The Court grappled with these problems again this past
Term

in ~ouchins

v. KQED, 46 U.S.L.W. 4830 (Jun. 26, 1978).

The

Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and White argued that
"Neither the First Amendment nor Fourteenth Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government's control.
Under our holdings in Pell v. Procunier, supra, and
Saxbe v. Washington Post, supra, until the political
branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the
media has no [special right] of access to the Alamedia
County Jail different from or greater than that accorded
the public generally."
Id. at 4833.

In particular these Justices took exception to the

idea that the press was the appropriate agent for asserting the
public's right to receive information.
"Editors and newsmen who inspect a jail may decide to
publish or not to publish what information they acquire .
• . • Public bodies and public officers, on the other
hand, may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what
they might prefer to conceal. No comparable pressures
are available to anyone to compel publications by the
media of what they might prefer not to make
known."
Id.

(citations omitted) .3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart conceded that
"terms of access that are reasonably imposed on
individual members of the public may, if they impede
effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to
convey to the general public what the visitors see."
3. I find it difficult to understand this argument.
Although editors are free from government compulsion to
publish particular information, certainly the
competitive nature of the news business as well as
general pressure to attract readership would provide
substantial pressure to publish. And I cannot fathom
how public pressure can be brought to bear on the
government to disclose particular information unless the
public already is informed in some fashion, presumably
by the press.

17.
Id. at 4834 (emphasis supplied).

He voted to reverse the

injunction, however, on the ground that the injunction gave the
press access to sources of information not available to the
public.

a'~

The dissent, which you joined, argued that the question

"

presented was not whether the press had a special right of
access, but whether the record provided a basis for ordering some
form of public access to the jail.

Arguing that the severe

limitations on outgoing information that prevailed at that jail,
when considered from the perspective of the special public
interest in information about prisons, required some form of
judicial intervention, the dissent reasoned that it was entirely
appropriate for the court to limit its relief to the plaintiffs
in that case, who happened to be members of the press.

The

dissent, in other words, would have upheld the injunction not on
the basis of the special status of the press but because the
limitation of relief to the press fell within the lower court's
discretion.
Although the right to gather information has not fared (
well when presented to the Court in the form of a sword, it has
not done much better when raised as a shield.
Hayes, 408

u.s.

In Branzburg v.

665 (1972), the Court ruled that a newsman's

interest in protecting the confidentiality of his sources,
although entitled to some protection under the First Amendment,
was

o~tweighed

by a grand jury's need to acquire information in

the investigation of a crime.

In a concurrence, you pointed out

18.
that a newsman could seek to quash a subpeona that intruded too
heavily into his information gathering operations and that in
such a hearing a court could balance the First Amendment and
investigatory interests implicated.

This past Term, the Court in

Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 46 U.S.L.W. 4546 (May 31, 1978),
rejected a similar claim of privilege against searches conducted
pursuant to warrants obtained through an ex parte process.

The

majority opinion expressly rejected as insufficient the claim
that "the processing of news and its dissemination will be
chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal
editorial deliberations."

Id. at 4550.

It was enough that "the

courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the
search."

Id. at 4550-51.

In a concurring opinion, you commented

that,
"If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled
to a special procedure, not available to others, when
government authorities required evidence in its
possession, one would have expected the terms of the
Fourth Amendment to reflect that belief."
Id. at 4552.

~u

reaffirmed, however, that "a magistrate asked

to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and should
take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First
II

Id.

the regulation of content cases, the information
cases have not produced clear guidelines and a
consensus on the interests involved.

Disagreement as to whether

as an institution enjoys special rights and privileges

'

'

•'
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has obscured analysis of both the personal and public interests
in the collection of information.

-

Your opinions have emphasized

- --

that the press does have a special role to play when it acts as a

...........____

means of fulfilling the right to receive information.

Other

Justices have not focused as clearly on the societal interest on
the flow of information.

To oversimplify things a bit, the Chief

Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist seemed to have taken the
position that the right to collect information is of interest
primarily to the institutional press and because the press does
not have any special privileges under the First Amendment, the
right to collect information enjoys little if any constitutional
protection.

Because Justice Stewart has his own understanding of

the Press Clause, he would allow the press (but not others) to
use the First Amendment as a shield against governmental
interference with information gathering

~t

would not allow the

First Amendment to be used as a sword to aid the press in the
collection of information.

Although it would not be inconsistent

with Justice Stewart's position to recognize a societal interest
in the collection of information, which the press as well as
individuals could vindicate, his vote in KQED would suggest he
has a contrary view.

Justice Stevens appears to believe in a

right to collect information where prisons are concerned, but it
is not clear to me what position he would take in other contexts.

3.

~

~

Constraints on the Selection of Information for Publication
Crucial to the analysis of the court below was the

recognition of another, independent right to "process"

20.

cflz.
information.

According to the majority, the press does not
1\

simply transmit what information it gathers to the public:
first must pick and choose what information to publish.

It

This

selective or "editorial" process, it was reasoned, is an inherent ,
function of the press, as recognized in CBS v. Democratic
National Committee, 412

u.s.

94 (1973), and Miami Herald

Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418

u.s.

241 (1974): therefore

government interference with it was impermissible.

~

c~-

Although some language in CBS and Miami Herald
Publishing Co. is not inconsistent with the analysis of the court
below, neither of those decisions supports the result.

~ .
~

~ volve

CBS

d t h e quest1on
.
of whether the First Amendment mandated a

~right of
'----- 6 #fY been the

access to the broadcast media by persons alleged to have
subject of biased coverage.

The Court rejected the

claim, although it was split as to whether the result should rest
on state action or First Amendment grounds.
the right of access issue more starkly.

Tornillo presented

A Florida statute

required newspapers to print responses to editorial attacks on
political candidates.

The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous

Court, analyzed the case as presenting a variation on tradition
prior restraint themes:
"Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not
amount to a restriction of appellant's right to speak
because "the statute in question here has not prevented
the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished" begs
the core question. Compelling editors or publishers to
publish that which "'reason' tells them should not be
published" is what is at issue in this case. The
Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense
as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to

21.

publish specified matter. Governmental restraint on
publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional
patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on
governmental powers . . . . The Florida statute exacts a
penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The
first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled
printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in
printing and composing time and materials and in taking
up space that could be devoted to other material the
newspaper may have preferred to print."
418

u.s.

at 256 (citation omitted).
The Chief Justice followed up on this discussion with

the remarks on which the decision below appears to hinge:
"Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs
to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear
the barriers of the First Amendment because of its
intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is
more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of ' the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-- constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time."
Id. at 258.

In noting that the editing process was intrins_ic t?;_ . . A

D

~~~~

the publication function of the press, the Chief Justice appeared

"'

to imply that no government interference with the editorial
process was permissible.4

4. The Chief Justice also quoted language in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376
(1973), appearing to imply the same rule:
"Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any
restriction whatever, whether of content or layout,

22.
Although the implication is there to be found, and

----------------

indeed was seized on by the court below, I doubt that the Court
meant to free the editorial function from all forms of government

intrusion~ornillo, ~d Pittsbu~ess

;.;ch

~volv;d

attempt to dictate the content of a publication in advance.

an
As

such, these cases fell within the scope of established prior
restraint doctrine, although the form of the restraint was
somewhat novel.

None of these decisions involved the imposition

of subsequent penalties on the publisher for the harmful
consequences of the exercise of his judgment.

As discussed

above, the distinction between prior restraint and subsequent
punishment has been crucial in cases involving the regulation of
the content of publications.5

[4. cont.]
on stories or commentary originated by
Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its
contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm
unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial
judgment and to the free expression of views on these
and other issues, however controversial."
418 U.S. at 255, quoting 413

u.s.

at 391.

5. One might argue that the distinction is without a
difference inasmuch as prior restraints can be enforced
only by subsequent punishment. This argument overlooks
the fact that subsequent punishment for violation of a
prior restraint is imposed upon proof of a publication
only, while other forms of subsequent punishment require
proof that the publication caused some kind of harm the
state is entitled to prevent. Thus Judge Oakes'
argument that compelled disclosure is a prior restraint
of subsequent deliberations not only flies in the face
of the distinctions made in Near and Sullivan, but seems
entirely illogical as well. ~he would use the term,
any restraint is a prior restraint; so used, the term
loses any meaning and ceases to aid analysis.

~~

,~

/~

..,_

~

"~·' .

~
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At first blush, these "editorial process" cases

strike~ '

merely applying traditional right to publish doctrine to

~

facts, not as carving out a separate "right to edit"
entitled to First Amendment protection.

Editing is an

of communication, if not expression.
information to influence

another

some care in the choice of words.

essential ~

One wishing to

ordinarily will exercise

The only thing different about

newspapers and the broadcast media is that they have separate
persons who perform the editing function.

The press has no

monoply on editing, and I would think the protection afforded
that process would be the same no matter who or what is asserting
that right.

Further, I would think the scope of protection would

be derived from principles governing the regulation of the
I

content ' ' of speech.
~

Certainly the extent of protection would not

be greater for editing than for the final product.

It would seem

to follow that a form of governmental intrusion that is
~

- rr

--n-

___,

permissible with regard to content, namely the deterrence of

--

malicious falsehoods about public figures through civil

--

._.

liability, also would be allowed with regard to editing.

c

Indeed,

::::::-

I would think the very choice of "knowing or reckless disregard"
as the key issue directly focuses the instrusion on matters of
editorial choice.6

6. The attempt of the court below to treat the
privilege it created as a "procedural" limitation on the
defamation action rather than as a "substantive" change
in the standard of recovery for defamation seems to me
spurious. This case provides an excellent example of
how the substance/procedure distinction can hinder
rather than help analysis. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v.

24.
Others, including the court below, have analyzed the
editorial process differently, however.

Emphasis has been placed

on the press as an enterprise enjoying special constitutional
protection separate from and independent of that accorded
communication.

Although the result below does not follow

automatically from this premise, the progression is simple:
the press enjoys an independent constitutional status:
editing is an essential function of the press:
enjoys independent constitutional protection.

3)

1)

2)

editing

Respondents make a

similar argument by stressing the quasi-governmental role of the
press under the Constitution and then making a claim for the kind
of governmental privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974).

A more sophisticated version of this

analysis would start with the presumption that the press
ordinarily should enjoy the same degree of protection as the
general public, but would require special privileges for the
press when:
"(1) . . . enforcement of a neutral restriction will
compromise the press's editorial freedom:
(2) . . .
less preferential means are available to protect the
press's editorial freedom: and (3) . . . the desired
accomodation will neither threaten the editorial freedom
of the press nor subject the press to governmental
York, 326 u.s. 99 (1945). The privilege asserted by
respondents would prevent petitioner from obtaining what
may be the best evidence available on the issue of
malice, on which the outcome of his suit turns. The
burden of establishing a malicious state of mind is hard
enough, but doing so when the defendant is free to shut
off as much inquiry into his thought processes as he
chooses would seem impossible. If the majority in
Sullivan had intended completely to disable public
figures from vindicating their reputation through a
defamation suit, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg
would not have had to write their concurrences.

25.
influence or coercion."
Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 Va. L. Rev. 731,
770(1977):

cf. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 631,

635-36 (1975).

It is by this analysis that one arrives at

Justice Stewart's position of treating the right to gather
information as a press "shield", Zurcher, Branzburg, but not as a
"sword", KQED, Pell, Saxbe.

Accepting this framework, one might

sustain the "editorial process" privilege because:

1) permitting

the usual amount of extensive discovery will compromise editorial
freedom by exposing the give-and-take of the press room to the
chilling glare of public scrutiny:

2) nothing less than a full

privilege can forestall this evil:

and 3) permitting the

privilege will not in any way make the press beholden to the
government for special favors that could be withdrawn.

See

Bezanson, supra, at 766.
~: Several objections can be raised to this interpretation

of

t~Press

Clause.

To begin

with~t

has been conceded

generally that the Framers did not intend to establish any
separate rights for the institutional press not derived from the

-

Speech Clause.

L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression:

Freedom of

Speech and Press in Early American History 174 (1963):

Lange,

The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 77, 88-99
(1975):

Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy:

What Does

It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 Hastings L.J. 639, 640-41
(1975) .

Furthe ~he

past decisions of this Court do not support

the interpretation advanced by this school.

Tornillo, the

26.
bulwark of this interpretation, can be understood best as a
"prior restraint on content" case.?

KQEQ_, Pell, and §_axbe

expressly declined to accord special status to the press, as did
Branzburg and Zurcher.
Supporters of special institutional status for the press
claim the defamation cases as support for their thesis, but these
cases can be made to fit the interpretation only through gross
distortion of their holdings.

Justice Stewart has argued,

"Officials within the three governmental branches are,
for all practical purposes, immune from libel and
slander suits for statements that they make in the line
of duty. This immunity, which has both constitutional
and common law origins, aims to insure bold and vigorous
prosecution of the public's business. The same basic
reasoning applies to the press. By contrast, the Court
has never suggested that the constitutional right of
free speech gives an individual any immunity from
liability for either libel or slander."
Stewart, supra, at 635.

Similarly, Gertz's requirement that

defamation liability to private persons be predicated on at least
negligence has been described as applying only to the press, the
explanation being that the pressure imposed by press deadlines
require a degree of solicitude not necessary for individual
speakers.

Bezanson, supra, at 747.

A closer look at Sullivan

and Gertz, however, belies both these assertions.

~ four

To begin with,

of the successful petitioners in Sullivan were individuals,

7. The Chief Justice, who authored Tornillo, has stated
more recently that "[t]he Court has not yet squarely
resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the
'institutional press' any freedom from government
restraint not enjoyed by all others." First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371, 4380 (Apr.
26, 1978) (concurring opinion).

27.
although concededly ones who had employed a newspaper as a means
of publishing their defamation.

And Gertz quite carefully

avoided any intimations one way or the other as to the standard
applicable to individual defendants;

rather the Court resolved

only the case before it, which happened to involve a publisher.
Perhaps more important, the analysis employed in both Sullivan
and Gertz involved a balancing of the constitutional importance
of the speech involved and the particular state interest in
vindicating an individual's reputation.

The status of the press

did not enter into this equation, and I can find nothing in
either opinion that indicates that it should.

Your opinion in

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371 (Apr.
26, 1978), indicates that the nature of the speech and not the
status of the speaker is the important factor in determining the
scope of First Amendment protection.

See also Eaton, The

American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond:

An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349, 1416-18

(1975).
On a more fundamental level, advocates of the special
status of the press have not responded, at least to my
satisfaction, to the arguments made by the Chief Justice in his
concurrence in First National Bank of Boston.

First, as he

pointed out,

I

"[T]here is no fundamental distinction between
expression and dissemination. The liberty encompassed
by the Press Clause, although complementary to and a
natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited
special mention simply because it had been more often
the object of official restraints."

28.

Id. at 4380.8

Although a vigorous press facilitates the values

guarded by the First Amendment, it cannot be said that the
Constitution thereby regards the well-being of the press as an
end in itself, always to be promoted at the exp~of other
values of constitutional significance.

Second, the Chief Justice

pointed out that as a practical matter it is

impossible~o

identify what is and is not the "institutional press".
--

- - -

As the

7

Court observed in Branzburg,
"Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right'
which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . .
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.' . • • The informative function

8. Although this statement implies that no functional
distinction can be made between the press and others,
thereby ignoring the role for the press you perceived in
Saxbe and Pell as an age~t fulfilling the public's right
.
to receive informatio~ do not understand your
/ lP~ ~
position in those cases as asserting a special
~~
insfitut1onar status for the press akin to what is
in~ nere.
Ratner I understand your position as
being in agreement with the Chief Justice's where, as in
this case, the public's right to receive information, to
the extent it is implicated at all, cuts against the
respondents' claim of privilege. I would regard your
statement in First National Bank of Boston, that "[t]he
press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally
recognized role of. that institution in informing and
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing
a forum for discussion and debate," id. at 4376, as
consistent with this analysis.
-I similarly would regard Justice Blackmun's
observation in Bigelow v. Virgina, 421 U.S. 809, 828
(1975), that "The strength of appellant's interest was
augmented by the fact that the statute was applied
againshhim as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not
against the advertiser or a referral agency or a
practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more
serious First Amendment overtones." Bigelow was
grounded on the right of the public to receive
information, in relation to which a newspaper does have
a special function.

29.
asserted by representatives of the organized press in
the present cases is also performed by lecturers,
political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers,
and dramatists."
408

u.s.

at 704-05 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303

450,452 (1938) (Hughes, C.J.)) (citations omitted).

u.s.

444,

The special

privileges which advocates of the Stewart position would bestow
upon the press could not be cabined except through the most
arbitrary and invidious distinctions among publications.
As a final point, I must express my agreement with Judge
Meskill's argument that by according the press special status,
the decision below runs the risk of depreciating the First
Amendment rights of individuals.

In this case, the individual

rights implicated include not only Herbert's interest in
redeeming his reputation, but the public's interest in knowing
how much it can rely on this particular medium as a source of
information.

Cf. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of

Claiming a "Preferred Position,"
(1977).

28 Hastings L.J. 761, 767-68

-----

The press here is asserting a right to deny the public

information of substantial importance. At best there is a
....
_,
conflict in First Amendment values here, and this conflict
further weakens the claim of the press.
A Caveat
On the whole it appears to me that petitioner has the
stronger case, and that the scope of discovery as to editor's
thought, conclusions, and opinions should be governed by the same
standard of relevancy as is used generally in discovery.

This

does not mean, however, that the procedures for this kind of

..
•'

30.
discovery need be exactly the same.

The fact that First

Amendment interests are implicated here should obligate the
district court to exercise the same kind of sensitivity in
compelling discovery as was indicated in Branzburg and Zurcher.
The prospect of every person who imagines his dignity to be
wounded raking prominent editors over the coals in grueling
depositions is not an attractive one.
to avoid this abuse.

Several steps can be taken

To begin with, a court might postpone

compulsion of this kind of discovery until it becomes clear that
a plaintiff both has at least a colorable ground for recovery and
needs "editorial process" information to substantiate further his
claim of malice.

Clearly unmeritorious suits can be disposed of

through summary judgment without resort to "editorial process"
discovery.

See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 409

u.s.

1125 (1973):

Washington Post Co.

v. Keough, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1011 (1967).

Second, a court might exercise tighter control over

such discovery than in the usual case, importing more meaning
into the relevance requirement than normal practice might
indicate.

The court below appears to have made a special effort

to get plaintiff to narrow the scope of his inquiries, and has
waited to compel discovery until the state of the evidence has
established at least some indication of bias and disregard for
the truth on the part of defendants.
probably deserve some comment.

These examples of restraint

LFP/vsl
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MEMORANDUM

RE:

No. 77-1105, Herbert v. Lando, Wallace
and CBS, Inc.

TO:

Paul

FROM:

L. F. P. , Jr.

This memorandum is for the clerk who has the
above case for a summer memorandum.
Over the past weekend, I read with some care the
opinions of the CA2 judges:

Chief Judge Kaufman, who an-

nounced the judgment; Judge Oakes, concurring; and Judge
Meskill, dissenting.

I also took a superficial look at the

briefs.
As Judge Oakes states, "this case breaks new ground
in an area of utmost importance."

I am far from being per-

suaded that the CA2 majority acted consistently with precedent
or good judgment.

I do not find either the opinion of Judge

Kaufman or of Judge Oakes persuasive.

Nor am I entirely con-

tent with the dissent by Judge Meskill, although I believe
his views are more compatible with my understanding of
Sullivan, Miami Herald, and other relevant decisions.

't

2.

No. 77-1105

The amicus brief filed by the American Newspaper
Publishers Association suggests that "resolution of the
constitutional issue could have been avoided had the court
focused specifically on the scope of discovery issues"

(p.3).

This was my own reaction to CA2's opinions before reading
this amicus brief.

As presently advised, I see no reason

to create and resolve a new constitutional issue when I
would have thought that questions of this kind could and
should be decided on a case by case basis under the discovery
rules.

The American Newspaper Publishers agree, however, with

the judgment of CA2 on the theory that the district court
struck the wrong balance between "the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of opinion matter against the
discovering party's need for the information."
The opinions below do not identify specific questions.

Rather, Judge Kaufman states that there were "a small

number of questions relating to [Lando's] beliefs, opinions,
intent and conclusions in preparing the program."

He then

stated that these "assertedly objectionable inquiries can
be grouped into five categories"

(see p.l9a, 20a of petition).

As the categories are rather general, I think it is
necessary to look at the questions themselves (said to be only
a "small number").

I would examine with special care the

No. 77-1105

3.

questions that fall into categories two and three.

The is-

sue, under Sullivan, is whether the defendants acted with
actual malice -- that is, with knowing or reckless disregard
of the truth.
"conclusions"

Here, categories two and three refer to Lando's
(opinion or judgment) concerning the "veracity

of persons interviewed."

Certainly he could have been asked

whether he believed in the truth and accuracy of what was
told him by his sources.

If he answered in the affirmative

(as presumably he would) , surely cross-examination could probe
his reasons for accepting as true what had been told him by
people whom he interviewed.

If a reporter simply accepted

whatever was told him without considering and verifying the
veracity of the informer (e.g., opportunity for observation,
consistency with other evidence, etc.) a jury would be entitled to find there had been "reckless disregard of the
truth."
After listing the five categories of questionable
inquiries (Pet.l9a, 20a), Judge Kaufman characterized them
as "discovery of the editorial process."

Once this imprecise

characterization was adopted and applied sweepingly to all
five broad categories of questions, it became fairly easy
for the two majority opinions to view with horror this probing
into "the journalistic state of mind:"

4.

No. 77-1105

Herbert wishes to probe further and
inquire into Lando's thoughts, opinions
and conclusions. The answers he seeks
strike to the heart of the vital human
component of the editorial process.
Faced with the possibility of such an
inquisition, reporters and journalists
would be reluctant to express their
doubt.
Indeed, they would be chilled
in the very process of thought.
(Petition, 22a.)
The holding of CA2 was that this probing constituted an "invasion [of] First Amendment rights."
As indicated above, I am not presently inclined to
extend Sullivan or to view this case as presenting a constitutional question.

But this is my first impression, and I

reserve final decision until I know a good deal more about
the case and have the benefit of my clerk's careful
consideration and views.
Perhaps I should add that I am well aware from my
own experience and observation that the discovery rules are
customarily abused, sometimes quite flagrantly.

I do not

think district courts exercise adequate control, perhaps because they are so pressed.
of unlimited discovery.

I am not, therefore, an advocate

In this case, my guess is that the

DC was inclined to be too liberal, and that some questions
were improper.

But if the full sweep of CA2's decision were

No. 77-1105

5.

to become the law, public figures could forget about resort
to the law of libel.

L.F.P .
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
November 1, 1978
I had not responded to the American Newspaper Publishers

Association brief in my earlier memorandum, as I should have.
have gone back to the opinions of the lower courts and the
appendix, with the contentions of that brief in mind.
Unfortunately, the appendix does not contain examples of the
questions Lando and CBS refused to answer.

The following

excerpts from a letter to counsel for Lando contains the most
detailed summary I can find of the questions Lando refused to

I

~.

answer:
" ( 1 ) questions concerning matters wh,ich Barry
Lando proposed or discussed including in, or
excluding from, the "60 Minutes" segment on Col.
Herbert;
"(2) questions concerning Lando's belief or intent
as a basis for including in, or excluding from, the
"60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic article
reference to specific matters, facts and events;
"(3) questions concerning matters which Lando
considered, or was interested in, mentioning on the
"60 Minutes" segment;
"(6) questions concerning Lando's opinions and
conclusions concerning the truth and accuracy of
persons interviewed, appear1ng on or referred to in
connection with the "60 Minutes" segment or the
Atlantic Monthly article;
"(7) questions concerning conclusions reached by
Lando about specific events referring or related to
the "60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic Monthly
article;
"(8) questions concerning the basis for Lando's
conclusions regarding people or leads to be
pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with
the "60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly
article; • • • • " App. at 130a-131a.
As far as I can tell, Lando made no concessions in any of these
areas, and the above list accurately describes the scope of the
controversy between these parties.
I note two things about these questions.
appears thatl)hey

inclu~~d--i-n-~ ry

into

~do's b~lief

veracity of matters that were broadcast.
(6).

Even his counsel conceded at oral

matters should not be privileged.

First, it
as to the

See especially category
~ument

Secon~all

that such

the questions

except those in category (1) relate to Lando's personal thoughts
and beliefs, and not to conversations or other interchange with
fellow journalists.

Most of these questions, it would appear, do

not involve the "free flow of ideas" or "give-and-take in the

J.

newsroom."

Rather, they pry into Lando's personal beliefs about

the content of his publications.
The cases to which the Publishers Association refers are
not fully apposite here.

Those decisions for the most part

involved discussion or reporting of some sort, communicative
processes that conceivably might be discouraged by undue
scrutiny.

Here, in contrast, most of the questions appear to

relate to Lando's own impressions.

Lando will continue to have

thoughts and impressions no matter how much inquiry he is forced
to endure.

As a result, the rationale that supported recognition

of a limited privilege in those cases (most of which involved a
variant of executive privilege) does not apply here.
I

The one category of questons that inquire into something
''

....

other than Lando's personal thoughts involves discussions between
1/

Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or excluded in

,,

their show.

w~

He r be b t and Lando were involved in the production of

the program and their conversations presumably related to how it
was put together.

To the extent these conversations covered

matters of balance and impact, I suppose they would be irrelevant
to Herbert's case.

If one confessed to the other his serious

doubts about the veracity of something in the program, however, I
would think that confession should and would be discoverable.
suppose the best analogy might be to the attorney-client
privilege which, as I understand it, may not be used as a cloak
behind which illegal activity may be carried out.
For these reasons, and those discussed in my previous
memo, I do not think this case properly presents a question of

-----------------~-----------------------------~

I

....
privilege.

To the extent the court below believed the First

Amendment required journalists to be free not ~o answer questions
of the sort posed here, regardless of relevancy to disputed
issues of fact, I believe it erred.

To this extent, I believe '

the court below should be reversed.

That is only the beginning,

however.

The court below, without creating a special privilege

for the journalistic profession, could have ~ demanded both a
substantial showing of

releva ~

------~~-----------------------~

a response to the questions,
confrontation altogether.

~d

as a prerequisite to compelling
efforts to avoid the

To take the latter first, the district

court, as Justice Brennan seemed to suggest at oral argument,
coould have entertained summary judgment on the issue of truth,
thereby precluding inquiry into malice.

Of course, some of the

blame for what may have been an unnecessary constitutional
adjudication must rest with Lando, who seems to have been eager
to reach the privilege issue.
As for relevance, it is impossible to make any firm

~

statement without having the exact questions available.

If you

would like me to look into the depositions to see what was
objected to, I would be happy to do so.

If the generic

descriptions of the questions contained in the appendix and lower
court opinions are at all accurate, however, it would seem
Herbert
(

~stabl ~hed

-

of the questions.

substantial

relevan~s

to at least_:ome

If some of the statements in the program were

false, and if some of the statements Lando excluded were true,
Herbert is entitled to know why Lando included the former and not
the latter.

Lando might give self-serving or evasive answers,

~

5.

but such responses will have significant impeaching value for
Herbert.

To the extent malice remains in the case, I think

Lando's thought processes generally would be discoverable even
under a relevance standard with some backbone.
If I am correct that at least some of Herbert's
questions may not constitute an abuse of discovery, then the

..

privilege issue must be reached.

~

To this extent I disagree with

-------~-----------------the Publishers
Association, which seems to believe that the
decision below can be sustained on discovery grounds.

Although

the district court believed it was constrained to apply an
"almost

anyth~ng" standard on discovery, it also stated that, "The

"

publisher's opinions and conclusions with respect to veracity,
reliability, and the preference of one source of information over
another are cJearly relevant."

Pet. App. 65a.

If this

observation was correct, I would think the decision of the court
below would have to be reversed at least in part.
,/

~
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No. 77-1105 Herbert v. Lando
CA 2 identified three categories
constraints on the press:

o~ernmental

(1) collection of information:

(2) content, or what is published: and (3) the editing

~.

process (prepublication).
This case does not involve "collection".

Nor does

it involve prior restraint.

•·

It is concerned, I think, with both the editing

----

and the ultimate content of a publication.

Although CA2

, ...

•

views these two as separate processes, and creates a new
privilege for what it calls the editing process, I view them
as one in the same analytically.
Sullivan dealt strictly with content:

a false

publication, and no question was raised as to the editing
process that produced it.
The principles governing possible liability should
be the same for "content" and "editing", as the former is
usually the product of the latter.

Raw information is

seldom published without going through the editing process.
•:

While no prior restraint is permissible, Sullivan and its progeny - establish that if a publication with
respect to a public figure is false, there may be recovery
''

2.
in a libel suit if actual malice is shown- i.e., if the
untruth was published knowingly or in reckless disregard of
its truth.
CA2 held that the civil remedy available for the
publication is not available with respect to the editing.
As to the latter, CA2 established what in effect appears to
be an absolute privilege.
But, as noted above, editing without publication
needs no privilege.

There simply is no injury.

A cause of

action arises only where there has been a publication, and
whether the aggrieved party is entitled to recover depends
upon proof of falsity and malice.
Proof of malice often would be impossible if no
inquiry could be made into the editing process:

whether the

author or editor knew or should have known of the falsity,
and this involves a host of subsidiary inquiries in a case
such as this one.

What was the basis for believing that the

information published was truthful?
excluding favorable information?

What was the basis for

What were the sources?

What investigation was made to verify the credibility or
reliability of sources?

* * *
I would hold, for the reasons indicated briefly
above, that there is no special or separate privilege for
the editing process.

The case is here on an interlocutory

3.
appeal.

It should be reversed and remanded.
The opinion, in addition, to holding there is no

special privilege, should make clear that in essence, this
is a discovery case - with the DC proceeding under Rule 26
and a motion under 26(c) to limit discovery.
As is true generally with respect to discovery,
the issue is relevancy.

The opinion should give some

guidance as to types of questions (discussed above) that do
relate to relevant material and some that do not.

Also, the

fact that there are First Amendment interests should be
taken into consideration by the DC in making sure that
discovery inquiries in fact are relevant to real issues in
the case.

In a sense, there will be discovery questions

that require the type of balancing I mentioned in Branzburg.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Although CA2
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as one
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same analytically.

Sullivan dealt strictly with content:

a false

publication, and no question was raised as to the editing
process that produced it.
The principles governing possible liability should
be the same for "content" and "editing", as the former is
usually the product of the latter.

Raw information is

seldom published without going through the editing process.
While no prior restraint is permissible, Sullivan
and its progeny - establish that if a publication with
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in a libel suit if actual malice is shown- i.e., if the
untruth was published knowingly or in reckless disregard
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CA2 held that the civil remedy available
publication is not available with respect to the editing.
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But, as noted above, editinq without publ,J cation

needs no privilege.

There simply is no injury.
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upon proof of falsity and malice.
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and this involves a host of subsidiary inquiries in a case
such as this one.
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excluding favorable information?
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appeal. , It should be reversed and remanded.
',

The opinion, in addition, to holding there is no
special privilege, should make clear that in essence, this
is a discovery case - with the DC proceeding under Rule 26
and a motion under 26(c) to limit discovery.
As is true generally with respect
the issue is relevancy.

The opinion should qive some

guidance as to types of questions (discussed above) that
relate to relevant

mat~ria~

and some that do not.

Also,

fact that there are First Amendment interests should be
taken into consineration by the DC in making sure that
discovery inquiries in fact are relevant to real issues
the case.

In a sense, there will be discovery questions

that require the type of balancing I mentioned
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MEM0RANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
Justice White's opinion focuses almost exclusively on

the editorial process privilege created by the court below.

It

ends up pretty much in the same position as Judge Meskill's
dissent in the court below:

The line of questioning at issue

here should be treated as just another discovery request and
should be bounded only by the usual Hickman v. Taylor standards
of relevance, etc.

At the end, however, he does indicate that

the district court has the authority to control discovery more
forcefully than it has done here, but he gives no guidance as to
how this authority should be exercised in this particular
context.
I think you can join Justice White's opinion, inasmuch
as you agree with its basic conclusion that there is no editorial
process privilege as such.

The problems that you may have with

the opinion involve what it does not say, rather than what it
says.

I think two things could be done to improve it.

On paqes

4-5, in the statement of facts, I think more could be said to
show how respondents put their eqgs all in one basket--

that

they opposed the motion to compel a response solely on the

2.

---

grounds of the asserted privilege, and not because of relevance,
burdensomeness, or ripeness.
r - - _ .... """"-. ___....,_,__.

(I think the record will support

"" ...,._.,. """"' ""

this assertion, or at least that respondents did not seriously
contend the responses were irrelevant or burdensome).

By

focusing on the narrowness of the question presented, I think the
opinion would better justify its failure to address other issues
that might be in this case.

Second, on pages 25-26 Justice White

has stricken out a paragraph indicating that district courts

------

-

should be sensitive to First Amendment concerns in this area.

~

This paragraph looks like a teaser to me:

It almost appears as

if he left it in this form to give you something to bite into.
Whatever his intentions, I would recommend that you urge Justice
White to leave in this paragraph.
I think, with the above modifications, you would be
happy to join the opinion.

I also think that you might want to

write separately to elaborate on what steps a conscientious
district judge can and should take to avoid unnecessarily
intrusive discovery in this area.

Although Justice White

probably is justified in regarding the question presented in this
case as very narrow--

whether an absolute editorial process

privilege exists or not--

someone should address the other issue

implicit in this case, namely what should the courts do short of
creating a privilege.
concurrence •

.

... .

I would be happy to get cracking on such a

lfp/ss 2/7/79

Rider A, p. 13 (Lando)

It is not improper, of course, to urge the abandonment
or modification of existing constitutional
interpretation, and notable developments in First
Amendment jurisprudence have evolved from just such
submissions.

But rarely has the Court abandoned or

modified major constitutional doctrine that has been
reiterated and reaffirmed with the constancy that we
have adhered to New York Times.

As noted above, our

decision in that case effected a major change in the
standards applicable to civil libel actions.

In the

succeeding 15 years the Court repeatedly has
acknowledged or reaffirmed that case as prescribing the
applicable First Amendment standard in a defamation

-

~,W•4~
suit by a public figure.

,

St. Amant, Gertz, and most

~
recently in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
457 (1976).

u.s.

448, 455-

In the two most recent cases, Gertz and

Firestone, the Court reiterated its conviction - one
reflected in the law of defamation of all of the states -

~

that the individual's interest in his reputation is of
1\

basic concern.

We thus are being asked to modify

substantially constitutional doctrine that, until the
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, was
thought to

/...~~~I
~

established.

~

carefully considered and firmly

Moreover, it was widely perceived as

2.
First Amendment doctrine essentially protective of
press freedom.

February 7, 1979
77-1105 Herbert v. Lando

Dear Byron:
I have read with interest your tvped draft of
1/30/79, and think I will have no difficulty in joining it.

As I went along, I noted in pencil an occasional
change - though none of any consequence. See pages
12, 15, 16 and 24. On p~ge 13, I dictated a rider (attached)
that is more form than substanc~. I do not urge any of it
on you.
editin~

I think your disposition of th~ constitutional
privilege issue is thorough and convincing. I was
particularly impressed by your use of Butts, Walker and Hill
in footnote 6.
As you anticipated, my only serious question is
whether the opinion should address more fully what may be
called the •aiscovery issue•, or whether it should be
limited substantially to decininq the constitutional
privilege issu~ - as you have writtPn it. I enclose a
memorandum to my file dated November 11, 1978 (althouqh I
believe I actually wrote it on November 1) that summarized
my thinking about the case at that tim~. You will note that
I thought - and arn inclined still to think - that the case
should be remanded. I appreciate that it would be difficult
to give the DC much guidance with respect to discovery, but
I may see if something along this line can be written. I
would expand somewhat upon your paragraph at the bottom of
page 25, instead of striking it. If I write, I would concur
in your opinion and simply move briefly into the discovery
problem.
Thank you for the opportunity of reviewing your
draft, which I think is exceptionally well done.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss

.
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It is not improper, of course, to urge the abandonment or
modification of existing constitutional
notable developments in First Amendment jurisprudence have
from just such submissions.

But rarely has the

Court abandoned or modified major constitutional doctrine
that11~has beenw ., rei't er'ated
and recHf irmed with the constancy
.•
.;ri·,

<

•

l

that we have1 adhered to New York Times.

As noted above,

decision in that case effected a major chanqe in
standards applicable to civil libel actions.

[n the

succeedingj lS years the Court repeatedly has acknowledged
reaffirmed that case as prescribinq the apolicable First
Amendment standard in a defamation suit by a public
Butts, Walker, St.
Fireston~,

424

u.s.

Am~,

Gertz, and Time, Inc. v.

448, 455-457 (1976).

In the two most

recent cases, Gertz and Firestone, the Court
conviction - one reflected in the law of defamation of
of the states- that the individual's interest in his
reputation also is of basic concern.
We thus are being asked to modify substantially
constitutional doctrine that, until the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case, was thouqht to have been
carefully considered and firmly established.

Moreover, it

was widely perceived as First Amendment doctrine essentially
orotective of press freedom.
I"
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:ffi
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~
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, ) On Writ of Certiorari to the
No. 77- llOS

v.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Barry Lando et al.

~

~ ""

[February -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither
the Federal 110r a State Government may make any law
"abridging the freedom of speech. or of the press ...." The
question here is whether those Amendments should be construed to provide further protection for the press when sued
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More
specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging
falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation,
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publication, even though
the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a
critical element of his cause of action.

I
P etitioner, Anthony Herbert. is a retired Army officer who
had extended war-timE' service in Vietnam and who received
widespread media attention in 1969- 1970 when he accused his
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other
war crimes. Three years later, on February 4, 1973. respondent Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc. (CBS) . broadcast a
report on petition er and his accusations. The program was
produced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was
:narrated by respondent Mike Wallace.. Lando latE)r published

;

'·•

..
,•

; '

.,,
<
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a related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then
sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defamation in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as
a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to
excuse his relief from command, and requested substantial
damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences.
Although his cause of action arose under New York State
defamation law, Herbert conceded that because he was a
"public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to
"public figures " by Curt·is Publish·ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S.
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent kuowing falsehood, liability requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is,
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable
falsity, " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6
( 1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."
St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, at 732.
In preparing to prove his case in light of these requirements, Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response
was refused on the ground that the First Amendment protected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who
Criminal libel prm,;ecutions are Oiubjf•ct to the same
tations. Garrison v. Louiswna, 375 U. S. 64 (1964) .
1

't

con~titutional

limi-
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edit, produce or publish, and into the editorial process. 2
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b), which
permits discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," the District
Court ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of
"central importance" to the case. it was obvious that the
questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to Herbert's
efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to doubt the
veracity of certain of his sources, or, equally significant, to
prefer the veracity of one source over another." 73 F. R. D.
387, 395, 396 ( SDNY 1977). The District Court rejected the
claim of constitutional privilege because it found nothing in
the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit or
require it to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected and
unpublished. " I d., at 394. The case was then certified for
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 3
2 The Circuit Court summarized the objectionable inquirie~ as follows:
'' 1. Lando's conclusions during his research and inve~tigation regarding·
people or lt>ads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with
the 60 Minute;; segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
"2. Lando'~> conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his
state of mind with respect to the veracity of pero;ons interviewed;
"3. The basis for conclusions where Lando te~tified that he did reach a:
conclusion with respect to persons, information or events;
"4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter~ to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and,
" 5. Lando's intentions a~ maniff'sted by the decision to include or exclude material." Herbert v. Lando, 568 F. 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977).
8 Respondents' Petition for Leavl." to Appeal from an Interlocutory
Order, which was granted, ~tated the is~ue on appeal as follows:
''What effect should be given to the Fir~t Amendment protection of the
pres~ with reo;pect to its exerrisf' of editorial judgment in pretrial discovery

.;.
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A divided panel reversed the District Court. 568 F. ~d 974
(CA2 1977). Two judges, \niting separate but ~verl~ppi1~g
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient
protection to thE' editorial Pfocesses to protect Lando fron~
inquiry about his thoughts: opit1ious. and conclusions with
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conversations with his editorial colleagues. The privilege not to
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly reverse its judgment.
II
Civ1l and criminal liability for defamation was well established i11 the common law when the First Amendment w~
adopted, and there is no indicati9n that the Framers intended
to abolish such liability. rntil New York Times the prevail,
ing jurisprudence was that "libelo.us utterances [are not]
within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . . "
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250. 266 (1952); see also
Roth v. United St(l.tes, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942);
Xea1' v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707-708 (1931). The
accepted view was that neither civil nor criminal liability for
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedom
of the press. and a majority of jurisdictions made publisher~
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of
their in tent.~ New York Times and Butts effected major
111 a libl'l ca::;c governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S.
254 ( 19li4) '?"
1 See, 1'. g., Re::;tatrment of Torts § 580 (1939); Pedrick, Freedom of
thr Pre,;::; and tlw Law of Lilwl: The :Vlodern Rrvitied Tran~lation, 49
Corn . L. Rrv . 581, 5R:{-584 (1904); Notr, Drvrlopmrnt::; in the LawDefamatiOn, 69 Harv . L. Rev . 875, 902-910 (1956) . In Peck v. Chicago
Tribu11e C'o., 2H U. S. 185, 189 (1909). l\Jr . .Tul:lticr Holme~ ~ummarized

.

'
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·chauges in the standards applicable to civil libel actions.
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages
awarded.
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the
common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood.
Give11 the required proof, however. damages liability for
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom
of the press.
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources from which the plaintifJ could obtain the
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause
of actwn. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny
made 1t essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on
the prPvaihng view of stnct liability in thP coursp of reviewing a libel
Judgment renderPd in a federal diversity of citizPnship action:
"There was ::;ome suggestion that the dPfendant published the portrait by
mistakr, and without knowledgr that it was the plaintiff's portrait or waH
not what it purported to be. But thr fact, if it was orw, was no Pxcnse.
If the Jlnblication was librllous the dPfendant took thP risk. A:s was said
of ::;urh matters by Lord ;\Jansfield. 'WhatC'vcr a man publislws lw pubhshe:; at his peril.' The Kiug v. Wvvdfall, Lofft 776, 7151. . . . The reason Js plau1. A libel rs harmful on it::< facr. If a man sees fit to punish
mamfestly hurtful statements conrerning an individual, without othC'r
.JUstificatwn than ex1;;ts for an advertisement or a p1ece of news, thC'
usual prmr1plrs of tort will make him liable, if the statement~ are fal~e
0r arr true of someone else "

77-1105-0PINION
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be
liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public
figures must know or suspect that his publication is false. In
other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps,"
is essential to recovery. Inevitably. unless liability is to be
completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of
the alleged defamer would be open to examination.
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that although
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of
objectivf' circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be
inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or suspected that their damaging
publication was in error. In Butts, for example. it is evident
from the record that the editorial process had been subjected
to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evidence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had
trenched upon forbidden areas. 6
" The dt>finitiou of fault was to be tlw re;;pmn>ibility of state laws. Gertz
v. Robert Welch , Inc .. 418 V . S. :323, 347 (1974) .
u Srr :388 lJ. S., at 156-159, wherP 2\fr. Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, rPviewrrl thr record under thP ~iandard lw prrferrrd to apply to
publi(• figure:;, and upheld the verdict for tlw plaintiff. Chief .Justice
Warren independently reviewPd tht> record under tl1e "actual malice"
standard of New York 7'£mes and abo concluded in hi;,; concurring opinion
that the verdict should be upht>ld. !d. , at 168-170. The evidence relied
on a nd Httmmarized in both opinion:; imludrd substantial am011nts of testimony that would fall within tlw editorial process privilegE' a~ defined by
respondent~ . Thf' record before t hr Court included drpo;,;itions by the
.aut hor of the defamatory articlf' , an individual paid to a&;ist thf' author
in prf'paration, the Sports Editor of ThE' Saturda~· Evening Po,;t , and both
it:; Managing Editor and Editor-m-Chif'f. The:;e df'po~ition s revf'aled The
Saturday Ewning Post's motive:s in publi:;hing the story (Record 706717) , sourceR (Rf'cord 364, 662-664, 719-720, 729), conversationH among
the editors and author corH'f'rning the rf'search and dE-velopment of thP-<) rticle (Hf'eord 363-367, 721-737), drci:siom; and rra;;on~ rf'lating to who

J..,t

'.
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Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means
a recent development arising from New York Times and
similar cases. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the common-law
rule, predating the First Amendment, that a showing of
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to
recover punitive or enhanced damages. 7 In Butts, the Court
should be intPrviewed and what ~hould be inve::;tigated (Record 666667 , 699-700, 7:34-7:36, 772-774), conclu~ions tlH to the importance and
veracit~· of sources and information )H'f'HE'nted in the article (Record 720,
732-7:35. 737, i71-772, 776), and conclusions about the impact that publi~hing the article would have 011 the subject (Record 714-716, 770).
JUH'J'ICE BRENNAN, writing for him;;elf and MR . .JuwrrcE WHITE, also
thought thr rvidence of record ::;ufficient to sati:sfy the New York 7'imeiS
malice l'tandard. It i!:l quite unlikrl~· tha,t tlw Court would have arrived
at the rl'~ult it did had it believed that inquiry into the editorial proces::;es
was con;;t it ut ionally forlHdden.
The Comt Pngaged m ;;imilar analysis of the record in rever8ing the
judgments entE•red in a compamon casr to Butts, Associated Press v.
Walker, :~88 U. S., at 158-159; id .. at 165 (Warren, C . .J., concurring);
nnd in Time Y. Hill. 385 U.S. 374, :391-394 (1967). In Hill, the record
included the rdited drafts of the al!rgedly libelous article and a examination and eros~-examiuation of the author. During that examination, the·
writPr explained in detail thr preparation of tlw article, his thonght:s, concluHion~. am! belief::; regardmg the material, and a line-by-line analysis of
the artiele with explanation~ of how and why addition::; and deletion~ were
madr to the vanous draft8. As in Butts. the editorial proce~:~8 wa::; the·
focm; of much of the rvidencr, and dirPct inquiry was made into the state
of mind of the media dPfendants. Yet the Court rai;;ed no qur;;tion as to·
the proprirty of tllf' proof.
7 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Tort;;~ 163 (1969); Notr, Developments
hi thr Lnw-Defamation, supra. at 9:38; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and SlnndPr
§ 352 (1970); 50 C . .T. S. Libel and Slander§ 260 (1955).
The He~tatPment originall~· provided in a sepamte section for the award
of punitivr damage~ for maliciou~ dPfamations. RestatemPnt of Torts
§ 10(i8 (Tent. Draft 13, 19;36) :
;,On<' who i;:; liable for harm to another's rrputation cau::;ed by the publication of a libel or slander i~ nbo liab!P for punitive damages if the
defamatory matter was published with knowledge of ito; fabity or if it was·
pti;bh~hed in rPckJe~s .indifferencr to it~ truth or fall;ity or sol(']y for the·

·-
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damages which in
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reckless indifference of culpable negligence" or "ill will. spite,
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166.
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan. id., at 156-162.~ nor Chief .Justice
Warren, concurring, id., at 165-168, raised any questioll as to
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the
publisher and its responsible agents. 9
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decided, certain
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from
liability for libel unless the publication was made with
malice. 10 Malice was defined in numerous ways, but in genpurpo:;e of cau~ing harm to the plaintiff's reputation or other legally protected interf:'St."
The provision was later omitted with the explanation that recovrry of
pnnitiv<• damagrs would be drtrnninrd by thr rules in thr Re;;tatrment
with re:;pect to damages in genrral. Re::;tatPment of Tort~ § 106S (.Propo:;ed Final Draft 3, 1937) .
Gertz v. Robert Welch , Inc .. supra. at 350, limitPd the entitiPment to
punitive damagE's but such damagr~ are :stiU awardable upon a showing of
knowing or reckJp;;~ falsehood .
8 As Mr. Ju:stice Harlan noted, tlw jur~· had been in~tructed in considering punitive damagel:i to as::;es,; •'thr rrliability, the naturP of tlu.'·
:sources of the plamtiff's information , its acceptance or rejection of the
sources, its rare in ch<>cking upon as::;ertion:s." 3H8 U.S., at 156 (emphasis
added) . The Justicr found nothing umi::;::; either with the in:;truction or
the re::mlt the jury rpachE'd und<>r it . ~IH. Jus'l'I<"E BRENNAN, di,;,;pnting·
in thE' B·utts case, id., at 172-174, analyz<'d the in;;tructions diffPrPntly but
nused no ljUE'~tion as to thE' con~titutiouality of turning the award of Pit her
compen:;ator~· or punitive damage~ upon direct a~ well a;; circnm;;tantial
evidence going io the mPntal state of tlw dC'fPndant.
n SrP n. 6, supra.
10
See Nalle v. Oyster. 2:30 U . S. 165, 179-180 (191:3); WhiteY. Nicholls,
3 How . 266, 2H6-292 ( 1845) ; T. l'luckiwtt , A Couci~<' Hi:;tory of t hC'
Common Law 502 (5th <'d . 195G); HaiiPu, Charaetpr of BeliPf Nf'ct';;H<uy
(Qr the Conditional Privi!Pgc iu DPfamatiou, 25 fll L. ReY. 865 {19~1) ..

·~
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era] depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with
improper motive. 11 This showing in turn hinged upon the
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the
In White Y. Nichulls, supra. at 290-291, the Court Hurveyed the common
law and summarized the privilege aR follows:
"We have tim:; taken a view of the authorities which treat of tlw doctrines of ::;lander and librl, and havr ronsidrred tho::;e authoritie::; particularly with rrference to t hl' di:;tinetion the~· establish, brtween ordinary
in::;tances of slander, written and unwritten, and tho::;e which have bel'n
;:;tyled, privileged communications; the IWCuliar character of which is said
to l'xempt thl'rn from inferl'nrPs which thE' law ha<' creatPd with re::;pect
to those case::; that do not partake of that character. Our Pxamination,
extl'ndl'd as it rna~· "rPm to have bel'n. ha:; been called for by the importance of a ,;ubJert rno;;t intimatply connected with thP right:; and happine:;:; of mdividual::;, as 1t IS with thr qtuPt and good ordrr of soci<'ty. The
mvp;;tJgation ha::; conductrd us to thr following conclusion:;, which WP
propound n" the law applicablr thl'reto. 1. That evl'ry publication, either
b~· writmg, printing, or picture:;, which charge:; upon or imputrs to any
prr::;ou that winch render::; him liable to puni;:;hment, or which is calculatPd to mah• h1m infamous, or odious, OJ' ridiculou::;, i;:; prima facie a libel,
ami imphe:-; malirP in the author and pubh::;her toward::: the per::;on concernmg whom :-;uch publication i:; made. Proof of malice, thl'refore, in
lhr rmw::: ju:;t dp::;cnbed, cau nev<•r be required of the party complaining
beyond tlw proof of the publicatiOn it::;e]f: ju;:;tification, excuse, or extenuatiOn, 1f r1ther can br ~howu. mu~t prot'<'Pd from the drfendant. 2. That
tlw clP::;cnption of rases n·cogm~l'd a::: privileged communication::;, must be
understood a:< l'X<'l'ption~ to thii< rulr, and as being founded upon some
apparrntly rrrogm::;l'd obligation or mot1vr, legal, moral, or social, which
may fairly br prPsumrd to hav<' led to thE' publication, and therefore prima
fane rrltrvPi< tt from that JU~t implication from which the general rule of
th<· lnw i~ dPduePd. Thr rulr of rvidrnce, Hi< to :;uch ca~:;es, i~ accordingly
as far rhangrd a::; to impose it 011 thr plant iff to remove thosP presumptions
f!owlll!!: from the sPeming obhgatiom; and situation::; of the parties, and to
n•qtur<' of hun to brmg homr to thr dPfrndaut tlw exi~:;tence of malice as
lhl' tntP mot IV<' of hi::: con duet. Beyond t hts PXtPnt no presumption can
l)(' p<·rmit!Pd to oprratP. mud1 k"~ bP made to sanctify thP mdulgence of
mah<·t•, how<'vrr wtckrd. howrvrr <•xprP">S, under thr protection of ll'gal
forms. Wr ronrludP thpn that maht·<• ma.v he proved, though alleged to
·have <'XJ::<trd in the prorrechng" hl'forr n court, or lrgislative body, or any
[ fi'ootuote 11 is on p. 10]
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belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or upon
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the
defendaut.12
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant
and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance
damages. 13 The rules are applicable to the press and to other
· defendants alike, 14 and it is evident that the courts across
other tribunal or authority, although such court, legislativP body, or othPr
tribunal, may havr been tlw appropriatr authority for rPdre:ssing the
grievancP rPJlfPHPntPd to it ; and that proof of rxpress malice in any
written publication, petition, or proct•eding, addre::;spd to such tribunal,
will rendPr that publication, petition, or proceeding, libellous in its character, and actionable, and will subjPct the author and publi:sher thereof
to all the con::;equpnces of libt>l."
tl Hal!Pn , sup1'a, at 866-867.
In sornP juri::;dictions a dt>fendant forfeited his privilPgP if he published negllg('J1tly or without probable cause
to be.lieve tlw :statPment was true. lrl., at 867; sec White v. Nicholls,
supra, at 291.
12 SPe, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 45.5 :
"The exi::;tence of actual malice rna~· bP shown in many ways. As a
genPral rule, any competent PvJdPnce, E'ithPr dirPct or circumstantial, can
be resortf•d to, and all thP rPlevant circumstance,; ::;urroundiug the transaction may br ::;hown, providPd they arE' not too rPmote, includ,ing threats,
vrior or subsPqurnt dl'famatiow,;, :;ub,.;cquPnt statemputs of thP defendant.,
eircumstances indicating the cxistf•ncP of rivalry, ill will, or ho~tility between
tho partie~, facts tpnding to show a reckless cli~rPgard of the plaintiff's
rights, and, in a11 action against a npw~papPr, cn~tom and usage with
rPspect to the trPatment of new~ items of the nature of the one under
consideration. ThP plaintiff may show tl1at thr drfenclant had drawn a
pistol at the time he 11ttPrPd thP word::; complained of; that defpndant had
tried to ki :;~ and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publication; or 1hat dt•fendant had failed to makP a proper investigation before
publication of thr statPmPnt in question. On cros:;-examination the
dt>fendant may be questioned a~ to his intpnt in making the publication."
(Footnotes and citations Oimt1 eel.)
13 E. g., Odger '~ Libel and Slunder ·"271-*288 (lt-Jt Amer. eel. Bigelow
1884 ; 50 Am. ;Jur. 2cl § 455 ; 53 C . .J. S. § :!1:3.
J~ Cf. Odgrr':s Libel and SlundC'r 239 (1st Amrr. t'd. BigPluw 1884);

.' '

.''
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the country have long been accepti11g evidence going to the
editorial processes of the media without encountering constitutional objections. 15
F. Holt, The Law of Libel 57 (h;t Amer. ed. 1818); Billet v. TimesDemocratic Pub. Co., 107 La. 75,32 So. i7 (1902).
15 ln scores of libel case~ courts have addre;:;:;ed the general is:;ue of the
admissibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial process
privilege as:;erted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of
the evidence on behalf of libel plaintiff~. See, e. g., Johnson Pub. Co. v.
Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960) (Editor may be cro:ss-examined
on meaning mtendrd to bP convryed by pas::;agPs in magazine article);
Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P. 687 (1950) (malice may be
est.abli::;hed by direct proof of the ::;tate of mind of a per~on, or by evidence
from which its existencE' may br infrrred); Scott v. 'l'imes-Mirmr Co., 181
Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (all relevant circum~:o1:nncrs concerning publication admissible); Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931)
(all n •lrvant evidrnce includmg direct evldrnce on :;tate of mind or surrounding rircurnstancrs-city editor and rrporter called to stand and que::;tioned
extmsivrly a::-: to motives, circum~tnncPs of publication, and genE-ral practiceR); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Har. ao9, 31 Am. DPc. 766 (Del. 1837) (where
qne~tion of mali<'<' in i:::sue, dE-clarations of publishrr at the timE' of publica"
tJon admis~ible 11:; part of t hP res gestae) ; Western Union 'l'elegraph Co. v.
Vicker.~. 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S. E. 2d 440 ( 1944) (all re}pvant evidence
admii-isible, including direct. evidPnce of ~tate of mind and :;urrounding cireum~tances); Cook v. East 8hore Netl'spapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 04 N. E. 2d
751 (1945) (ull rPIPvant cvid('llC<' roncerning circumstaucrs of publications
admi:-;~ible, including te~timony by rE-porters and rmployePt; of defendant);
Berger v. Fre eman Tribune Co .. 132 Iowa 290, 109 N. W. 784 (1906) (all
relevant rvidenr<'); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Ma~s. 176, 181
N. E. 24n (1932) (only evidence on state of mind of tho~e agents of defendant rntrustcd w1th detrrmining what shall bP published is admi~:sible and
material) ; Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E.
2d 729 (1940) (any relevant evidence on defendant's malice); Cymwski v.
Polish American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N. W. 58 (1917) (testimony
of individuals who advised reporter to question plaintiff before publishing
defamatory article was admissible on the i::;sue of malice); Friedell v.
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 20:3 N. W . 974 (1925) (any rplevant
evidmcr admissible) ; Cook v. Globe Printing Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W.
332 (1910) (evidcncr ~howing that defendant's editorial manager knew an
important fact to be false admi~Iblr on quP~tioll of malicr); Butler v.
GarZ.ette Co ., 119 App . D1v . 767, 10-:1 N .. Y .. S. 637 (1907) (any c•videncc·
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In the face of this history, old and 11ew, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases
had announceu unequivocal protection for the editorial procadmis~ible to provr actual malicr of defendant); B1iggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C.
377 (1851) (rxpreH~ malicr may be proved either by dirrct evidence or
surrounding cirrumstances); McBurney v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R. I.
:~31, 175 A. :2d 170 ( 1961) (relevant evidence admi;;8ible to rebut te;;timony
by rrporters and ed1tor;; that they publi;;hed without malicr); Lancour v.
Herald & Globe Assu .. 112 Vt. 471,28 A. 2d 396 (1942) (any rt•levant evidence on malicP); Farrar v. Tribuue Pub. Co., 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash.
1961) (nil circumRtanrf'R surroundmg publication rPlPvant and admi;;sible).
Similarly, the courts have uniformly admittPd o:urh evidence on bPhalf of
the drfPndant. See, e. g .. Bohan v. Record Pub . ('o ., 1 Cal. App . 429, 82 P.
5:~4 (1905) (tf'::itimon~· on good faith); Hearne v. De Youny , 119 Cal. 670,
52 l'. 150 (18911) (tp::;timony on ~ourcPs, precautions taken, and good
faith) ; Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 2Da Iowa 1095, 212 N . W . 557 (1927)
(tr:stimony of reportrr and rditor on good faith admi::;::;ible); Snyder v.
1'ribun e Co .. 161 Iowa 671, 14!~ N. W . 519 (1913) (tr::;timony a:; to source
of infomwtion and good faith of' reporter admissiblr); Courier Journal
Co. v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (trstimony of reporter
on good faith) ; Conner v. StarHlard P·ub. Co., 183 Ma::;s . 474, 67 N. E. 596
(1903) (tr~;tnnon~· a>~ to ::;ourcr of information); Davis v. Marxhausen, 103
Mich. 315, 61 N. W. 504 (1894) (tr::;timony on good faith and proper
prrranhons takPn beforp publi::;hmg) ; Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo. 35,
107 S. W. 496 (1907) (tp::;timon~· on thought::; and intrntion~ at the time
of publication admi~::;iblP); Paxton v. Woodward , :n Mont. 195, 78 P. 215
(1904) (trstirnony as to motiw, good faith , and source~); Las Vegas Sun,
Inc. v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P . 2d 867 (1958) (testimony of publi~her on good faith) ; Ltndsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N . .J. Misc.
1275, 163 A. 245 (1935) (tp;;t nnony on good faith) ; Kahn Y. P&D Co., 169
App. Div. 580, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (;;ource) ; Hains Y. New York
Eveniug Journal, 204 N. Y. S. 7:H (1930) (sourer); Goodrow v. Malone
Telegram, 235 App. Div . :3, 255 N. Y. S. 812 (19:32) (reportrr's te::;timony
aR to sourcP) ; Goodrow v. Press Co., 283 App. D1v. 41 , 251 N. Y. S. 364
(1931) (defpndant can testify and intruducr rvidPncr on hi::; good faith at
time of publicatwn) ; Kehoe Y. Neu• York Tribun e, 229 App. Div . 220, 241
N Y. S. 676 (1930) (te;;timony on good faith admi::;sible to prrvPIJt impo::;ltlon of punitive damagp:;); Varvaro v. American Agricu!tu1·ist, 222 App .
D1v. 213, 225 N. Y. S. 564 (HJ27) (defPndant may te;;tify and introduce
rvidencf' on lack of malice), Vau Arsdale "· Tone, Inc .. 35 N. Y. S. 2d
'951, aff'd, 265 AJ>P. D1v. 919, :m N Y . S. 2cl 41:3 (1942) ; Wezrhbrodt "-
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94
(1973), we invalidated state efforts to pre-empt editorial
decision by requiring the publication of specified material.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement
that a television network air paid political advertisemeuts and
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System sought
to control in advance the content of the publication. they
were deemed as invalid as were prior efforts to enjoin publication of specified materials. 111 But holdings that neither the
State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest
that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry
whatsoever.
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia
Broadcasting System or in Tornillo silently effected a substantial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v.
New York Evening Journal, l1 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant
may te~tify as to good faith and probable caust>); Cleveland Leader
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 84 Ohw St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (testimony on good fa1th); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P.
1079 ( 1914) (defpndant's te~timony as to lack of malice and source of
information); Times Pub. Co. v. Ray, 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d
105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (te~timony as to lack of malice); Pfister v.
Milwaukee Free Press Co .. 1:39 Wi~ . 627 , 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony
liS to absence of malice) .
None of thrse ca::;e,.; as much as suggested that there wert> ~pecial hmits
apphcable to tlw press on the d1~coverability of such evidence, either
befon> or during trial.
UJ As we stated in 'I'ormllo. "no 'government agency-local, ~tate, or
federal-can leU a newspaper in advance what it can prmt and what it
cannot.'" /d ., at 225-256, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relalions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 391 {1973) (ST~>:WAJ{'l', J., dissenting).
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained au overview
of recent developments in the relationship between the First
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a
companion case had uarrowed the evidence available to a
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be
drawn from the Gertz opinion. since it, like prior First Amendment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record
iudicating that the state of mind of the editor had been
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion. in requiring proof
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor
allCl in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements.17
In sum. contrary to the views of the Court of Appeals,
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a
media defendant in a libel case is not only not required,
authorized or presaged by our prior cases. but would tend to
frustrate the expectations evidenced by the prior opinions of
this C'ourt.

III
It is nevertheless urged by respondents thBt the balance
struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide
further protections for the press when sued for circulating
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the abandonment, modification, or refinement of existing constitutional
17 Two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), there
was likewise no indication that the plaintiff is ::;ubject to ::;ubstantial e':idrntiary re~:~trictiom; m proYmg the defendant'::; fault. As M11 ..JusTICE
PowELL and MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWAH'r ::;tated in concurrence, the answer to
thi::; question of culpability " clrprnds upon a carrful consideratiOn of all the
relevant evidence concerning Time'::; actions priol' to the publication of the
' mlle~:~tones' article." They suggcstrd that on remand all the eYidence of
record ~;hould be ron::;idered , which included evidence goirg to thr beliefs
Qf Ttmr '~ editorial ::;taff. See id , at 467, and 'I. fi .
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interpretation, and remarkable developments in First Amendment jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions.
But the proponents of innovation bear the burden of persuasion, and they have not carried it in this case.
The Court has recently reiterated its conviction, reflected
in the law of defamation in ail of the States, that the individual's interest in his reputation is of basic concern and has
exhibited its reluctance to interfere with state efforts to
vindicate that interest. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S.
448, 455-457 (1976). Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S., at
348- 349. Here the case for placing beyond reach direct
evidence of knowing or reckless falsehood, elements critical to
plaintiffs such as Herbert, is by no means clear and convincing.
ln the first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privilege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial
interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff such as
Herbert to prove his case. As respondents would have it,
the defemlant's reckless disregard of the truth, a critical
element, could not be shown by direct evidence through
inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclus;ons of the
publisher but could be proved only by objective evidence from
whirh the ultimate fact could be inferred. It may be that
plaintiffs will rarely be successful in proving awareness of
falsehood from the mouth of the defendant h{mself, but the
relevance of answers to such inquiries, which the District
Comt recognized and the Court of Appeals did not deny, can
hardly be doubted. To erect au impenetrable barrier to the
plaint;ff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a
matter of some substance, particularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their good-faith belief in the truth
of their publications, 18 and libel plaintiffs are required to prove
See, e. g., the rasPs collected Ill n. 15, s·upra. in which media defendand court~ uphPid, the right to present this type of evidence
at tnalm orrler to establish good faith and lack of :nalice.
t"

ant~ a~;;"rted,

77- 1105-0PINI.ON
HERBERT v. LANDO

knowing or reckless falsehood with "convincing cla;rity." New'
York Tinws v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at285-286.
Furthermore, the outer boundaries of the editorial privilege
now urged are difficult to perceive. The opinions below did
not state, and responde11ts do not explain. precisely when the
editorial process begins and when it ends. Moreover. although
we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as
to what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his
interviews. as opposed to what he "believed," it is not at all
clear why the suggested editorial privilege would not cover
knowledge as well as belief about the veracity of published
reports. 1 " It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted
by respondents would immunize from inquiry the internal
communications occurring during the editorial process and
thus place beyond reach what the defendant participants
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues a.re to
be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made
to third parties not participating in the editorial process also
be immune from inquiry? We thus have little doubt that
Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important interests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted
privilege.
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial
conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the veracity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable
It waR also ·· ugge~ted at oral argument that 1he privilege would cover
questions in the '' why" form . but not of the " who, " " what," "when," and
" where" type. Tr. of Oral Arg., a1 32-34. But it is evident from Lando's
depo~ition that quest ions soliciting "why" answers relating to the editorial
prores;: wpre anHwerrd, e. g., Tr. of Deposition 21, L. 7; 1892, L. 18, and
tha t he refu:;ed to answer other:; that did not fall into this rategory, e. g.,
Tr. of Deposition 666, L. 20; 774, L. 5 ; 877 L. 12; 880, L . 5; 1488, L. 3;
1893, L. 11 ; sf'e Tr. of Oral Arg., at 46.
10
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chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decisionmaking. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely those that our cases have
held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment
credentials.
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the C'.JOurt
in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is
present in order to eliminate the risk of self-censorship and
the suppression of truthful material. Those who publish
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, however, are subJeCt to liability. the aim being not ouly to compensate for injury but also to deter publication of Ullprotected
material threatening injury to individual reputation. Permitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publica.tion
of erroneous information known to be false or probably false,
this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press.
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the
suppression not only of information known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful information, the
.issue would be quite different. But as we have said, our cases
necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial process
to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and
if .indirect proof of th1s element does not stifie truthful publication and IS consistent with the First Amendment, as
respondents seem to concede. we do not understand how direct
inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substan-

I

._;
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tially more suspect. 20 Perhaps such examination will lead to
liability that would not have been found without it, but this
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors,
which affords the opportuuity to refute inferences that might
otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all,
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisiomnaker.
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory
reports about the plaintiff, oue of which is false and damaging,
and only the false oue is published. In resolving the issue
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false,
it is only common sense to believe that inquiry from the
publisher, with an opportuuity to explain, will contribute to
accuracy. If the publication is false but there is an exonerating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this
effect. 21 Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire
before trial'? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no
forbidden self-censorship will result from permitting the relevant inquiry. Only k1:owing or reckless error will be discouraged; and mlless there is to be an absolute First Amendment
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be
threatened.
It is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and
editors will be dampened and sound editorial ·judgment en~
"" Thr kind of qur~tion r<.>~pondrnts ~ePk to avoid an~wrrmg is, by thE>ir
own ndrru~~ion, the rasiest to answ<.>r. SrP Tr . of Oral Arg., at 31:
•· ·[T]hey are l:'et-up que,hons for our ~Ide. . . . [T]he::;t> are not difhcult que::;twns to answer. ·•
"' Often it i ~ the librl defendant who fir::;t pre~ents at trial direct evidence
abo u1 the editorial procP s in order to rstabli::;h good faith and lack of
malice. That wa8 true m Nell' York Times v. Sullivan, sPP, e. g., Record
· 7.6.:2, m1d m many of tbP ca::w;; <'Ited in n . 15, supm .
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dangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. ~ We do not doubt the
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or
not there is liability for the injury. the press has an obvious
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to
liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions. such as
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly, we find
it difficult to believe that error-a voiding procedures will be
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpable error and because the editorial process will itself be
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process
are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunderstanding that they should be immune from examination in
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The
evidentiary burden Herbert must carry is substantial indeed,
and we are unconvinced that his chances of winning an
undeserved verdict are such that an inquiry into what Lando
learned or said during editorial process must be foreclosed.
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges
have ro constitutional protection from casual inquiry. There
is 110 law that subjects the editorial process to private or
official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve
some general end such as the public interest; and if there
were, it would not survive constitutioual scrutiny as the First
2

2

~ They invoke c ur obseryation m Unit ed .States v. Nzxon, 4l!l U. S.
f-i83 , 705 (1974): "Those who expect pubhc dil:'oemination of their remarks
may well temprr candor with a concern for appearance and for their own
intere::-tH to the dctriml;'nt of the derioJcmmaking proceQ~ ."
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Ameuument is presently construeu. No such problem exists
here, however, where there is a specific claim of injury arising
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or
recklessly false.
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are uot favoreu,n and
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances. The President, for example. does not have an
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. NixCYII, 418 U. S.
683 (1974). In so holding, we found that although the
President has a powerful interest in confidentiality of communications between himself allCI his advisers. that interest
must yield to a demo11strated specific need for evidence. As
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against
disclosure. " [ w j hatever their origins, these exceptions to the
demand for every man 's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed. for they are in uerogation of the search
for truth." !d., at 710.
With these considerations in mind. we concluue that the
present construction of the First Amendment should not be
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the
respoudents now urge.

IV
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the
press, is an anciellt phenomenon. it is true that our cases from
X ew York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the
profile of such cases. In years gone by. plaintiffs made out a
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth
~" SPl' Elki?t8 v. United States, :~04 LT. S. 20fi, 2:H (J\Jf\0) (Frankfmtr1·,
,J): '·Limitntiom; are proprrl~ · pht<'l'd upon 1hP O]Wml ion of t lm; grncral
principll- I of no tPHtimonial pri,·i!Pgel on!~· to tlw vrr~· limited cxtrnt that
pcrmtttmg a refu~al to te;,;tit\ or (•xclndmg rPIPnlllt rvideneP ha:< a puulie
good t ran::H·rudinp; thP norma II~· pr!'dominnnt priJl(·iplr of utiliziug all
ra t10nal UH':tn~ for astC'rtainin!!: truth. " 8<·P al~o R .1. ''' tgmor<', Eviden<'c
§ 2192 (:YfeXaughtoJJ reY . 19(il) ; 4 Th<• Work~ of .)Nrmy lkuthnm :32J
'{J. Bowring Pd . 1843) •

.,
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and privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege
or to prove exemplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is
now considerably expanded. In every or almost every case,
the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on
the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now
resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it
is to perform its task," 4 which is indispensable in a system
such as ours.
Creating a coustitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry
into the editorial process, however, would not cure this problem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability
from defamation would effect this result. and the Court has
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the
First A1pendment. Furthermore, mushrooming litigation
costs, much of it due to pre-trial discovery, are not peculiar
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery,
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. 2 " But
~~It iH urged that the large costs of defending lawsuits will intimidate
the pres:; and lead to self-cen8orship, particularly where smaller new::>papers
nnd hroadca::>ters are 'involved. It i~ noted that Lando's deposition alone
continued intermittently for over a yrar, filled 26 volume::> containing
nearly :3,000 pages and 240 Pxhibits. As well a:; out-of-pocket cxpent>es
of thr deposition, there were ,;ubstantial lrgal frrs, and Lando and his
associate;; werr diverted from news gat bering and re1x>rtmg for a significant
amount of timr.
2 5 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 U. S. 72:3, 740-741
(1975) ; ACF lndust1·ies, luc. v. EEOC, U. S. (1979) (PowELL,
S'l'gWAR1' nne! HEHNQUIWr , .1.1., di::>senting from drnial of certiorari);
Burgrr : Agenda for 2000 A. D. : A Need for Sy::>tematic Anticipation, The
l'ound ConferencP, 70 F . .R. D . 7o, 9.5-96 ( 197ti) . The Committee on
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until and unless there are major changes in the present rules
of civil procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and
in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse.
The Court has more than once declared that the depositiondiscovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the
litigants in civil trials. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507
( 1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis
added.) To this end, the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be
firmly applied, and the district courts should not neglect their
power to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection
for] a party or person from rumoyance, embarrassment, oppres.:
sion, or undue burden or expense . . . . " Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
26 (c). With this authority at hand, judges should not
hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery
process.
Whether, as a nonconstitutioual matter, however, the trial
judge properly applied the rules of discovery was not within
the boundaries of the question certified under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) and accordingly is not before us. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.

Rules of Practice and Procedurr of thP .I udicial ConferencP of tht> Umted
States ha propost>d amPndment~ to the Federal Hules of Civil Procedure
designed to ameliorate this problPm. PrPlimina ry Draft of Propo:sed
Amendments to the Federal Rule:; of C'n:il Procednre (1978) .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STAT~

No. 77- llOS
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner,] On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United Sta.t es Court of ApBarry Lando et al.
peals for the Second Circuit.
[February -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither
the Federal nor a State Government may make any law
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " The
question here is whether those Amendments should be construed to provide further protection for the press when sued
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More
specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging
falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation,
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial proc"
esses of those responsible for the publication, even though
the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a
critical element of his cause of action.

I
Petitioner. Anthony Herbert, is a retired Army officer who
had extended wa.r-timf' service in Vietnam and who received
widespread media attention in 1969- 1970 when he accused his
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other
war crimes. Three years la.ter. on February 4, 1973, respondent Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc. (CBS), broadcast a
report ou petitioner and his accusations. The program was
produced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was
nan·ated by respondent Mike Wallace.. Lando later published

•'
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a related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then
sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defam&.tion in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as
a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to
excuse his relief from command, and requested substantial
damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences.
Although his cause of action arose under New York State
defamation law, Herbert conceded that because he was a
"public figure " the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to
"public figures" by Curt·is Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S,
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent knowing fa.lsehood, liability requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is,
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable
falsity ," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 5
(1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."
Bt. A·m ant v. Thompson, supra, at 732.
In preparing to prove his case in light of these requirements, Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response
was refused on the ground that the First Amendment protected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who
Criminal libel pro~ecutions are ~ubjert to the same constitutional linutations. Garrison v Louisiana, 375 U.S. ()4 {1964) .
1

'•
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edit, produce or publish, a.nd into the editorial process. 2
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b), which
permits discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," the District
Court ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of
"central importance" to the case. it was obvious that the
questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to Herbert's
efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to doubt the
veracity of certain of his sources, or, equally significant, to
prefer the veracity of one source over another." 73 F. R. D.
387, 395, 396 (SDNY 1977). The District Court rejected the
claim of constitutional privilege because it found nothing in
the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit or
require it to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected a.nd
unpublished." !d., at 394. The case was then certified for
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S. C.§ 1292 (b), and the
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 3
2

The Circuit Court summarized the objectionable inquirir:s as follows:

'' 1. Lando's conclusiOns during his research and investigation regardingpeople or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with
the 60 Minutes :segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
"2. Lando':; conclusions about facts imparted by interviewers and his
state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons intervit>wed;
"3. The basi:; for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a:
conclusion with respect to prrsons, information or events;
"4. Conver:sations between Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or excluded from the broadca:st publication; and,
" 5. Lando's intentions a:; manift>:sted by the decision to include or ex-·
elude material." Herbert v. Lando, 568 F . 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977).
8 Re:spondents' Petition for Leave to Appeal from an Interlocutory
Order, which was granted, :sta ted the issue on appeal a:; follows:
" What effect should be given to the Fir:st Amendment protection of the
pre;;~ with re;:;l)ect to its t>xerri:se of rd1tonal judgment in pretrial discovery

.7.7-1105-0.PINION

4

HERBERT v. LANDO

A divided panel reversed the District Court, 56~ F. ~d 97~
( CA2 1977). Two judges, writing separate but overlapping
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficientJ
protection to the editorial processes to protect La.ndo from
tnquiry about his thoughts~ 'opii1iolls, and conclusions with
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conversations with his editorial collea.gues. The privilege not to
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978);
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly re..,
verse its judgment.
II
Civil and criminal liability for defamation was well estab~
lished in the common law when the First Amendment was
adopted, and there is no it~dicati~m that the Framers intended
to abolish such liability. Until New York Times the prevail"
ing jurisprudence was that "libelous utterances [are not]
within the area of constitutioilally protected speech . . . . "
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952); see also
Roth v. United StfLtes, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. Neuj Hampshire, 315 U.S. Q.68, 571-572 (194.2 );
Nea1· v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707_:708 (1931). The
accepted view was that neither civil nor criminal liability for
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedoni
of the press, and a majority of' jurisdictions made publishers.
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of
their intent. 1 New York Times and Butts effected major
in a libel ca;;c governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S.
254 ( 19(.14) ?"
4 See, f. g., Re;;tatement. of Torts § 580 (1939); Pedrick, Freedom of
the PrE's;; and the Law of Lihel: The ModE'rn Revised Tran:;lation, 49
Corn. L. Rev. 581, 58:3-584 (1964); Note, Developments in the LawDefamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev . 875, 902-910 (1956) . In Peck v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 214 U. S, 185, 189 (1909) , Mr . .Tu~;ticc Holmes summarized

•
.•
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'Changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions.
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages
awarded.
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the
common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood.
Given the required proof, however, damages liability for
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom
of the press.
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause
of action. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny
made it essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on
the prevailing view of strict liability in the cour~e of reviewing a libel
judgment rendered in a federal diversity of citizen~hip action:
"There was ~orne suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by ·
mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait or was
not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse.
If the publication was libellous the defendant took the risk. A:; was said
of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril.' The King v. W oodfall, Lofft 776, 781. . . . The reason i~ plain. A libel 1s harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to punish
manife;;tly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without othl'r
justificatiOn than ex1sts for an advertisement or a piece of new;;, the
usual princ1plcs of tort will make him liable, if the statements are false
<Jr f.JXfi tnte Q[ someone else."
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be
liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public
:figures must know or suspect that his publication is false. In
other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps/
is essential to recovery. Inevitably. unless liability is to be
completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of
the alleged defamer would be open to examination.
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that a1though
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of
objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be
inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or suspected tha.t their damaging
publication was in error. In Butts, for example, it is evident
from the record that the editorial process had been subjected
to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evidence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had
trenched upon forbidden areas. 0
5 The definition of fault was to be the respon~ibility of state laws.
Ge1·tz
v. Robert Welch, Inc ., 418 U.S. :32:3, 347 (1974).
6 See :388 U. S., at 156-159, when• Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, reviewed the record under the ~tandard ·he preferred to apply to
public figures, and upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. Chief Justice
Warren independently reviewed the record under the "actual malice"
standard of New York Times and also concluded in his concurring opinion
that the verdict should be upheld. 1d., at Hi8-170. The evidence relied
on and ~ummarized in both opinion;; included substantial amottnts of testimony that would fall within the editoria1 process privilege as defined by
reSJJondent~:~. The record before the Court included depositions by the
author of the defamatory article, an individual paid to assist the author
in preparation, the Sports Editor of The Saturda~· Evening Po~t, and both
·its Managing Editor and Editor-in-Chief. The;;e depo;;itions revealed The
Saturday Evening Post's motives in publishing the story (Record 706717), sources (Record 364, 662-664, 719-720, 729), conversation::; among
the editors and author concerning the research and development of the
~ rticl e (Rerord 363-367, 721-737), deci~iom; and rea~ons relating to who

•

•.
77-1105-0PINION
HERBERT v. LANDO

7

Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means
a recent development arising from New York Times and
similar cases. Rather. it is deeply rooted in the common-law
rule, predating the First Amendment, that a showing of
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to
recover punitive or enhanced damages. 7 In Butts, the Court
should be interviewed and what ~hould be investigated (Record 666667, 699-700, 734-736, 772-774), conclu;;ions M;; to the importance and
veracit~· of sources and information pre8ented in the article (Record 720,
732-735. 737, 771-772, 776), and conclusions about the impact that publi;;hing the article would have on the subject (Record 714--716, 770).
Ju;;TICE BHENNAN, writing for himself and Mn . .Tu;;TICE WHrrE, alsa
thought the rvidence of record ;;ufficient to sati;;fy the New York Times
malice standard. It is quite unlikely that the Court would have arrived
at the result it did bad it believed that inquiry into the editorial processes
was con;;titutionally forbidden .
The Court engaged in similar analysis of the record in reversing the
judgments entered in a companion case to Butts, Associated Press v.
Walke1·, 388 U. S., at 158-159; id., at 165 (Warren, C . .J., concurring);
and in Time Y. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 391-394 (1967). In Hill, the record
included the edited drafts of the allegedly libelous article and a examination and cross-examination of the author. Dming that examination, the·
writer explained in detail the preparation of the article, his thoughti:l, conclu;;ions , and belief;; regarding the material, and a line-by-line analysi;; of
the !uiicle with explanation;; of how and why additions and deletions wert:>
madP to the various drafts. As in Butts, the editorial process was the·
focn;; of much of the evidence, and direct inquiry was made into the state
of mind of the media defendants . Yet the Court raised no question as to·
the propriety of the proof.
7 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Tort;;~ 16:-l (1969); Note, Developments
hi the Law-Defamation, supm. at 938; 50 Am . .Tur. 2d Libel and Slander
§ 352 (1970); 50 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 260 (1955).
The Re,;tatement originall~· provided in a >~eparnte section for the award·
of punitiv<' damage~ for maliciou~ defamations. H.e~tatemPnt of Tort:;
~ 1068 (Trnt . Draft 13, 1936) :
" One who is liable for harm to another's r<'putation caused by the pubJicatioll of a libel or slander i::; abo liable for punitive damagt:"S if the
defamatory matter was publi~hed w1th knowledge of its fa.Isity or if it wa8·
l?U;hh~hed in reeklesR .i.uclifferenc<' to it~ truth or fah>ity or solely for the·
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damag(;'s which in
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reckless indifference of culpable llegligence" or "ill will. spite,
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166.
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan. id., at 156-162/ nor Chief Justice
Warren, coucurring, id., at 165-168, raised any question as to
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the
publisher and its responsible agents. 0
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decided, certain
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from
liability for libel unless the publication was made with
malice. 10 Malice was defiued in numerous ways, but in genpurpo~e of cau~ing harm to tllP plaintiff's rt'putatiou or other lPgally protectPd intere::;t."
The provision was later omitted with the rxplanation that recovf'ry of
punitive damages would be determinrd by thr rules in the He::;tatement
w1th respect to damages in geurrHl. Re:;tatrment of Tort:; § 106S (Proposed Final Draft 3, 1937) .
Gertz v. Robert Welch , Inc .. sup'l'a, at 350, limited the entitlement to·
punitive damage::; but such damage;; are still awardable IIJlon a showing of
knowing or reckle:;s fal8ehood .
8 As Mr . .Justice Harlan noted, the jury had been instructrd· in considering punitivr damagel:l to as:;es::; "the reliability, the naturt• of the·
sources of the plaintiff's information , its acceptance or rejection of the
sources. Jt~:> care in chrcking upon assertion~." 31:!8 U.S., at 156 (emphasis
added) . The Jwstice found nothing amiss either with thr in~:>truction or
the result the jury reached under it. MR . .TU~:>'l'ICE BRENNAN, di:;~enting·
in the Butts case, id., at 172-174, analyzed thr in~tructions diffrrently but
ra1srd no que~tion as to the comstitutionality of turning the award of eithrr
compen,;atory or punitive damage~ upon direct a:,; well a,; circum;;tantial
evidence going to the mrntal state of thr defendant.
~ Ser n. (i, supra.
10
See Nalle v. Oyste1', 2:30 U.S. 165, 179-180 (191:3); White v. Nicholls,
;3 How. 266, 286-292 (1845); T. Pluckuett, A Conci~r History of the
Common Law 502 {5th rd. 1956); Hallrn, Charactrr of Brlief NPce::>&'try·
(Qr the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 IlL L. Rev. 865 (1981)_

'
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eral depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with
improper motive.ll This showing in turn hinged upon the
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the
'•

In White v. Nichulls, supra. at 290-291, the Court surveyed the common
law and summarizrd the privilege as follows:
"We have thus taken a virw of the authorities which treat of the doctrines of slander and libel, and have contSidered those authoritietS particularly with reference to the distinction they establish, between ordinary
instances of slander, written and unwritten, and those which have been
styled, privileged communications; the peculiar character of which is said
to exempt thrm from inferences which tlw law has creatrd with respect
to those cases that do not partake of that character. Our t>xamination,
t>xtended a::; it may seem to have bt>rn, has been ca.Jied for by the importancE' of a subject mm;t intimately connected with tht> rights and happiness of individuals, as it is with tht> quiet and good order of society. The
inve:stigation has conducted us to the following conclusions, which we
propound as the law applicable thert>to. 1. That every publication, either
by writing, printing, or pietures, which charges upon or imputes to any
per!:lon that which renders him liable to punishment, or which is calculated to make him infamous, or odious, or ridiculous, is prim.a facie a libel,
nnd implie" malice in tht> nuthor and publio;her towards the person conct>rning whom such publication is made. Proof of malice, tht>refore, in
the casrl:l just <.lt>scribed, can newr be required of the party complaining
b!>yond tht> proof of the publication itself: jm;tification, excuse, or extenuation, if t>Jther can be shown. must procrrd from the defendant. 2. That
the descriptiou of cases recognisrd as privilegt>d communication:;, must be
tmdt>rstood a~ exceptions to this rule, and as being founded upon somr
apparently rt>eognised obligation or motive, legal, moral, or social, which
rnay fairly bt> presumed to havt> led to the publication, and therefore prima
facie rt>lirvc'S it from that just implication from which the general rule of
tlw law ~~ deduc<>d. Thr rule of evidf'nce, u~ t.o !:luch cases, is accordingly
as far chang<>d a~ to impo~e it on the plantiff to remove those presumptions
flowing from the ~t>eming obligations and !:lituations of the parties, and to
rrquire of him to bring homr to the defendant the existence of malice a:;
the true motivP of his conduct. Beyond 1hi~ extent no presumption can
be JH'I'lllJtted to oprrate. m11ch le~s br made to sanctify tlw indulgence of
malice, howPver wicked. howt>ver exprP~~. under tht> protection of legal
formA . Wt> conclude tht>n that malice may be proved, though alleged to
have existt>d in the procredings before n court, or ]pgislative body, or any
[ Footnote 11 -is on p. 10]
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belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or upon
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the
defendant.12
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant
and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance
damages. 13 The rules are a.pplicable to the press and to other
· defendants alike, 11 and it is evident that the courts across
other tribunal or authority, although such court, lE-gislative body, or other
tribunal, may have been the appropriate authority for redressing the
grievance reprP:sPnted to it; and that proof of exprPSS malice in any
written publication, petition, or proceeding, addreo;sed to such tribunal,
will render that publication, petition, or procPeding, libellous in it::; character, and actionable, and will subject the author and publisher thereof
to all the con::;equences of libel."
11 Hallen, supra, at 866-867.
In some juri:sdictions a defendant forfeited his privilege if he published negligently or without probable cause
Lo believe tlw statement was true. lcl., at 867; see White v. Nicholls,
supra, at 291.
12 See, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 455:
"The exi:stencP of actual malice may be shown in many ways. As a
genpral rulP, any competent rvidence, either direct or circumstantial, can
be resorted to, and all thP relevant circumstance;; :mrrounding the transaction may be ::;hown, provided they are not too remote, including threats,
J!rior or subsequrnt drfamations , subsequent statements of the defendant,
circumstances indicating the existrnce of rivalry, ill will, or ho:stility between
the parties, fact;; tending to :show a rrckle:ss disregard of the plaintiff's
right;;, and, in an action against a nPw:spaper, cu;;tom and usage with
respect to the treatment of news lt{'lns of the nature of the one under
consideration. The plaintiff may :slww {hat the defendant had drawn a
pistol at the time he uttered the word;; complained of; that drfPndant had
tried to kiss and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publication; ot· that defPndant had failed to make a proper investigation before
publication of thP statrment in quPstion. On cros;;-examination the
defendant may be questioned ws to his intmt in making the publication."
(Footnotes and citations omitted.)
18 E. g., OdgPr's Libel and Slander *271-*288 (1st AmPr. ed. Bigelow
'1S84; 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 455; 53 C . .T. S. § 213.
H Cf. Odgd~ Libel and Slander 239 (1st Amer, Pd. Bigelow 1884);
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the country have long been accepting evidence going to the
editorial processes of the media without encountering con·
stitutional objections. 1 5
F. Holt, The Law of Libel 57 (1st Amer. ed. 1818); Billft v. Times-

Democratic Pub. Co., 107 La. 75,32 So. i7 (1902) .
In scores of libel case::; courts have addre;;::;pd the gmeral is::;ue of the
admissibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial process
privilege as::;erted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of
the evidence on bel}alf of libel plaintiffs. See, e. g., Johmon Pub. Co. v .
.Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960) (Editor may be cros::;~examined
on meaning intended to be conveyed by pa::;::;ages in magazine article);
Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P. 687 (1950) (malice may be
estctblished by direct. proof of the state of mind of a per::;on, or by evidence
from which its existence may be inferred); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181
Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (all relevant circurn.;,1:ances concerning publication admissible); Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931)
(all relevant. evidence including direct evidence on state of mind or surrounding circum::;1ances-city editor and reporter called to ::;tand and ·questioned
exten::;ively a~ to motives, circumstances of publication, and general practires); Rire v. Simmons, 2 Har. 309, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (Del. 1837) (when~
queHtion of muli0e in issue, declaratione of publisher at the time of publica"
bon adm1:s:sible as purt of the res gestae); Westem Union Telegraph Co. v.
Vickers. 71 Ga. App. 204, :30 S. E. 2d 440 (1944) (all relevant Pvidence
admis::;ible, including direct. evidence of stute of mind and surrounding circumstance,;); Cook v. East 8hore Neu•s papers, 327111. App. 559, 64 N. E. 2d
751 (1945) (all relevant evidmce concerning circumstances of publications
admis::;ible, including te::;timony by reporters and employee::; of defendant);
Berger v. Freeman Tribune Co., 132 Iowa 290, 109 N. W. 784 (1906) (all
relevant evidence); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Mass. 176, 181
N. E. 249 (1932) (only 'evidence on &iatc of mind of tho::;e agents of defendant entrusted with determining what shall be published is admi8sible and
material) ; Conroy v. Fall Rive?' Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E.
2d 729 (1940) (any relevant evidence on defendant's malice); Cyrowski v.
Polish American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N . W. 58 (1917) (testimony
of inchviduah; who advised reporter to question plaintiff before publishing
defamatory article wa::; ndmissible on the i::;sue of malicl'); F1'iedell v.
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925) (any relevant
evidence ad missible) ; Cook v. Globe Printing Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W.
3:32 (1910) (evidence showing that defendant's editorial manager knew an
importnnt fact to be false udmi~iblc on queHtion of malice); B·utler v.
GarZ.ettP ru., 119 App . Div. 767, 104 N .. Y .. S. 6:-~7 (1907) (any evidencGl'
15
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In the face of this history, old and new, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases
had announced unequivocal protection for the editorial procadmis:sible to prove artual malice of defendant); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C.
377 (1851) (expre;;;.; malice may be proved either
direct evidence or
surrounding circumstances); MrBurney v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R. I.
331, 175 A. 2d 170 (1961) (rPlevant evidPnce admissible to rebut testimony
by reporters and editor::; tha.t thPy publi:shed without malice); Lancour v.
Hemld & Globe Ass11., 112 Vt. 471,28 A. 2d 396 (1942) (any relevant evidence on malice); Pan·ar v. Tribune Pub. Co .. 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash.
1961) (all circumstances surroundmg publication relevant and admissible).
Similarly, the courts have uniformly admitted ;,:urh evidence on behalf of
the defrndant. Sre, e. g., Bohan v. Record Pub. Co., 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P.
634 (1905) (testimon~· on good faith); Hearne v. De Youny, 119 Cal. 670,
52 P. 150 (1898) (tr:;timony on sources, precautions taken, and good
faith); Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 203 Iowa 1095, 212 N. W. 557 (1927)
(te:;timony of reporter and editor on good faith admissible); Snyder v.
Tribune Co., 161 Iowa 671, 14a N. W. 519 (1913) (testimony as to :source
of information and good faith of reporter admissible); Courier Joumal
Co. v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (testimony of reporter
on good faith); Conner v. Standard Pub. Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596
(1903) (testimony as to source of information); Davis v. Marxhausen, 103
1\llch. 315, 61 N . W. 504 (1894) (testimony on good faith and proper
precautions taken before publishing); Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo. 35,
l07 S. W. 496 (1907) (testimony on thoughts and intention:; at the time
of publication admi:s:sible); Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. 215
(1904) (testimony as to motive, good faith, and sourct>s); Las Vegas Sun,
Inc . v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P . 2d 867 (1958) (testimony of publi:sher on good fmth); Lindsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N. J. Misc.
1275, 163 A. 245 (1935) (te:;timony on good faith); Kahn v. P&D Co., 169
App. Div. 580, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (source); Hains v. New York
Eveniug Journal, 204 N. Y. S. 734 (1930) (source); Goodro·w v. Malou.e
Telegram, 235 App. Div. 3, 255 N. Y. S. 812 (1932) (reporter's testimony
as to source); Goodrow v. Press Co .. 233 App. Div. 41, 251 N.Y. S. 364
(1931) (defendant can testify and introduce evidence on his good faith at
time of publication); Kehoe v. New York Tribune, 229 App. Div. 220, 241
N. Y. S. 676 (1930) (testimony on good fmth admis:;ible to prevent impo:;Jtwn of punitive damage::;); Varvaro v. American Agricu!turist, 222 App.
D1v. 213, 225 N. Y. S. 564 (1927) (defendant may te;;tify and introduce
ev1dencr on lack of malice) ; Van Arsdale v. T11ne, /rt{)., 35 N . Y. 8. 2d
!;)51,. aff'ci, 265 App . Dtv. 919, 39 N. Y S. 2d 41:3 (1942); Weirhbrodt v.

uy

I

'
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94
( 1973), we invalidated state efforts to pre-empt editorial
decision by requiring the publication of specified material.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement
that a television network air paid political advertisements and
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System, sought
to control in advance the content of the publication. they
were deemed as invalid as were prior efforts to enjoin publication of specified materials. 10 But holdings that neither the
tate nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest
that the editorial process is immune from any mqmry
whatsoever.
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia
Broadcasting System or in TornilLo silently effected a substantial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v.
New York Evening Joumal , 11 " . Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant
may te::;tify as to good faith and probable cause); Cleveland Leader
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (testimony on good faith); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P.
1079 (1914) (defendant's testimony as to lack of malice and source of
information); Times Pub. Co . v. Ray, 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (te::;timony as to lack of malice); Pfister v.
Milwaukee Free Press Co., 139 Wis . 627, 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony
as to absence of malice) .
None of these case;; as much as suggested that there were special limits
applicable to tlw press on the d!::;coverability of ::;uch evidence, either
before or during tnal.
16 A::; we stated in 'l'ormllo, '' no 'government agency-local, state, or
federal-can tell a newspa)Jer in advance what it can print and what it
cannot.'" I d. , at 225-256, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. flurna.n Rela:l;ions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 391 (1973) (STHWAI~l', J ., dissenting).
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained an overview
of recent developments in the relationship between the First
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a
companion case had narrowed the evidence a.vailable to a
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be
drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amendment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record
indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion, in requiring proof
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor
and in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements. 17
In sum, contra.ry to the views of the Court of Appeals,
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a
media defendant in a libel case is not only not required,
authorized or presaged by our prior cases, but would tend to
frustra.te the expectations evidenced by the prior opinions of
this Court.
III
It is nevertheless urged by respondents th8t the balance
struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide
further protections for the press when sued for circulating
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the abandonment, modification, or refinement of existing constitutional
17 Two yrars later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), there
was likewise no indication that the plaintiff is subject to ~ubstantial e': idcntiary restrictions in proving the defendant's fault. As Mn. JusTICE
PowELL and Mn. JUS'l'ICE STEWAH'r stated in concurrence, the answer to
this question of culpability "depends upon a careful consideration of all the
relevant evidence concerning Time's actions prior to the publication of the
·milestones' article." They suggested that on remand all the eYidence of
record should be considered, which included evidence goirg to the beliefs
Qf Timr's editorial staff. See id, at 467, and n. !i.
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interpretation, and remarkable developments in First Amendment jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions.
But the proponents of innovation bear the burden of persuasion, and they have not carried it in this case.
The Court has recently reiterated its conviction, reflected
in the law of defamation in all of the States, that the individual's interest in his reputa.tion is of basic concern and has
exhibited its reluctance to interfere with state efforts to
vindicate that interest. 'Pirne, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S.
448, 455-457 (1976). Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S., at
348-349. Here the case for placing beyond reach direct
evidence of knowing or reckless falsehood, elements critical to
plaintiffs such as Herbert, is by no means clear and convincing.
In the first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privilege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial
interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff such as
Herbert to prove his case. As respondents would have it,
tho defendant'p, reckless disregard of the truth, a critical
element, could not be shown by direct evidence through
Inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclus:ons of the
publisher but could be proved only by objective evidence from
wh1rh the ultimate fact could be inferred. It may be that
plaintifi'P will rarely be successful in proving. awareness of
falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself, but the
releva11ce of answers to such inquiries, which the District
Court rC'cognizcd and the Court of Appeals did not deny, can
hardly be doubted. To erect an impenetrable barrier to the
plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a
matter of some substance, particularly when defendallts themselves are prone to assert their good-faith belief in the truth
of their publication s, 18 and libel plaintifi's are required to prove
1 ' ~ee, e. g., thr ra;;es collected m n. 15, supra, in which m edia defendant::; ns:s'rted, a nd court::; uphrld, the right to pre::;ent th1s type of evidence
Ht tnalm order to e::;tablish good fa1th and lack of :nalice.
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knowing or reckless falsehood with "convincing cla:rity." New·
York Ti'Jnes v. Sullivan, 37611. S., at 285-286.
Furthermore, the outer bom1daries of the editorial privilege
now urged are difficult to perceive. The opinions below did
not state, and respondents do not explain, precisely when the
editorial process begins ami when it ends. Moreover. although
we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as
to what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his
interviews. as opposed to what he "believed,'' it is not at all
clear why the suggested editorial privilege would not cover
knowledge as well as belief about the veracity of published
reports. 1 " It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted
by respondents \Vould immunize from inquiry the internal
communications occurring during the editorial process and
thus place beyond reach what the defendant participants
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to
be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made
to third parties not participating in the editorial process also
be immune fron1 inquiry'? We thus have little doubt that
Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important interests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted
privilege.
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial
conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the veracity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable
10 It was also suggeilted at oral argument that the privilege would cover
queiltmm; in the ''why" form, but not of the "who," "what," "when," and
"where" type. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32-34. But it IS evident from Lando's
deposition thnt questionH soliciting "why" an~wers rrlating to thr editorial
prores~; wrre answered, e. g., Tr. of Deposition 21, L. 7; 1892, L. 18, and
that he refused to an;;wer other:,; that did not fall into this category, e. g.,
Tr. of Deposition 666, L. 20; 774 , L. 5 ; 877 L. 12; 880, L. 5; 1488, L.•3;
11:;93, L. ll , see Tr. of Oral Arg., at 4f:i.
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chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decisionmaking. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely those that our cases have
held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment
credentials.
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court
in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is
present in order to eliminate the risk of self-censorship and
the suppression of truthful material. Those who publish
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, however, are subject to liability, the a.im being not only to compensate for injury but also to deter publication of unprotected
material threatening injury to individual reputation. Permitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication
of erroneous infonnation known to be false or probably false,
this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press.
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the
suppression not only of information known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful information, the
issue would be quite different. But as we have said, our cases
necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial process
to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and
if indirect proof of this element does not stifle truthful publication and is consistent with the First Amendment, as
respondents seem to concede. we do not understand how direct
inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substan-

> •

•u
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tially more suspect. 20 Perhaps such examination will lead to
liability that would not have been found without it, but this
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors,
which affords the opportunity to refute inferences that might
otherwise be drawn frorn circumstantial evidence, suggests
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing al'l,
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker.
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory
reports about the plaintiff, one of which is false and damaging,
and only the false one is published. In resolving the issue
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false,
it 1s only common sense to believe that inquiry from the
publisher, with an opportunity to explain, will contribute to
accuracy. If the publication is false but there is an exonerating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this
effect.t 1 Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire
before trial '? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no
forbidden self-censorship will result from permitting the relevant inquiry. Only kr:owing or reckless error will be discouraged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be
threateued.
1t is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and
editors will be dampened and sound editorial judgment en,...
20 The kind of question respondents 10eek to avoid answering is, by their
own admi10siou, the ea10iest to an::;wer. S~P Tr. of Orai Arg., at 31:
'' ·[TJhey are l:iet-up que3hons for our 101de. . . . [TJhese are not difhcult questions to answer. "
21 Often it il:i the libel defendant who firl:it prel:ients at trial d1rect evidence
about the editorial proce l:i m order to el:itablil:ih good faith and lack of
mahce. That wal:i true in New York Times v. Sullivan, l:iee, e. g., Record
7.!i2, and 111 many of tbe (•ase~:> c1ted i:n n. 15, supra .
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dangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 22 We do not doubt the
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or
not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to
liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly, we find
it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpable error and because the editorial process will itself be
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process
are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunderstanding that they should be immune from examination in
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The
evidentiary burden Herbert must carry is substantial indeed,
and we are unconvinced that his cha.uces of winning an
undeserved verdict are such that an inquiry into what Lando
learned or said during editorial process must be foreclosed.
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges
have ro constitutional protection from casual inquiry. There
is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or.
official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve
some general end such as the public interest; and if there
were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First
22

They invoke our observation in Umted .States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
68:1, 705 (1974) : "Those who expect public dissemination of their remarks
may well temper candor with a concern for appearance and for their own
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking proce::;::;."
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Amendment is presently construed. No such problem exists
here, however, where there is a specific claim of injury arising
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or
recklessly false .
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored/ 3 and
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances. The President, for example, does not have an
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974). In so holuing, we found that although the
President has a powerful interest in confidentiality of communications between himself anu his advisers, that interest
must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence. As
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against
disclosure, " [ w] hatever their origins, these exceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed. for they -are in derogation of the search
for truth. " !d., at 710.
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the
present construction of the First Amendment should not be
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the
respondents now urge.

IV
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the
press, is an ancient phenomenon. it is true that our cases from
New York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the
profile of such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth
~a See Elkins v. United States , :3ti4 F. S. 206, 2:{4 ( 1960) (Frankfurter,
.J.). '·Limitation8 are properly placed upon the opPrahon of th1s general
principlr I of no trstimonial privilege] on!~· to thr ver~· limited extrnt that

perm1ttmg a rcfu;;al to t~tif~· or excluding relevant c•videnre ha~ a public
good t ran~eending tlw normal!~ · prPdominant prineiplr of utilizing all
ratwual mPan~ for aJScertaining truth. " Ser al~o R .J . Wigmorr, Evidrnre
§ 2HJ2 (:\-Ir?\aughton reY . 1961) ; 4 The Work~ of JNemy Hrutham 321
( J, Bowring ed. 1 43) •

..
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a.nd privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege
or to prove exemplary dama.ges. The plaintiff's burden is
now considerably expanded. In every or almost every case,
the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on
the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now
resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it
is to perform its task, 24 which is indispensable in a system
such as ours.
Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry
into the editorial process. however, would not cure this problem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability
from defamation would effect this result, and the Court has
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the
First Arpendment. Furthermore, ( mushrooming litigation
costs, much of it due to pre-trial discovery, are not peculiar
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery,
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. 25 But
It is urged that the large costs of defending lawsuits will intimidate
the press and lead to self-censor:ship, particularly where smaller newspapers
u.nd broadcasters are ·involved . It is no1ed that Lando's deposition alone
continued intermittently for over a year, filled 26 volumes containing
nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits. As well as out-of-pocket expenses
of the deposition, there were substantial legal fees, and Lando and his
associates were diverted from news gathering and reporting for a significant
amount of time.
2 b Blue Chip ~tamps v. Manor Dr·ug Stores. 421 U. S. 72:3, 740-741
(1975); ACF lndu.stries, Inc. 1' . EEOC, U. S. (1979) (PowELL,
S•rEWAR1' and REHNQUIS'f, .JJ., di:s:senting from denial of certiorari);
Burger: Agenda. for 2000 A. D.: A Need for Systematic Anticipation, The
Pound Conference, 70 F . R. D. 76, 95-96 (1976). The Committee on
21
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until and unless there are major changes in the present rules
of civil procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and
in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse.
The Court has more than once declared that the depositiondiscovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately infonning the
litigants in civil trials. Schlaqenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507
(1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis
added.) To this end, the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be
firmly applied, and the district courts should not neglect their
power to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection
for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres.:
sion, or undue burden or expense. . . ." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
26 (c). With this authority at hand, judges should not
hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery
process.
Whether, as a nonconstitutional matter, however, the trial
judge properly applied the rules of discovery was not within
the boundaries of the question certified under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) and accordingly is not before us.. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed ..
So ordered.

Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the Unitf'd
States has proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
designed to ameliorate this problem. Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil .Procf'dure (1978),
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MR. J usTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
Respondents are representatives of the news media. They
are defendants in a libe1 action brought by petitioner, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert (U. S. Army, Ret.) , who is
concededly a public figure. Respondents asserted in District
Court an "editorial privilege" to shield from discovery information that would reveal decisions involved in their editorial
processes. The District Court rejected this privilege, holding
that, because of his difficult burden of proof, "a ·'public figure'
plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to liberal interpretation of the rules concerning pre-trial discovery." App.
to Petition , at 62a.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It grouped the discovery
inquiries objected to by respondents into five categories:
" 1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads to 'be pursued, or
not to be pursued , in connection with the '60 Minutes' segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
"2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the
veracity of persons interviewed;
"3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that
he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of
persons, information or events;
"4. Conversations between Lando and Walla.ce about
matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast
publication; and
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"5. Lanuo's intentions liS manifested by his decision to
include or exclude certain material." 568 F. 2d 974,
983 (CA2 1977) (Kaufman, C. J.).
The Court of Appeals stateu that "the issue presented by this
ease is whether. and to what extent, inquiry into the editorial
process, conducted during discovery in a New York Times v.
Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the work
of reporters and broadcasters." Id., at 979. The Court of
Appea.Is concluded :
" If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journal1St formulated his judgments on what to print or not to
print, we would be condoning judicial review of the
editor's thought processes. Such an inquiry, which on
its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a
freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the news·
room." !d., at 980.
The Court of Appeals held that all five categories of information
sought by petitioner were shielded by an editorial privilege.
The holding of the Court of Appeals presents a novel and
difficult question of ]a w. Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that "Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) · The instant case is brought under diversity'
JUrisdiction, 28 U. S. C. "§ 1332 (a), and Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence states that "in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness [or] per&on .. . shall be determined in
accordance with State law." Although New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), placed constitutional limits
on state libel claims, it did not itself create a federal cause of
action for libel. The "rule of decision" in this case, therefore,
ls defined by state law. There is no contention, however, that
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applicable state law encompasses an editorial privilege. Thus
if we were to create and apply such a privilege, it would have
to be constitutionally grounded, as, for example, is executive
privilege, see United Stales v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), or
the privilege against self-incrimination. See McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
This case must be approached from the premise that pretrial discovery is normally to be "accorded a broad and liberal
treatment,'' Hickma.n v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947),
and that judicial creation of evidentiary privi.leges is generally
to be discouraged. We have in the past, however, recognized
evidentiary privileges in order to protect "interests and relationships which ... are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts
needed in the administration of justice." McCormick, Evidence 156 (Clea.rly, ed. 1972). For example, Hickrnan v.
Taylor, supra, created a qualified privilege for attorneys' work
products because, without such a privilege, tl[t]he effect on
the legal profession would be demoralizing." Id., at 511.
Similarly, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957),
recognized a· qualified "informer's privilege" for "the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement." !d., at 59.
The inquiry to be pursued, therefore, is whether the creation of an editorial privilege would so further the purposes
and goals of the constitutional scheme as embodied in the
First Amendment, as to justify "some incidental sacrifice" of
evidentiary material. This inquiry peed not reach an inflexible result: the justifications for an editorial privilege may
well support only a qualified privilege which, in appropriate
instances, must yield to the requirements of "the administra~
tion of justice."'

I
Justice Brandeis reminded us over a half century ago that
'Those who won our independence • . . valued liberty botO.
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as an end and as a means." 1 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357, 375 ( 1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In its instrumental aspect, the First Amendment serves to foster -the
values of democratic self-government. This is true in several
senses. The First Amendment bars the State from imposing
upon its citizens an authoritative vision of truth. 2 It "forbids
1 Freedom of speech is itl>elf an end because the human community is
in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is then•fore
intrinsic t.o individual dignity. This is particula.rly so in a democracy
like our own, m which the autonomy of each. individual is accorded equal
and incommensurate respect . As the Court stated in Cohen v. California,
403 u. s. 15, 25 (1971) :
"The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended -to
remove governmental re:;tra.ints from the arena. of public discussion, putting the deci~:~;on as t.o what. vit>ws shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizt>DI'Y and more perfect polity and in the belief
t.hat no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system re;,-ts."
Re ~ pondt>nts properly do not rest their argmnents for an editorial privilege on the value of individual self-expression. So grounded, an ~di
torial privilege might not. stop short of shielding all speech.
~As Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., stated in 1946:
''The F1rst, Amendm!:'nt prot!:'cts . .. a social interest in the attainment
of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of
action but carry it out in the wisest way. . . . Truth can be sifted out
from falsehood only if the government ii:i vigorou~Sly and constantly crossexamined . . .." Z. Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (19i16).
Justice Holmes gave thh; social value a broader and more theoretical
lormuhttion :
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you l1ave no doubt of your premises or your power a.nd want
a rertain rrsult with all your heart you naturally express your wi~Shes in
1a"· and sw<rep away all opposition. . . . But. when men have realized
t.hat timP bas np~:>-et. many fighting faiths, they ma.y come to believe even
'll10l't> than they belit>ve the very foundations of th!:'ir own conduct that
th!:' ultimate good desired is better reaeht>d by free trade in ideas-that
thr best test of truth it> the power of thought to get itself accepted in the
l()()mpetition of the market , and that truth is the only ground upon which
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the State from interfering with the communicative processes
through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise
their rights of self-government. 8 And the Amendment shields
those who would censure the State or expose its abuses."'
their wishes safely can be carried out. That a.t any rate is the theory of
our Constitution. It. is an, experiment, as all life is an experiment . . . .
While that exprriment is pan of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant. against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with dea.t.h, unless they so imminently t hre1tten immediate interference with the lawful and pres&1ng purpot;es of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."
.Abm11'!.3 v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J .,
dissentmg) .
See Red Lion Broadcl18ting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
8 "Just ~o far as, at. any point, the citizens who are to decide a.n issue
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief
or criticJ,;m which i:s relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be
ill-con::::idered, ill-balanct'd planning for the general good. It is that mutilatiO'fl of the thinking process of the community against which the First
.Amendment to the rort.Stitution is directed. The principle of the freedom
of spet•ch springs from the necessities of the program of tit'lf-government.
It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduc~
lion from the ba.:-;ic American agreement tha.t public issues shall be d~
cidE>d by universal suffrage." A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The
Com..tit.uhonaJ Power~ of t.he People 27 (1965).
See Virginia Pharmacy Board"· Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748,
765 (1976) , Brennan, The Supreme Court and tht1 Meiklejohn Interpret a tiOn of t1HI First Ami>ndment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (196:5) .
4 See Bla::;i, The Checking Value of the First Amendment, 1977 Am.
Bar. Fouud. Res. ,J. 521. Lord Erskine, while defending Thomas Paine ·in
l1is trial for srditious libel, offered a compact and eloquent statement of
t his pORJtion :
''Gentlemen, I have in::;isted, at great length, upon the origin of government~, and detmled the authorities which you have heard upon the subiPct , because I consider it to be not only an essential support, but the
very Joundat10n of the liberty of the press . If Mr. Burke be right in his
prmc1pleH of government, I admit that the press, in my sense of its fr~
dam, ough1 not to be free , nor free m any sense at all; and that all
addresses to the people upon the subjects of government, and all specula.
tions of amendment , of what kind or nature soever, are illegal and crimi·
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These various senses can sometimes weave together, as can be
seen in the letter of 1774 addressed by the First Continental
Congress ~o the inhabitants of Quebec, listing the rights "a
profligate [English] Ministry are now striving, by force of
arms, to ravish from us":
"The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom
of the press. .The importance of this consists, besides
the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promo~
tion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers
nal; since if the people have, without possible re-call, delegated all their
authorities, they have no jurisdiction to act, and therefore none to think
or wnte upon such ~ubjects; and it would be a 1ibel to arraign government or any of its acts, before those who have no jurisdiction to correct them . But on the oth~'r hand . . . no legal argument can shake
the freedom of the press in my sense of it, if I am supported in my doctrine:> concerning the great unalienable right of the people to reform or to
change their governments. It is because the liberty of the press resolves
itself into this great i:;sue, that it has been in every country the last
liberty which subject~:~ have been able to wrest from power. Other liberties are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps government~ them:;rlves in due ~ubjection to their duties." Speeches of Lord
Erskine 524-525 (J. High, ed. 1876).
Thb position i~ often predicated upon a natural adversity between the
government and the press. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 80--88
(1975) . In Mills v. Alabama, "384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966), for example,
we stated :
" [T]he pre:ss serves and was de:>igned to serve as a. powerful antidote to
any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping official:; elected by the people responsible to all
the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right
of the pres~ to prmse or critJCize governmental agents and to clamor and
contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the
Framer::; of our Constitntion thoughtfully and deliberately selected' t01
lmpt:ow Ql;lr :societ~: an<:!, E:eep i.t fr.ee·, .

.•.
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are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and
just modes of conducting affairs." 5
Although the various senses in which the First Amendment
serves democratic values will in different contexts demand
distinct emphasis and development, they share the common
characteristic of being instrumental to the attainment of social
ends. It is a great mistake to understand this aspect of the
First Amendment solely though the filter of individual rights. 0
This is the meaning of our cases permitting a litigant to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute as overbroad under
the First Amendment if the statute "prohibits privileged
exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record
discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct.'' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. 432 (1963). Our
reasoning is that First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society," id.,
at 433, and that a litigant should therefore be given standing
to assert this more general social interest in the "vindication
of freedom of expression." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S.
479, 487 (1965). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88,
97-98 ( 1940). It is also the mea.ning of the "actual malice"
standard set forth in New York 'Pimes Co. v. Sullivan, supra,
at 279-280. Even though false information may have no
intrinsic First Amendment worth, St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968), a.nd even. though a particular
defendant may have published false information, his freedom
of expression is nevertheless protected in the absence of actual
1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774) .
" II)t i~ useless to define free speech by talk about rights . The agitalor asserts his constitutional right to speak, the government asserts it;;
ronstitutional right to wage war. The result is a deadlock. . . . The true
boundary linf' of the Fir::;t Amf>ndment can be fixed only when Congre;;s
and the court:-; realize that the principle on which speech is classified as
lawful or unlawful involwi> the balancing against each other of two very
'important ;;ocial interf'st:;, in public ~afety and in the search for truth.''~
'Chafee, supra, n. 2, at 31, 35.
5

6
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malice because "to insure the ascertainment and publication
of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First
Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as
true ones." lbid. 1
In recognition of the social values served by the First
Amendment, our decisions have referred to "the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social. political. e·sthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experience." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis supplied), and to "the circulation of information to which the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutio11al guaranties."
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936)
(emphasis supplied). In 'l'irne, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.-s. 374
(1967), we stated that the guarantees of the First Amendment
"are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit
of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures
the maintenance of our political system and an open society."
ld., at 389.
The editorial privilege claimed by respondents must be
carefully analyzed to determine whether its creation would
significantly further these social values recognized by -our
prior decisions. In this anaJysis it is relevant to note that
respondents are representatives of the communications me_dia,
7
In an analogous mannE>r the Court has, over m~' strong protest,
analyzed the exclusionar~ · ruiP a!l permitting a defendant to assert social
interest~ that do not reduce to hi:; personal rights:
''The primary justification for the exclu:;ionary rule then ill the deterrencP of police conduct that violates Fourth AmendmPnt right:;. Po~:~t
Mapp dl'ciNion:; hav(' e::;tablish('d that the rule is not a per~:~onal con:;titutiOnal right. It is not calculat('d to rPdr('~s the injury to th(' privacy of
the victim of tlJP :;earch or seizure, for any '[r-l('paration comes too late.'
£mkletter Y. WaU·er, H81 U . S. 618, 637 (1965) . Instead,
'the rule 1:> a judicially created remedy d('Signt'd to safeguard Fourth
Amendment nghts generally through its deterrent effect . . . .' Unitea
~tates v. Calandra, [414 U: S. 338, 348 (1974)].'' Stone. v Powell, 42iL
465, 484 (1976) .

u. s
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and that the ''press and broadcast media," Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 343 (1974), 8 have played a dominant and essential role in serving the "information function,"
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 705 (1972), protected by
the First Amendment. "The press cases emphasize the special
and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in
informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and
providing a forum for discussion and debate." First National
Bank of Bosto·n v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978).~ "The
newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is
safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the
public and business affairs of the nation than any othe~ instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the
suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free
press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.' 1
Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 250. An editorial
privilege would thus not be personal to respondents, but would
shield the press in its function "as an agent of the public at
large. . . . The press is the necessary representative of the
public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which
effects the public's right." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U. 8. 843, 86~864 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Compare New York Tim es Cu. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964):
'"ln Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575, this Court held the utterances of
a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made 'within the outer
perimeter of his duties.' . . . Analogous considerations support the priviJege fo'r the citizerv-critic of government. It is as much his duty to
rnticize as it is fhe official's duty to administer." (Emphasis supplied.)
~~' Of course, "the press does not have a monopoly on either the First
Amendment or fhe ability to enlighten.'' First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti. supra, at 782. "The information function asserted by representatives of the organized press .. . is also performed by lecturers, political
pollster~:~, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any
author may quite accurately assert that he i::; contributing to the flow of
information to the publir ••.. .."' Bra.uz.burg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, ..705o
8
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Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S: 241
(1974), struck down as undue interference with the · editorial
process a Florida statute granting a political candidate a tight
to equal space to reply to criticisms of his record by a
newspaper,
"Even if a newspaper would iace no additional costs. to
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion
into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than
a passive Feceptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved to this time." !d., at 258.
See Pittsburgh Press Co . v. Human Relations Comm'n,· 413
U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee; 412 U. S. 94, 120, 12~125
(1973) . · Through the editorial process expression is composed ; to regula.te the process is therefore to regulate the
expression. ·The autonomy of the speaker is thereby compromised, whether that speaker is a large urban newspaper or
an individual pamphleteer .. ·The print and broadcast media,
however, because of their large organizational structure, cannot
·exist without some form of editorial process. · ·The.protection
of the editorial process of these institutions thus becorpes a .
matter of particular First Amendment concerh.10
,
''!

----10
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This is not of course to imply that the· editorial ·process of perso~s or·
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There is in this case, however, no direct government regulation of respondents' editorial process. But respondents argue
that disclosure of their editorial process will increase the likelihood of large damage judgments in libel actions and will
thereby discourage participants in that process. 11 Respondents' reasoning is at least superficially consonant with that of
New York 'Pirnes, which stated: "What a State may not
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear
of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the
Alabama courts here ma.y be markedly more inhibiting than
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." 37~ U. 8.,
at 277. Of course New York Times set forth a substantive
sta.ndard defining that speech unprotected by the First Amendment, and respondents' editorial process cannot be shielded
merely so as to block judicial determination of whether respondents have in fact engaged in such speech. Our inquiry,
therefore, becomes the nature and reach of the editorial
process sought to be protected, the independent First Amendment values servt>d by that editorial process, and the extent
to which the exposure of that process would impair these
First Amendment values.
im;tltutions other than the communications media does not merit Fi:rst
Amendment protection.
11 The editorial process could be inhibited in other ways as well.
For
example, public figures might bring harassment suit~; against tht> media
In order to use discovery to uncover aspects of the editorial proce~;s which,
if publicly revealed, would prove embarrassing to the press. In different contexts other First Amt>ndment values might be affected. If sued
by a powerful political figure, for example, journalists might fear reprisals
for information disclosed during discovery. Cf. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Pl'ess v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,- U. S.
App. D . C. - , F. 2d (1978). Such a chilling effect might particularly impact on the press's ability to perform its "checking" function.
See n. 4, supra. In the instant ca~;e, however, petitioner is not such a
public official, nor are respondents claiming to be suffering the effert~:~ of
· ~uch a chill.
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In Tor·nillo we defined the editorial process in a functional
wanuer. as that process whereby the content and format of
publishE>d material is selected. The Co~rt of Appeals belo,\·
identified two aspects of this process. The first concems
"th<-" mental processes of the press regarding 'choice of matrrial' • • • /~ 568 F . 2d. at 995 (Oakes, J .). · This aspect
encompasses a11 editor's subjective "thought processes," his
" thoughts. opillions and conclusions." ld., at 980, 984 (Kaufmau , C. J .). The Court of Appeals concluded that if discovery
wer·e permitted conceming this ·aspect of the editorial process,
journalists ''would. be chilled in the very process of thought.''
ld , at !184,
I find this co11clusion implausible. Since a journalist cannot work without such mternal thought processes, the only
way this aspect of the editorial process can be chilled is by a
journalist ceasing to work altogether. Given the exceedingly
generous standards of J\'eU' York Times, this seems unlikely.
Moreover, .'\rew York 'L'·irnes removed First Ameqdment protection from defamatory falsehood published with actual malicein knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.12 Subsequent
rlecisions have made clear that actual malice turns on a
journalist's "subjective awareness of probable falsity. " Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc ., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6 (1974) . ft
would be anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield from
disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude. There
will be, of course, jourualists at the margin-those who have
some awareness of the probable falsity of their work but not.
euo ugh to constitute actual malice-who might be discouraged
from publication. But this chill emanates chiefly from the'" Elemem ~ of pP1itiorwr'~ complaint appear to ~et forth a claim for
invasion of privacy See 'l'ime, inc. v. Hill, 3R5 U. S. 374 (1967) . The
ea:<e ha ~ comt• to tht.." Co11rt framed a~ a libel act10n, however, and l;:;hitll
':iO COili"ldt'r if.

{
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~Substantive standard of New York Times, 11ot from the absence
of au editorial privilege.
The second aspect of the editorial privilege identified by
the Court of Appeals involves "the free interchange of ideas
within the newsroom,'' 568 F. 2d, at 980 (Kaufman, C. J.),
"the relationship among editors;'' ld., at 993 (Oakes, J.) .
The Court concluded that "'[iJdeas expressed in co11versations,
memoranda, hamlwritten notes a11d the like, if discoverable,
would in the futme 'likely' lead to a more muted, less vigorous
and creative give-and-take in the editorial room." ld., at.
993- 994. "A reporter or editor, aware that his thoughts might
have to be justified itt a court of law. would often be
discouraged aJld dissuaded from the creative verbal testing,
probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which
are the sine qua rum of responsiblP joumalism." I d., at 980
(Kaufman, C J ).
An editorial privilege pwtecti11g this aspect of the editorial
IJrocess would essentially be analogous to the executive privilege which shields the "advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations .. . by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.' ' Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E'. B. Carl
Zeiss, lena., 40 F. R. D. 318, 324 (DC 1966). As our cases
interpreting exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act,
5 H. S. G § 552 (b)( 5), make clear, this privilege would not
protect merely "factual'' material, but only "deliberative or
policymaking processes." EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 89
( 1973). The rationale for this privilege was succinctly stated
ln United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974): "Humau
experience teaches that those who expect public dissemiuation
of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of
the decisioumaking process."
The same rationale applies to respondents' proposed editorial privilege. Just as the possible political consequences
of disclosure might undermine predecisional communication

.
J

77-1105-DISSENT
\

HERBERT v. LANDO

l!.4

within the Executive Branch, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975), so the possibility of future libel
judgments might well dampen full and candid discussion
among editors of proposed publications. Just as impaired
communication "clearly" affects "the quality" of executive
decisionmaking, ibid., so too muted discussion during the
editorial process will affect the quality of result1ng publications. Those editors who have doubts might remain silent;
those who would prefer to follow other investigative leads
might be restrained; those who would otherwise counsel caution might hold their tongues. In short, in the absence of
such an editorial privilege the accuracy, thoroughness, profundity of consequent publica.tions might well be diminished.
Such a diminution would affect First Amendment values.
The AmetH.lment embraces the public's iHterest iu "accurate
and eft'ective reporting by the 'news media." Saxbe v. ·Wasb.inyton Post . Co., 417 U. S. 843, 863 (1974) (PowELL, J.,
dissenting). "Those who won our independence had confidence
in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication
of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth ....•
Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press .. : impairs
those opportunities for public education that are essential to
effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the
processes of popular government." 13 · Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). Respondent is concededly a public
figure; " [o] ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial· interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press
to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in
public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case oi
'public officials.' " Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S.
130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J .. concurring in result). To theextent coverage of such figures· becomes fearful and inhibited,..
1 ~ Were the plaintiff in this cnst• a public official intent upon using discovery to iritimiclate the press, other First Amendment values might welt
be implieated. See n . 10, supra.

j
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to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of
such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by
the First Amendment suffer abridgment.
I find compelling these justifications for the existence of an
editorial privilege. The values at issj.le are sufficiently important to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary
material. The reasoning supporting this privilege is, of course,
essentially varadoxical. For the sake of more accurate information, the possible inaccuracies of the press are shielded from
diselosure; in the name of a more responsible press, the legal
restrai11ts by which it is bound are made more difficult to
apply. The same paradox, however, inheres in the concept of
an executive privilege: so as to enable the government more
effectively to implement the will of the people, the people are
kept in ignorance of the workings of their government. The
paradox is unfortunately intrinsic to our social condition.
Judgment is required to evaluate and balance these competing
perspectives,
Judgment is also required to accommodate the tension
between society's "pervasive and strong interest in preventing
and redressing attacks upon reputation," Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U. R. 75, 86 (1966). and the First Amendment values that
would be served by au editorial privilege. In my view this
tension is too fine to be resolved in the abstract. As is the
case with executive privilege, there must be a more specific
balaucing of the particular interests asserted in a given lawsuit. A general claim of executive privilege, for example, will
not stand against a "demonstrated, specific need for evidence . , .. " United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 713
( 1974). Conversely, a general statement of need will not
prevail over a concrete demonstration of the necessity for
executive secrecy. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 11
(1953). Other evidentiary privileges are similarly dependent
upon the particular exigencies demonstrated in a specific
Tawsu1t. Rovia:ro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957) , for
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example, held that the existence of an informer's privilege
depends "on thf> particular circumstances of each case, taking
into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other
relevant factors." ld., at 62. Hickrna:n v. 'Paylor, 329 U. S.
495 (1947), similarly required ad hoc balancing to determine
the existence of an attorneys' work product privilege.
In my judgment the existence of a privilege protecting the
editorial process must, in an analogous manner, be determined
with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. In
the area of libel, the balance struck by New York 1'irne8
between the values of the ·:First Amendment and society's
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation
must be preserved. This can best be accomplished if the
privilege functions to shield the editorial process from general
claims of damaged reputation. If, however, a public figure
plaintiff is able to establish. to the prima facie satisfaction of
a trial judge, tha.t the publication at issue constitutes defamatory falsehood, 14 the claim of damaged reputation becomes
specific and demonstrable, and the editorial privilege must
yield .1 r- Requiring a public figure plaintiff to make a prima
facie showing of defan1a.tory falsehood will not constitute an
undue burden, since he must eventually demonstrate these
elements as part of his case-in-chief. ~ And since editorial
privilege protects only deliberative and policymaking processes
1

14

Sef' 01'Penbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. B1·esler, 398 U. S. 6

~ W70) .
J:r. I do

not rearh the case in which tt media. defendant has more specific
xnd <"oncrete · interests at Htake. See nn. 10 and 12, sup?'a. Nor do I
rrach the ra:se in which a litigant with more weighty interests than a civil
phunt iff attemptJS to overcome a rlaim of editorial privilege. See, e. g.,
Associated Press v. NLRB. 301 U. S. 103 (1937); Associated Press v.
United 8ta.tes, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) .
10 A plaintiff can make hiEt prima facie showing us part of hh; motion
for an order compelling discovery under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
tivil Procedure, or at any other appropriate time.
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and not factual material, discovery should be adequate to
acquire the relevant evidence of falsehood. A public figure
plaintiff will thus be able to redress attacks on his reputation,
and at the same time the editorial process will be protected in
all but the most necessary cases.

III
Applying these principles to the instant case is most dif.ficult, since the five categories of objectionable discovery
inquiries formulated by the Court of Appeals are general, and
it 1s impossible to determine what specific questions are
emcompassed within each category. It would nevertheless
appear that four of the five categories concern respondents'
mental processes, and thus would not be covered by an
editorial privilege. Only the fourth category-"Conversations
between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or
excluded from the broadcast publication"-would seem to be
protected by a proper editorial privilege. The Court of
Appeals noted, however, that respondents had already made
available to petitioner in discovery "the contents of pretelecast conversations between Lando and Wallace .. . ."'
568 F. 2d. at 982. Whether this constitutes waiver of the·
editorial privilege should be determined in the first instance
by the District Court. I would therefore, like the Court of
Appeals, remand this case to the District Court, but would'
require the District Court to determine (a) whether respondents have waived their editorial privilege; and (b) if not, the
·two per scope and applicatio.n: qi that privilege •
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Anthony Herbert, PetitiOner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApBarry Lando et al.
peals for the Second Circuit.
[February - , 1979]
MR ..JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither
the Federal nor a , 'tate Government may make any law
"abridging the freedom of speech . or of the press ...." The
question here is whether those Amendments should be construed to provide further protection for the press when sued
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More
specifically. we are urged to hold for the first time that when
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging
falsehoods and is sued for in.i ury to the plaintifl"s reputation,
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the e~roc.
esses of those responsible for the publication, even though
the i nquiry would produce eviuence material to the proof of a
critical c1ement of his cause of action .

I
Petitioner, Anthony Herbert. is a retired Army officer who
l1ad extended war-time service in Vietnam and who received
widespread media attention in 1969-1970 when he accused his
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other
war crimes. Three years later. on February 4. 1973, respondeJlt Columbia Broadcasting • ystem. Inc. (CBR). broadcast a
report on petitioner and his accusations. The program was
}Jroduced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was
rmrrated by respondent Mike Wallace. Lando later published
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related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then
sued La.ndo, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defam&.tion in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as
a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to
explain his relief from command. ancl requested substantial
damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences.
Although his cause of action arose under New York State
defamatiou law, Herbert conceded that because he was a
"public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to
"public figures" by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, '388 U. S.
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent knowing falsehood, liability requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that · is,
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publicatio11.'' St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable
falsity,'' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6
(1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."
St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, at 732.
In preparing to prove his case in light of these requirements. Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response
was refused on tlw ground that the First Amendment protected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who
f)

I

1
Criminal libel pro;:;<>ruhon~ :~rr ~ubjrct to tlw :samr con;:;titutJOnal
tation,.:, Garrison \ Louzsiana, ;{(5 F. R. 64 (1964) .

lirni~
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edit, produce or publish, and into the editorial process. 2
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.16 (b2, which
permits discovery of any matter "relevant tOtlie subject
matter involved in the pending action'' if it would either be
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence." the District Court
ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of "central
importance" to the issue of malice in the case, it was obvious ~
that the questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to
Herbrrt's efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to
doubt the veracity of certain of his sources. or. equally significant, to prefer the veracity of on<' source over another.'' 73
F . R. D. 387, 3!J5. 396 (SDXY 1977). The District Court rejected the claim of constitutional privilege because it found
nothing in the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit
or require it to increase thr weight of the injured plaintiff's
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected and
unpublished." !d., at 394. The case was then certified for
an interlocutory appeal under 28 F. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 8

~.The Cu·cmt Court summanzed thr inqumes to which Lando objected
as tollow:,; .
" 1. Lando't> conclusion~ dunng his research and inve,;tigation regarding
peoi1lc or lrad~ to be pur~ued, or not to be pur::med, in connection with
thr 60 Mmutrs sPgmcnt and the Atlantic Monthly article;
"2. Lando's conclu::;ion~ about fact,; impar!Pd by intervit>wees and his
st a tP of mind with rt>spect to t ht> veracity of per~>ons interviewed;
"3. The baHis for conclusions wherP Lando trstifird that hr did rPaeh n
conclu,;ion with rPSJ)t>Ct to prr;;onH, in formation or event~;
"4. Conver~ation;; between Lando and Wallace about matter:; to br ineluded or excluded from the hroadca~t publicatiou; and,
"5. Lnndu'~ intPntions a,; manifPstpd by thP clPcision to include or excludC' material." Herbert Y. Lando, 5()8 F. 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977).
n Rr::;pondrnts' l'etttion for Leave t
AppPHI from an Int rlocutory
Ord('f , which wa~ grantPd, ,;tated thr i"::;ur on appPH us follows :
" What f'(frrt should he giVPn to the Fir;;t Am<'nd.tnPnt protrction of the

-

-----------

l
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A divided panel reversed the District Court. 568 F. 2d 974
(CA2 1977). Two judges, writing separate but overlapping
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient
protection to the editorial processes to protect Lando from
inquiry about his thoughts, opinions, and conclusions with
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conversations with his editorial colleagues. The privilege not to
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued
the First and Fourteenth Atnendments and accordingly reverse its judgnwnt.
IT
Civil and criminal liability for defamation was well established iu the common law when the First Amendment was
adopted, and there is no indication that the Framers intended
to abolish such liability. Until New York 1'irnes the prevailing jurisprudence was that "libelous utterances [are not]
within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . . "
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 ( 1952); see also
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942);
iVear v. Minnesota, 283 U ..... 697, 707-708 (1931). The
accepted view was that ueither civil nor criminal liability for
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedom
of the press, and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of
theit· intent. 1 New York 1'irnes and Butts effected major
prr,.;~ w1th re~pPcl to it:; <'xrrcJSP of ~chtorial judgmmt in pretrial ch~covery
m a librl ra,.;r govrrnrd by New 'fork Times Co. v. S'Ulliva'll, 376 U. S.
25-J. ( 19()4) ?"
1 See, e. y .. He~tatrm<'nt of Torti:l § 580 ( 1939); Pednck, Frrrdom of
tlw Pre"" and the Law of Librl: Thr Moclrrn HrviH!'cl Tran~lation, 49
Corn. L. Hrv. 581, 5X:3-5H4 (1964) : ~otr, D!'velopmcnts in the LawDi'famat~on·, (i9 Hat,·. L. H<'v 875, 902-910 (J95fi) . In Perk v . Chirago
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changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions.
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages
awarded.
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the
commo11 law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood.
Given the required proof, however, damages liability for
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom
of the press.
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause
of action. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny
made it essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on
7'ribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 189 (1909), Mr. Ju:stice Holmes :summarized
the prevailing view of strict liability in the cour:se of reviewing a libel
Judgment rendered in a federal diversity of citizenship action :
" Thl'I'C was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by
mistnkr, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait or was
not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, wa:s no excu:se.
If tlw publication was libellous thr defendant took the risk. As was said
of ::mrh matters by Lord :\1ansfield, ' Whatever a man publi:shes lw publishes at his peril.' The King v. Woodfall, LotH 776, 781. . . . The reaS~)n i~ plain . A libl'l i~S harmful on it~ facf'. If a man sees fit to punish
manif<'stl~· hurtful statemf'nt:s concerning an individual, without other
ju,;tifiC'ation than exi8ts for a n advertisement or a piece of news, the
usual principles of tort will make him liable, if the statements are false
•or -ll re 1n{e of someone else,"

;.
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. "'£Q_!le
liable, the. alleged d.efamcr of public officials or of public
figures must know or suspect that his publica.tion is false. In
other cases- proof of some kind of fanlt. ne~~;ligenre perh~tps.~
is csscu!ial to rceorcry. Tum·.italJly, u11le::;::; liaLil.ity i::; (,o be
completely foreclosed. the thoughts and editorial processes of
the alleged defamer would be open to examination.
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that although
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of
objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be
inferred. plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or suspected that their damaging
publication was in error. In Butts, for· example, it is evident
from the record that tl)e editorial process had been subjected
to close examiHatiOll and that direct as Well as indirect evidence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had
trenched upon forbidden areas. 6
~ Th(;' defimtion of fault wa~ to bl' the re,;poll'~ibility of state law~. Gertz
\'.Robert Welch, Inc .. 41R P. S. :32:3, :347 (1974) .
u Sre 388 U. S., at 156-159. whrrP l\T r ..Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, revirwrd the record under thr standard lw prefrrrPd to apply to
public figun•s, and npheld the vPrdict for thr plaint iff. Chief .Justice
Warren mdepend£>ntly rcvww£>d the record undrr thr "actual malice"
shwdard of New York 'l'irnes and also concluded · i1i his roncmring opinion
that the verdict should be upheld. !d., at 168-170. The evidenee relied
on and summarized in both opinions included ~ub;;tantial amounts of te:;timony that would fall within the rditorial proces,.; privilegr as defined b'
respondPnts. The record before ' the ourt me u eel depo;;JtiOns ~· the
author 'Of thr defarnator~· artJC!t', an individual paid to as~ist the author
In preparation, the Sport~ Editor of The Satmday Evenmg Po"t, and both
1ts Managmg Editor and Editor-in-Clue!'. The;;e deposition~ revealed The
aturday Evenmg Po,.;t's motive~ Ill puhli:>hing the story (Record 70(i:...
717), source" (Hecord 3(\4, li62-664, 719-720, 729), ronv<>rsation~ among
the ed1ton; and author conrerning the research and dPvelopment of the
;utirll:' ('Record ~6:~-;36i , 721-7:37), decisions nnd ren><ons relating to wh()
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Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means
a recent development arising from New York Times and
similar cases. Rather. it is deeply rooted in the common-law
rule. predating the First Amendment, that a showing of
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plai11tiffs to
recover punitive or enhanced damages.' In Butts, the Court
:;hould be interviewed and what :;hould be inve;;tigated (1~ecord 666667, 699-700, 7:34-736, 772-774), conclu;;ions as to the importance and
veracity of sources and information pre;;Pnted in thr articlr (Rrcord 720,
7:32-735 , 7:37, 771-772. 77()), and conclusions about tlw impact that publi,-hmg thr articlP would have on thr ;;uhjt'ct (Record 714-716, 770) .
•JusTICE BHENNAN, writmg for lnm;:;elf and MH . .JusTlCJ> WHI'I'E, al::;o
thought thr rvidencr of rt>cord ;;uflici(>nt to ;:;ati;;fy the Netc York Times
malice l'tandard. Tt i:s qmte twllkei~· that the Court would have arrived
at the rP:sult it did had 11 lwliPv('d that inquiry into the editorial proces;:;es
was ronNt itut ionall~· forbidden .
The Court engagrd in ;;nnilar arwly:si~ of thr record in rever::;ing the
judgment.~ rnter('d in a companion case to Butts, Associated Press v.
Walker, :388 U. S., at 158-159: id .. at 165 (Warren, C. J., concurring);
and in Time Y. l/i/1 , 385 ll. S. 374, :391-394 (19!-)7). In Hill, thr record
included thr ed1ted draft:; of tlw allegedl~· hbelou;; article and a examination and cros,;-examination of thr author. During that exnmination, the
\ writer explained in detail tlw pn•paration of tlw articlr, his thoughtH, conclu:;ion~. and brlid~ r<•gardmg t hr matrrial, and a line-l::iy-luw analy~is of
the articlr with explanation~ of how and why addition:,; and deletions were
\ made to the v;triou~ draft~ . A~ in Butt~. thr editorial procrs;; was the
focu~ of much of ihr evJdencP, and direct inquiry was made into the state
of mind of thP medm ddend1mts . Yet the Court raised no que;;tion as to
tlw proprirty of the proof.
7 A. Hanson. LibPI and Helated Tort::;,[ 163 (1969) ; Note, Developmentsill thr Law-Defamation, supra, at 938 ; 50 Am . .fur. 2d Libel and Slander
§ :352 (1970) ; 50 C. J. S. Libel and Shmder § 260 (1955).
Tlw Hr~tatrnwnt originally providPd in a separatP section for the award
of pumt ivc damagP~ for maliriou,; defamation~>. Rr:statement of Torts
§ lOGS (Tf·nt. Draft 1:~, 1936) ·
''One who i:; hnblP for harm to anotlwr's rPputation cau:sed by the publicatiOn of a libel or· ;;lander rs al:so liablr for punitive damages if the
defamatory matter wa,: publbhrd wrth knowlrdgP of it:,; fabity or if it was
1mblr~hcd i,n rrcklc~s i.ndJffe~:eneP to it::- tntth or fal-;it · or solely for th£:.
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damages which in
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reckless indifference of culpable negligence" or "ill will, spite,
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166.
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan, id., at 156-l62, 8 nor Chief Justice
Warren, concurring. id., at 165-168, raised any question as to
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the
publisher and its responsible agents. 9
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decidecl, certain
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from
liability for libel unless the publication was made with
malice. 10 Malice was defined in numerous ways, but in genpurpo~e of rausing harm to the plaintiff's reputation or other legally protertrd mtrrest ."
The provtsion wai'i latPr omtttrcl with thr explanation that recovPry ·of
pun it tvr damagr~ would be detrrmmed by the rule~ in the Re~tatement
with respect to damages in gent'J'al. Reo;tatement of Torts § 1068 (~ro
po~ed Final Draft a, 19:37) .
Gertz \'. Robert Welch, Inc ., suprcr, at 350, limited the entitlE>ment to
1mnitive damag<•:; but ~uch damagE'i'i arc HtiU awardable upon a sh<;>wing of
knowing or reckle8~ faiHE'hood.
8 A. Mr. Justicr Harlan noted, thr jury had bE>en instructrd in considering punitive damage~ to ai<8l'!:l>' '·the reliability, the naturr of the
sources of thr plaintiff's mformation, its acceptance or rejection of the
sources, tts care in chrcking upon as,;ertion:s." :388 U. S., at 156 (emphasis
addE-d) . The Jutitice found nothing ami~s either with the ino;truction or
the reHttlt the jury reachrd undE-r it. MR. Jm;TICE BHENNAN, di;;senting
in thr Butts case, icl., at 172:._174, analyzed the in;;truction;; diff~'rE'ntly but
ratsed no question a~ to the com;titutionality of turning the award of either
compen~atory or punitivE' damage:; upon direct as wrll a;; cirrumo;tantJal
evtdence going to the nwntal statr of the defendtml.
1
' St•r 11. 6, supra.
HJ ~~· e Nalle v. Oyster. 230 U. S. 165, 179- 180 (191:3) ; White v. Nicholls,
:3 How . 266, 286- 292 (1845); T . Plucknrtt, A Conci8e Htstory of the
Common Law 502 (5th eel. 195G) ; Hallt•n, Charactrr of Behef Neer:;sary
for tlw ('Qnd1t10nal Pnvilege m Defamatlou, 25 IlL L Rev . 865 (1931) .
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eral depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with
improper motive." This showing in turn hinged upon the
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the
In White v. N!cholls, supra. at 290-291, tlw Court surveyed thP common
law and summarized thf' privilPgP as follows:
"We have thu:; taken a view of the authoritif':l which treat of the doctrines of slandPr and libPI, and have con~idPred tho~e authorities particularly with rPferencP to the distinctiou they establish, between ordinary
in:;tance~ of slander, written and unwntten, aud those which have bceu
~tyled, privileged commumcations; the peculiar character of which is said
to exempt thc·m from infPrence;; which the law ha:,; crrated wtth respect
to tho:;e cal'e:; that do not partake of that character. Our exammatwn,
extendrd as it may ;;c•rm to hnve bt•eu, ha:; been called for by the Importance of a <>Ub.Ject most intimately connected with thr rights and happine:;,.; of mdividuals, as it IS with thr qutet and good order of soc1ety. The
inve:;tigation ha;; conductrd u;: to tllC' following conclusion:;, which we
propound as the law applicable tlwreto. 1. That every publicatwn, e1ther
by wnting, printm~, or picture,.;, whic·h charges upon or nnputes to any
prrson that whtrh renders him liable to punishment, or which is calculated to makr him infamous, or odious, or ridiCulous, b prima facie a libel,
and implies malice in tlw author and pubh~her towards the person concerning whom such publication is made. Proof of malice, therefore, in
the ca~t>s ju,.;t cle:;crihPd, can never be required of the party complaining
bPyond the proof of thr publicatiOn it;;elf: JUstification, excuse, or extenuation, If eitll('r c•an he ~hown, mu~t JH"OCPf'd from the defendant. 2. That
the descriptiOn of ca~es rPcognised as pnvtleged commumcation~, must be
\tndrr:-;tood H~< rxcept10n~ to thi;; rulr, and m; being founded upon some
apparPntl~· rrcogmsed obligation or motiw, legal, moral, or social, which
may fair!~· hr pn'sumeu to have· leu to the publication, and therefore p1irna
facie rf'l!rvr~ it from that ju~t implication from which the general ruiP of
thr lnw t~ dc•duerd. The rulP of eviclt•llce, at; to ;;uch easrs, is accordingly
as far changPd as to impo~e it on thr plnntiff to remove those presumptions
flowtng from tlw speming obligationH and situations of the parties, and to
rrqutrc• of him to brin~ home to tlw dPfrndant the existence of malice as
thr tnH• mot in· of his conduct. Beyond thit; c•xtent no presumption can
lJ<' p<'l'll1lttecl to operate, much lel't; br made to sanctify the indulgence of
maher, howc•vpr wicked. howev<'r rxpre;;s, under tl)(' protpctJon of legal
form:-;. We coneludt• then thai malit•t• may ur proved, though allegPd to
havr C;\i;;tc•d Ill tlw procePdmg;; brforr a eourt, or !e~tslattve body, or anr

[Footnote 11

13 011
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belief of the defendant ii1 the truth of his statement, or upon
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the
defendant. 12
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant
and llecessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance
damages. 13 The rules are applicable to the press and to other
defendants alike, 1 ' and it is evident that the courts across
other tribunal or authority, although such court, legislative body, or other
triuunal, may have bren thr appropriate authority for redre::;sing the
grievance repm,;rntrd to it; and 1hat proof of express malice in any
writtrn publica! ion, petition, or proceeding, addressed to such tribunal,
will render that publication, petit ion, or proceeding, libellous in its character, and actionable, and will ~ubject the author and publisher thereof
to all the consequPnces of libel."
11 Hall('ll , supra, at 866-867.
In some jurisdictions a defendant forfeited hiR privil<>ge if he published negligently or without probable caut;e
to believe thP statement was true. lcl., at 857; see White v. Nic,holls,
supra, at 291.
12 Ser, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 1!-55 :
"The exi~tence~ctual malice may be shown in many ways. As a
general rule, any comrlPtent evidencr, either direct or circumstantial, can
be reHortrd to, and all thr relevant circumstance~ ~urrounding the transaction may be ~hown, provided they art" not too r~'mote, includjng threats,
prior ur subsequent dPfamation8, o; ub~Pquent statements of the defendant,
circumstances indicating the existrnrP of rivalry, ill will, or ho::;tiiity between
the parties, facts lending to ::;how a rrckles:; disregard of the plaintiff'::;
rights, and , in an action against a newspaper, cu::;t om and usage with
respect to the treatmrnt of news items of the nature of the one under
consideration. The plaintiff may show that the defendant had drawn a
pi::;tol at the time 1ll' uttered tlw word8 complained of; that defendant had
tried to kis::: and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publication ; or that defendant had failed to make a proper investigation before
publication of the statemrnt in question. On cro::;s-examination the
defendant may be questJOned as to his intent in making the publication."
(Footnotrs and citntions omitted.)
.ta E. g .. Odger'H Liuel and Slandt'r *271-«·288 (1st Amer. ed. Bigelow
1884 ; 50 Am: Jur. 2d § 455; 5a C . .T. S. § 21:3.
H Cf. Odger'~ Libel and Sh:md(~r 2a9 (1st Arner. rd. Bigelow 1884):

l/

...
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the country have long been accepting evidence gomg to the
editorial processes of the media without encountering constitutional objections. 1 "
F. Holt, Tlw Lnw of Libel 57 (lHt Amer. rd. 1818); Billet \'. TimesDemocratif' Pub. C'o., 107 LH. 75,32 So. 17 (1902).
1 " In :;corP~ of libel ca::;e:-; courts havl' addre;;sed the general i~sue of thr
admis,;ibility of evidenct' that would be excluded under the editorial process
privile~tc as:<erted herP and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of
the evidence on behalf of libel plaiutifrs. Sri', e. g., Johrw;ou Pub. Co. v.
Davis, 271 Ala . 474, 124. So. 2d 441 (19()0) (Editor may be cros,;~examined
on meaning mtPnded to be convPyrd by pa:;;;age~ in magazine article);
Freeman v. Mills, 9i Cal. App. 2d 1()1, 217 P. t)fi7 (1950) (malicP may b<'
establt~hed by dm'el proof of tlw ;;tate of mind of a pn~on, or by evidence
from which its exJstence may be inferred); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181
Cal. 345, 1.. 4 1'. (i72 (1919) (all rplevant circum::'tanee,; concerning publication admi,;~ibiP); Sandora v. Ttmes C'o .. 11:3 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (19:31)
(all relevant evidencP including direct evidence on state of mind or ,;urrounding circumstanc<'~-eity rditor and reporter called to :;land and questiont'd
exten:;ivcly ns to motive;;, circmn~tancP::> of publication, and general practices); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Har. :~09, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (Del. 1837) (wh€'re
que:;tion of malier in il'l'ille, declarationi' of publi,;lwr at the time of pllhlication admi~:,;ihlr Hl'i part of the res oestae); We stem U niou Telegraph Co. v.
Vickers. il Ga. App. 204, :JO S. E. 2d -l-10 (1944) (all rel<>vant eviclenct·
admi,.;:;ihle, in<·ludin~ dirrct rvid<>n('e of ::;tate of mind and surrounding circumstances); Cook, .. East Shore Newspapers. :~27 Ill. App. 559,64 N. E. 2d
751 (1945) (all rel<>vant PvidrncP concPrnin~ cin:11mstances of pubhcations
admi:-;:;ible, incl11ding te,;timony by reportpr:; and employee" of defendant);
Berger v. Freeman Tribune ('o .. 132 Iowa 2HO, 109 :X. W. 7R4 (1906) (all
relevant rvidencr); Thompson Y. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Ma:ss. 176, 181
N. K 24H (1932) (only '<"vidence on Rtatr of mind of tho~e agrnt:; of defendant entru,;t <'d with determining what shall br p11blishcd is admi~ible and
material); Conroy v. Pall River Iferald News Co .. 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E.
2cl 729 (1940) (an~· relevant evidence• on defendant's malice); Cyrowski v.
Polish American Pub . Co., 196 Mich. 648, 16:3 K. W. 58 (1917) (te,;timony
of mdividuab who advised rPportrr to que:stion plaintiff before publi:shing
defamatory artielc wa~< admi,;:sible on the i~,;u€' of malice); Priedell v.
Blakely Printing Cu., 163 -:\finn. 226, 20:3 N. W. 974 (1925) (anr relevant
evidenc<> admissiblP) ; Cook v. Globe Printtng Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W.
:332 (1910) (evJcl€'JWe ,.;bowing that df'fendant 's ed1torml manager knew :m
important fad to he falsE' admJ:<:SJble on que,.;tiou of malice); Butler v.
'Gautte Co ., 119 App . Dn· 7117 , 104 N .. Y. S. H:ri (1907) (any Pvidenre·
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In the face of this history, old and new, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases
had announced unequivocal protection for the editorial procadmissible to provr ncttml malice of clefrndant); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C.
377 (1851) (expre~H malice may br proved either by direct evidencr or
surrounding circumstance::; ); McBumey v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R . I.
331, 175 A. 2d 170 (1961) (rclrvant rvidence admissible to rebut trstimony
by reportrrs and rditors that th e~· publishrd without malice) ; Lancour v.
He rald<~ Globe As~u., 112 Vt . 471,21\ A. 2d 396 (1942) (any relevant evidence on malice) ; Farrar v. Tribune Pub. Co., 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash .
1961) (all circum:st ances stu-rouuding publication relevant and admis~ible).
Simila rly, tlw comb haw uniformly admitted ;.:uth evidence on behalf of
tho ddrndant. See, e. g .. Bohan v. Record Pub . ro .. 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P.
634 (1905) (t(',;timony on good faith) ; Hearne\'. De Young. 119 Cal. 670,
52 P . 150 (1898) (trstimony on source::;, precautwm; taken, and good
faith) ; Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 203 Iowa 1095, 212 K. W . 557 (1927)
(testimony of reporter and Pditor on good faith admi~::;ible) ; Sn!Jder \'.
Tribun e Co .. lfl1 Iowa 671 , 143 ~ . W . 519 (1913) (testimony as to source
of information and good faith of n' porter admissible); Courier Joumal
Co . v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S . W. 446 (1911) (te:stimon~· of reporter
on good faith) ; Conner v. Standard Pub . Co. , 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596
(1903) (t<'"timouy HS to source of information) ; Davis v. Mm·xhausen, 103
:Vlich. 315 , 61 K. W. 504 (1894) (testimony on good faith and proper
precautions taken before publishing) ; Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo . 35,
107 S . W. 49(i (1907) (te~timony on thought8 and intentions at the time
of publicatiOn admi~~ ible) ; Paxton \'. Woofltl'ard. :n :Vlont. 195, 78 P. 215
(1904) (te::;timony as to motive, good faith, and sourceil ) ; Las Vegas Sun,
luc. v. Franklin . 74 Nev . 282, 329 P . 2d &"i7 (1958) (testimony of publi:shrr on good faith) ; Lindsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N ..J. Misc.
1275, 163 A. 2-l5 (1935) (tc•stimony on good faith); Kohn v. PcPcD Co .. 169
App. Div . 5RO, 155 N . Y. S. 455 (1915) (sourrr) ; Hains v. N ew York
Bvening Journal. 204 N. Y. S. 734 (1930) (source); Goodrow v. Malone
Telegram , 2:35 App . Div. 3, 255 N . Y. S. 812 (1932) (reporter's testimon)'
as to sourre) ; Goodrow v. Press Co ., 233 App . Div . 41 , 251 N . Y . S . 364
(1931) (defrndant ran testify and introduce evidence on hi:s good faith at
time of publication) ; K ehoe v. Ne u• York Tribun e, 229 App. Div . 220, 241
~ . Y . S. ()76 (1930) (t estimon~· on good fmth admi~::;ible to prevrnt imposition of pumtivf' damagr:>) ; Var varo v. American Agriculturist , 222 A)li1 .
Div . 213, 225 -:-\ . Y . S. 564 ( 1927 ) (deft>ndant may te:-;tJfy and mtroduce
evidence on lark of ma lice ) ; Vau Ar~dal e v. 'J'ime, Inc., 35 N . Y. S. 2d
95I,.:tff'<l, 265 App. D 1v. 919, 39 .1. Y S . 2<1 413 (1942) ; Weirhbrodt v,
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
1'ornillo, 418 l!. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting
System V. Democratic !Vational Cmnrnittee, 412 r. S. 94 ( 1973)'
we in validated govern men tal efforts to pre-empt editorial
decision by requiring the publication of specified material.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement
that a television network air paid political advertisements and
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System sought
to control in advance the content of the publication. they
were deemed as in valid as were prior efforts to enjoin publication of specified materials.u; But holdings that neither the
State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest
that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry
whatsoever.
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia
Broadcasting System or in Tornillo silently effected a substantial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v..
New York Evenirt(J Journal. 11 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant
may te:stify a~ to good faith and probable cause); Cleveland Leader·
P1·inting Co. v. Nether~ole, 84- Ohio St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (tcstinwny on good faith); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P.

1079 (1914) (defendant's tP:stimony as to lnck of malice and :source of
information) ; 'l'imes Pub. Co. v. Ray. 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (teHtimony a::; to lack of malice); Pfister v.
Milwaukee Free Pre8S Co., 1a9 Wi~'<. ()27 , 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony
a~ to absencr of malice)
None of tlws!' rase~ as mnch as suggested that there were special limit::;
applicable to the pres~ on the discoverability of such evidence, either
lwfore or during t rwl.
10 As we statPd in 'l'omillo. "no 'govPrnmPnt agency-local, state, or
fcdrral-can tPII a newspaper in advancr what it can print and what it
cannot:'" !d., at 225-256, quot1ng Pittsburgh Ptess Co. v. Ht~:man Rela.-·
ti.ons Comm'n, 413 C. S. :m1 {!973) ~S'l'EWARI ••J., dis~~ntingJ.
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained an overview
of recent developments in the relationship between the First
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a
companion case had narrowed the evidence available to a
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be
drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amendment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record
indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion, in requiring proof
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor
and in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements. 17
In sum, contra.r y to the views of the Court of Appeals,
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a
medi2, defendant in a libel case is not required, authorized or l
presaged by our prior cases, and would substantially enhance
the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of .Yew Y ark Times, Butts and similar cases.

III
It is nevertheless urged by respondents that the balance
struck in New Y ark Times should now be modified to provide
further protections for the press when sued for circulating
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the abanyrar~

lat(•r, in 'l'ime, Inc. v. Fir-estone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), therr
no indication that the plaintiff is subject to ~ub~tantial eYid~ntiary re~triction~ in praYing; the defendant'~ fault. A~ Mn. Jus'l'ICE
PowELL and :MH. JusTICE STEWAH'l' ~tated in concurrence, the answer to
thi~ qur~tion of culpability "deprnds upon a carrful ronsidrration of all thr
rclrvant evidencr concerning Time'~ net ions prior to the publication of the
' milestonr~ ' articlr." The~· suggrstrd that on rrmand all thr eYidence of
reeord should bP ron~idHed. which included evidrnce going to thr belief~
of Timr'~ editorial ::;taff. SeP 1d, at 4()7. anclt1 .•1.
17

Two
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clomnent, modification or refinement of existing constitutional
interpretation, and notable developments in First Amendment
jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions. But
in the 15 years since .Yew Y ark Times, the doctrine announced
by that, case, which represented a major developmed and
which was widely perceived as essentially protective of press
freedoms, has been repeatedly affirmed as the appropriate
First Amendment standard applicable in libel actions brought
by public officials and public figures. Curt-is Publishing Co.
v. Butts. supra; St. Amant v. Thompson, supra; Gertz v.
Robert Welch. supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448
( 1076). At the same time, however, the Court has reiterated
its COJiviction-refiected in the laws of defamatiou of all of
the States-that the individual's interest in his reputation is
also a basic concem. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 l'. S., at
455-457; Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S .. at 348-349.
\Ve are thus being asked to modify firmly est1blished constitutional doctrine by placing beyo])(] the plaintiff's reach a
rauge of direct evitleuce relevant to provi11g knowing or reckless falsehood by the publisher of au alleged libel. elements
that are critical to plaintiffs such as Herbert. The case for
making this modification is by no means clear anu convincing.
and we decline to accept tt.
In t.he first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privilrge for the editorial process would constitute a substantial
mterference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of maher as required by New York Times .
•\.s respondents would have it, the defendant's reckless disregard
of the truth, a critical element, coulcl not be shown by direct
evidence through inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and coucltJs:Ol1S of the publ isher but could be proved only by objective
evidence from which the ultimate fact could be inferred. It
may be that plaintiffs will rarely be successful in proving awarenc>~'S of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself. but
thr relevance of answers to such i11quiries, which the District
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Court rrcognizrd and tlw Court of Appeals did not (]eny. can
hardly be doubted. To erect an · impenetrable barrier to the
plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a
mattN of somr substance. particularly when defendants themselves arr pronr to assf'rt their good-faith bf'lief in the truth
of thrir publications. 1 < and libel plaintiffs arc required to prove
knowing_ o~k~ss falsehood ~lUi ''co~ncing clarity." New
York Times ilUlJivan, 376 LT. S .. at 285-286.
Furthermore. the outer boundaries of the· editorial privilege
now urgrd are clifficult to pf'rceive. Thf' opinions below did
not stat<>, and rf'spolHlf'nts do not explain. precisely when thr
editorial process begins allCI whe11 it ends. Moreover. although
we an' told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as
to what hf' "kne·w" and what he had "learned" from his
interviews. as opposed to what hP "hPlievPd.'' it is not at all
cl<•ar \\'hy thr suggested editorial privilege would not cover
knowlPdgP as well as bP1ief about thP veracity of published
reportS. 111 Tt is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted
by respondPllts would also immuni;,c from inquiry thP intemal
communications occurring during the editorial process and
thus place beyond reach what the defendaut participants
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to
he barred from Pvidence, would a reporter's admissious made
to third parties not participating in tlJe editorial process also
be immune from inquiry'? We thus have little doubt that

I

1'

1'. g., tlw l'nsrs collrcfrd in n. 15, supra. in wluch media defendHii>'Prl<•d, and rourh; upheld, fiH' right fo prrl:'ent this typr of rvidetH'e
nt trial in ordn to C'HtahliHh good fa1th and lack of •nalice.
to It waR also suggeHted at oral argumrnt that the privilege would covrr
qur:-<tJOn~ in thC' '·why'' form. hut not of thC' ''who," "what," '' when ," and
"where" !~ ·pr . Tr. of Oral Arg., a! 32-:34. Hut i1 is rvident from Lando'~
tlepo~ifion !haf qurstiOnH ,.oJicitin!!: ''why" au,;wrr,.: relatmg to the ed1torial
proces;: werr aniiWf'r('(], e. g .. Tr. of Depos1t10n 21, L: 7 ; 1892 , L. 18, nnd
that hr rrfUii<·d to an:;wrr o!hPr::> thaf did not fnll mto th1s cntegory, e. g.,
Tr. of Drpoiiitwn fl(1o, L. 20; 774, L. 5 ; 877 L. 12 ; 880, L. 5 ; 1488, L. 3 ;
189:;1 , L, 11 ; see Tr of Oral Aq~ ., af 46.

ant~
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Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important interests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted
privilege.
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial
'--conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the verne:.
Tty-"Of the ma erial w-na;'"gathered will have an intolerable
chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decisionmaking. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods,
those effects are precisely what Sew Y ark Times and other cases
have held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading false information in and of itself carries 110 First Amendment credentials. "There is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.' ' Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 F. S., at 340.
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court
in New York Tim es, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present
in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and
the suppression of truthful materiaL Those who publish
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, however, are subject to liability, the aim being not only to compensate for in.i ury but also to deter publication of unprotected
material threatening injury to individual reputatiou. Permitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication
of erroneous information known to be false or probably false,
this is 110 more than what our cases contemplate and does not
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press.
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the
suppression not only of informatiou known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful informa.tion , the

- ·-

..
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issue would be quite different. But as we have said. our cases
necessarily contemplate examination of the ~r_ial_pL.Qc_ess
to j )rove the nccessar
areness of proba,ble falsehood. and
if indirect proofo f this element does not stifle tru ul j)ublication and is consistent with the First Amendment, as
respondents seem to concede, we do not understand how direct
inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substantially more suspect. 20 Perhaps such examination will lead to
liability that would not have been found · without it, but this
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors,
which affords the opportunity to refute inferences tha.t might
otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all,
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker.
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory
reports about the plaintiff. one of which is false and damaging,
and only the false one is published. In resolving the issue
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false,
it is only commou sense to believe that inquiry from the
\ author. with an opJX>~'tUI~ity .to explain, will ~ontribute to
accuracy. If the publwatwn 1s false but there 1s au exonerating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this
effect."' Why should not the plaintift' be permitted to inquire
before trial? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact hacl
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless. 110
' undue self-censorship will result from permitting the rel<'20 The kii1d of question respondrnts seek to avoid answering is, by their
own admi~sion, the ra><iest to answc•r. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at ;H:
'' ' [TJhey arr ::;et-up qur3tions for our Hidr. , . . [Tihrse are not diffi cult qii<'J:>tions to an~wrr.' "
"' Often it is thr libel drfrndant who first J1resrnt,.; at trial direct evidence
about the editorial pro('f' ~ in order to e~tablish good faith and lack of
malice. That was trur m New ro1'k Times v. Sullivan, see, e. g., Hecord
-762, and in Jnnny of the ca~E'Il cited in n. 15, supra.

r

'-
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vant inquiry. Only knowing or reckless error will be discouraged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless cm1duct, which
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be
threatened.
It is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and
editors will be dampened and sound editorial judgment endangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 22 We do not doubt the
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or
not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover. given exposure to
liability whe11 there is knowing or reckless error, there is even
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly. we find
it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpable error and because the editorial process will itself be
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial processare so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunderstanding that they should be immune from examination in
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The
evidentiary burdeu Herbert must carry to prove at least reck- ~
)~or t1e truth is ~ubstantial indeed, aed-;e are
unronvinced t at his chances of winning an undeserved verdict
Tlw~· invoke cur observation in Unit ed States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
6S3, 705 (1974) : "Tho,.;e who expect public di~ semination of their remarks
may wrll tempN candor with a co11cern for appearance and for thrir own:
22

iutGre~?Ui

,,

to the detriment of the deri:sio111naking proces::;."
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a.rf' such that an inquiry into what Lando learned or said during
editorial process must be foreclosed.
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges
have no constitutional protection from casual inquiry. · There
is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or
official exami11ation merely to satisfy cmiosity or to serve
some general end su~h as · the public ii1terest; and if there
were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First
Ameudme11 t is presently construed. · No such problem exists
here, however. where there is a specific claim of injury arising
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or
recklessly false. 23
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favorNI.~ and
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances. The President. for example, does not have an
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974). In so holding. we found that although the
President has a pawerful interest in copfide11tiality of com1

::VIR . .Tu:s•rrc:E BRENNAN' woulcl c•xtc•Hd morr <'Oil~1itu1ioual protrrtion
to rditorial di,.:cu~~i<~l h.'· rxcu~ing an~wt·r" to rc•I<'VIIIIi ftiH'"tion" about
in-hou~r <'OilV!'I'>'Hiioth• nntil 11w ll1:~inliff ha" mndc• :1 prim:t fariP !':1:'1' of
fabit~·. Jf thi~ "ugge,.:tiun t·ontPmpl:tlc•,.: :1 biftll't·atf'd lri:d, fir,.l ou f:~bit~·
ami tlwn on <"nlpahilit~· nncl in.im~·. Wl' clP<'Iinr to ~uhjpr1 lihd trinl" t(')
such lmrdt•n:<otn<' c·omplication,.; and inloiNahl!' dPI:t~ · . On lhP otht·r han<l,
if, a" "<'<'Ill" morf' lik(·l~ · . flw prima fa<'iP showing cloP:< nol eontPmplat<' n
mini-trial on f:tl~it~· , no rr~olution of eonAieting Pvidl'JH'l' on thi" i~stu·. but
on I~ · :l rrPdibll' :t;;,.('f'ti<rn h.'· lht· pl:tinl iff, il "maeb of :l rc•quir('lll<'n( that
ronld hP :<ali.-<fiPd h~· :tn :tffida.,·it or :t :<implt· wrifieation of i'lw pl(•ading8.
\;\/(• :trr l'f;lnrl:tn'l to imhed illi:< rormali~lll in tlt(' <"on:<titulion.
tl SPP R/A·ins \', rllitl'r7 Stn.te.~. :11\.J. \' . S. 20fi, 2:~.J. (19(i0) (Frankfnrtpr,
J.): ''Limitations :tl'l' pr·opPrl~· pl:t!'<'d 11pon thl' oprralion of lhi~ g<'J)('r:tl
prinripiP rof JlO il'Htirnollial priviiPg(•l 0111~ · to t]H' \'(')'~' limitl'd (•Xif'llt lhnt
prrmitting a rdui<al to IC'i<tif\ or <'X!'Iudiug rcll'vanl c·,·ickncc ha" n p11blir
good 1ntnsr·pnding lhl' nonltall~· Jll'l'dominanl prin<'ipiP of utilizing nil
rational ntP:lll~ for a~<'rrt:tinin~~; truth." Rt'<' :tl:<o ,'I .T. 'Wigmore•, E,·idrncc
§ 21!:)2 (:\l<'N:tn~~;hton n·,·. 1961): 4 The Works of JcrPmy Brut1tam .a21
r(J. ]~ow ring cd . 1 4'3),
2 '1
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munications between himself and his advisers, that iutet·est
must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence. As
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against
disclosure, "[w]hatever their origins. these exceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed. for they are in derogation of the sea.rch
for truth." !d., at 710.
With these considerations in mind. we conclude that the
preseut construction of the First Amendment should not be
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the
respondents now urge.

IV
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the
press. is an aucient J)henomenon. it is true that our cases from
New York Times to Gertz haVE' considerably changed the
profile of such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth
and privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege
or to prove exemplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is
now considerably expaQded. In every'-or almost every case,
the J)laintl 1nt"i""stfocus on the editorial ·process and prove a
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on
the part of the publisher. 1f yl~i!)tiff~ in consequence now
resort to more discovery, it would not · be surprising; and it
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it
is to perform its task,"" which is indispensable in a system
such a. ours.
2 :; It j,; urg<•d th:d iht• largr co~t~ of dei'Puding lawHuit:< will intimidate•
·the Jlf<'>'S and lrad to ~p]f-censor:-;hip, particularly whrre smaller newspaperi<
nud hroadeu "tt•r,; arP 'involvrd. It is noted that Lnndo 's deposition alone
('Ontinurd intrrmitt rntly for 0\'('r H yrar, fillrd 26 volumrs rontaining;
.._.......,___ ,......_.,.,. --..
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Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry
into the editorial process. however. would not cure this problem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability
from defamation would effect this result, and the Court has
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the
First Amendment. Furthermore. mushrooming litigation
costs. much of it due to pre-trial discovery. are not peculiar
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated ex- ~
pressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery,
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus.'"' But
until and unless there are major changes in the present rules
of civil procedure. reliance must be had on what in fact and
in law are ample )Owers of th · li trict iudg~ to Jrevent abuse.
""--" "'
~""-The Court has more than once declared that the depositiondiscovery rules are to be accol·ded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately inforrniug the
litigauts in civil trials. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507
(1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. are subject to the iujunction of Rule
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis
added.) To this end. the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be
nearly ~,000 pagrs and 240 exhibits. As wrll as out-of-pockrt expense~
of the dl•po..;ition, there wen· ·substantial legal fees. and Lando and his
assoeiatP~ were divertrd from news gathering itnrl rf>J)()rting for lll>ignificant
amount of time.
26 Blue C'hip Str.tmps "· Mcwo,· Drug Stores. 421 F. S. 72:3, 740-741
)
(1915); ACF l11dustries. Inc. \', EEOC. U. S. (19i9) (PowJ,LL, Y
S'l'l>WAHT and HEHNQUJs'l' , .TJ :, di~senting from denial of certiomri);

Burger: Agenda for 2000 A. D.: A NPed for Systematic Anticipation, The
'Pound Conferenre, 70 F. R. D. 76, 95-96 (19i6). Thr Committee on
HuiE:'s of Practice and Procedure of the .Judicial ConfereriCl' of the 1-nited
Stat<•,; has propo~cd amendments to the Federal HulC's of Civil Procedure
de,;igned lo ameliorate thi:-; problPm. Preliminary Draft of ·J>ropo;seq
Ic.~ of Civil Procedure ( 1978) ,
;\mencl!:q<'nts to the Fe't!cral

_a,,

i7- J ]():1- 0I'f\'J( •\'

JIEHHI·:H'r r . L\:\1)0

firmly nppl it' d. and tlw district eourts should not nq.dect tlwir
power to rr8triet. discovery when• "jul:'tiec· rc•quir<'S fprotection
tor J a party or pt~rson fro111 annoyanc·<·. !'tnbarrassnwnt. opprl'ssioll. or UtH.Itw huniPtl or exp<•nse ... .'' F<•d. Rulr C'iv. Prot'.
2fi (e).
With thii' authority at hand . judges should not
h<'~itnt<· to rX<'rci~r appropriatP control ovPr the di s<'on~ ry
])l'OC('S:'i,

\YIH•tlwr, as a non<·onstitutiot~al mattc·r. howrvPr. t]l(' trinl
j udgP proprrly appliNI tlw ruks of diRcovt~ry was not with in
thl' boUll<laJ'iPS of t}w LjlH'Stioll CPI'tifi<•d under 28 1'. ~ . ('.
7
~ 1:2~1:..? (h) und 8('<'ordin:zly is 11ot lwfol't-' 111:'. "
The jud~lll<'llt
of tlw ( ·ourt of .\ppc·nJ::; i~ rc·wrsc••l.

So ordered.

" 7 -:'IIJ L .Jr,-'l'ln: i-:TE\1'. \Ifl 1\'ollld r< 'llland lo h:tl'l' IIH' I rial t·ourt rult • OlJC'('
:tgain till tltt • rt ·lt·,·: tnt·t· or il1t · cli.- ptttt•d tptt·:' tion.' . !\til t Itt · opinion of tilt'
I rial judtrt ' rt 'l't':tl :' th:tl ht• t·orrt·t·Jl .' · tllldt·r:'Jood th:tf Xt·tr l'ork Tilll ('s ant!
(; t'l' t z n ·qnirt ·d I Jt.rl~t·rt lo prm·•· t·it IH'r knowin:.r l':tl.-<'houd or n ·t' klt ·~"
di.•r• ·tr:trcl fo r fnlth. \\' il11 tilt' propt•r •·on ~ tittJtiml : tl t • lt' llll ' lll ~ in mind , tlw
jtldtr< ' 1\'( •111 1111 111 nil• · 1h:li Ji lt' <JIIt'~tion " at i~ :' llt' 11' 1' 1'1 ' (·h ·<~rl .' · n •lt•vanl all(!
lh:tl 1111 l ' lllt~tiltilifln : tl pri1·ilt '!!t ' I ' Xt · IJ ~t · d Latulo from :tll:'ll'l'l'ing tlwm . 'Yt•
hold Jit:tJ. tiH · j1Jtlg•· t'flllllllitll·d no t ' IIJJ ~ fitntifln:tl t' ITflr hnt ~ • · ontJ ·;u~ · to
-:'111: .•11 "TJI'I·: ~T1 ·: 11· 11n , find it in:IJIJiropri:tit· to n ·\·i<'ll' hi" niling~ till
rt'it' ' '" ll'' Y·
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BRAFT · OPINION
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
March 3, 1979

Mr; - ~ustice · Powell,

concurring.

Although I join the opinion of the Court, I am not
entirely convinced that the question presented by this case is
limited to the existence of the editorial privilege claimed by
respondents.

I agree that with respect to pretrial discovery

in a civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of
editorial iudgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the
protection the First Amendment accords the product of this
judgment, namely published speech.

1

But althouqh I also aqree

that this protection does not extend to enforcement of the kind
of evidentiary privilege respondents assert, I do believe that
pretrial discovery must be conducted with First Amendment
concerns in mind.
As the Court notes, a district court in supervising
discovery possesses "what in fact and in law are ample powers •
• . to prevent abuse."

Ante, at 22.

When demands for

discovery threaten interests protected by the First Amendment,

2.

the exercise of these powers becomes a duty.

The

burden ~

excessive and harassing discovery should not be permitted in

l\' -.. ,'s

e.r.~~'¥

"~

any litigation)\ ~ t~ese Q8 9 9S~e~ia~ly intolerable l when added

•
to the costs of discovery is a risk of reduction in the flow of
information necessary to informed public discussion of
qovernmental affairs.

See First · National · Bank · of · 8oston v.

Bellotti, 435

u.s.

765, 781-783 (1978);

Post · eo;, 417

u.s.

843,862-863 (1974)

Saxbe v. Washinqton
(Powell, J.,

dissenting).
The initial inquiry in

enforcem~nt

request is the question of relevance.

of any discovery

Too lenient a standard

allows the parties to saddle each other with excessive,
redundant, and unnecessary demands.

Whatever the standard of
2

relevance applicable in other circumstances,

when evaluating a

discovery demand that trenches on First Amendment

~~

~Pleeuts

a

~WK~"1

district court

should~ scertai ~the actual need for the

material souqht in light of the intrusiveness of the request.
Where the established need for the material does not outweiqh
the First Amendment costs of meeting the demand, enforcement
should be denied.

Cf. Zurcher v.

Stanford · ~aily,

436 U.S. 547,

3
570 (1978)

(Powell, J., concurring).

Beyond determining what demands should be honored, a
district court has considerable discretion to decide when a

3.

request for discovery must be complied with.

In many cases

careful management of the order of discovery can eliminate
conflicts such as that presented here.

~

Demands wfiiea might

seem relevant when made may appear less significant in light of
further discovery or the subsequent elimination of issues to be
tried.

In some cases it may be possible to avoid the conflict

altogether by disposing of the suit on a ground to which the
4

material sought to be discovered would be irrelevant.
These measures are illustrative of the kind of steps a
district court may take to safeguard First Amendment

inter~ts.
~

Others can be developed by courts and litigants as problems
arise.

The presence of this power to accomodate First

Amendment concerns where they exist reinforces the Court's
decision not to create a new evidentiary privilege that would
add to the already considerable burdens a public-figure libel
plaintiff must bear without furthering substantially the values
the First Amendment is designed to protect.

•

1.

As the Court notes, the issue framed by respondents' motion

for permission to appeal pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§

1292 (b) was:

"What effect should be qiven to the First Amendment protection
of the press with · respect · to · its · exercise · of · editorial · jndgment
in pretrial discovery in a libel case governed by New · York
Times · eo~

v. Snllivan, 376

u.s.

254 (1964)?" Ante, at 3-4, n. 3

(emphasis supplied).
2.

Among the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure are recommendations to restrict the scope of
discovery generally.

See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Practice

and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, March 1978, at 6-11.
also Powell, Reforms-458, 461-463 (1978);

See

Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
ABA Section of Litigation, Report of the

Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, October 1977.
3.

The District Court held that the matters sought by

petitioner were "clearly relevant."
1977).

73 F.R.D. 387,

(SDNY

Although I agree with the Court that the District Court

pro?erly understood the constitutional elements in a libel
suit, and that it would be inappropriate for this Court to
review the rulings on relevance, ante, at 23 n. 27, I do not

FN 2 •
•
interpret the Court's opinion as barring review of these
rulings by the District Court in light of the views expressed
herein.
4.

I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that discovery into

the exchange of views among press employees always must be
postponed until a preliminary determination of the falsity of
the publication is made.

See post, at 16-17.

First, I am not

persuaded that in all circumstances inquiry into these
exchanges will exert some impact on future publications, and I
do not believe newsroom conversations, like any other
conversation, enjoy any First Amendment protection other than
· what is derived from that accorded published speech.

In

addition, I do not believe the issues of falsity and belief of
falsity always will be separable.

Often a trier of fact will

have little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of
a published statement, but rather will have to weigh the
probative value of conflicting versions of events.

In

assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of fact
would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the author of
one version was warned by a colleague familiar with the
underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous,
inconsistent, or unreasonable.

Denying a libel plaintiff this

evidence would hobble unfairly his attempt to make a prima

FN 3 •

•
facie showing of falsity.
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
November 1, 1978
I had not responded to the American Newspaper Publishers

Association brief in my earlier memorandum, as I should have.
have gone back to the opinions of the lower courts and the
appendix, with the contentions of that brief in mind.
Unfortunately, the appendix does not contain examples of the
questions Lando and CBS refused to answer.

The following

excerpts from a letter to counsel for Lando contains the most
detailed summary I can find of the questions Lando refused to

I

2.

answer:
"(1) questions concerning matters which Barry
Lando proposed or discussed including in, or
excluding from, the "60 Minutes" segment on Col.
Herbert:
"(2) questions concerning Lando's belief or intent
as a basis for including in, or excluding from, the
"60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic article
reference to specific matters, facts and events:
"(3) questions concerning matters which Lando
considered, or was interested in, mentioning on the
"60 Minutes" segment:
"(6) questions concerning Lando's opinions and
conclusions concerning the truth and accuracy of
persons interviewed, appearing on or referred to in
connection with the "60 Minutes" segment or the
Atlantic Monthly article:
"(7) questions concerning conclusions reached by
Lando about specific events referring or related to
the "60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic Monthly
article:
"(8) questions concerning the basis for Lando's
conclusions regarding people or leads to be
pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with
the "60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly
article: • •
" App. at 130a-131a.
As far as I can tell, Lando made no concessions in any of these
areas, and the above list accurately describes the scope of the
controversy between these parties.
I note two things about these questions.

First, it

appears that they included inquiry into Lando's belief as to the
veracity of matters that were broadcast.
(6).

See especially category

Even his counsel conceded at oral argument that such

matters should not be privileged.

Second, all the questions

except those in category (1) relate to Lando's personal thoughts
and beliefs, and not to conversations or other interchange with
fellow journalists.

Most of these questions, it would appear, do

not involve the "free flow of ideas" or "give-and-take in the

3.

newsroom."

Rather, they pry into Lando's personal beliefs about

the content of his publications.
The cases to which the Publishers Association refers are
not fully apposite here.

Those decisions for the most part

involved discussion or reporting of some sort, communicative
processes that conceivably might be discouraged by undue
scrutiny.

Here, in contrast, most of the questions appear to

relate to Lando's own impressions.

Lando will continue to have

thoughts and impressions no matter how much inquiry he is forced
to endure.

As a result, the rationale that supported recognition

of a limited privilege in those cases (most of which involved a
variant of executive privilege) does not apply here.
The one category of questons that inquire into something
other than Lando's personal thoughts involves discussions between
Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or excluded in
their show.

Herbert and Lando were involved in the production of

the program and their conversations presumably related to how it
was put together.

To the extent these conversations covered

matters of balance and impact, I suppose they would be irrelevant
to Herbert's case.

If one confessed to the other his serious

doubts about the veracity of something in the program, however, I
would think that confession should and would be discoverable.

I

suppose the best analogy might be to the attorney-client
privilege which, as I understand it, may not be used as a cloak
behind which illegal activity may be carried out.
For these reasons, and those discussed in my previous
memo, I do not think this case properly presents a question of

·.

.,,

11 ...

4.

privilege.

To the extent the court below believed the First

Amendment required journalists to be free not to answer questions
of the sort posed here, regardless of relevancy to disputed
issues of fact, I believe it erred.

To this extent, I believe

the court below should be reversed.

That is only the beginning,

however.

The court below, without creating a special privilege

for the journalistic profession, could haved demanded both a
substantial showing of relevance as a prerequisite to compelling
a response to the questions, and efforts to avoid the
confrontation altogether.

To take the latter first, the district

court, as Justice Brennan seemed to suggest at oral argument,
coould have entertained summary judgment on the issue of truth,
thereby precluding inquiry into malice.

Of course, some of the

blame for what may have been an unnecessary constitutional
adjudication must rest with Lando, who seems to have been eager
to reach the privilege issue.
As for relevance, it is impossible to make any firm
statement without having the exact questions available.

If you

would like me to look into the depositions to see what was
objected to, I would be happy to do so.

If the generic

descriptions of the questions contained in the appendix and lower
court opinions are at all accurate, however, it would seem
Herbert has established substantial relevance as to at least some
of the questions.

If some of the statements in the program were

false, and if some of the statements Lando excluded were true,
Herbert is entitled to know why Lando included the former and not
the latter.

Lando might give self-serving or evasive answers,

;

5.

but such responses will have significant impeaching value for
Herbert.

To the extent malice remains in the case, I think

Lando's thought processes generally would be discoverable even
under a relevance standard with some backbone.
If I am correct that at least some of Herbert's
questions may not constitute an abuse of discovery, then the
privilege issue must be reached.

To this extent I disagree with

the Publishers Association, which seems to believe that the
decision below can be sustained on discovery grounds.

Although

the district court believed it was constrained to apply an
"almost anythng" standard on discovery, it also stated that, "The
publisher's opinions and conclusions with respect to veracity,
reliability, and the preference of one source of information over
another are clearly relevant."

Pet. App. 65a.

If this

observation was correct, I would think the decision of the court
below would have to be reversed at least in part •

.,
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SECOND DRAFT OPINION
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
March 9, 1979

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately
to elaborate on what is said in Part IV of the opinion.

I do

not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's
opinion;

rather, I write to emphasize the additional point

that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public
figure, a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment
interests as well as those of the plaintiff.
I agree with the Court that the explicit
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case
of this kind, as articulated by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376

u.s.

254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an

evidentiary privilege.

With respect to pretrial discovery in a

civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of editorial
judgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the protection the
First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely
published speech.

This holding requires a reversal of the

2.

judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Court notes, however,

that whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us
under the question certified pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1292(b),

ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will

----------

continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories
and questions which respondents declined to answer.

In short,

the case will return to that court for completion of pretrial
discovery.
I had occasion earlier this Term, in
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF Industries,
Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity
453( January 8,

Commissio~,

No. 78-

197~, to comment upon the widespread abuse of

discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in
civil litigation.

Slip op. at 5-7.

At the 1946 Term, just a

few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment".
Hic~man

v. Taylor, 329

u.s.

495.

The bar was not slow in

heeding th is admonition, and indeed in exceeding - all too often the bounds of liberality.

The situation has reached the point

where there is serious "concern about undue and uncontrolled
discovery".

Ante, at 22.

1

In view of the evident attention

3.

given discovery by the District Judge in this case it cannot be
said that the process here was "uncontrolled".

But it

certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all
concerned.

2

Under present Rules the initial inquiry in
enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance.
Whatever standard of relevance may be appropriate in other
types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on
First Amendment rights a district court should measure
(

relevance in light of both the private interests of the parties
UY·t~"

and the important public i__nt.e.r.ests implicated.

On the one

hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude
evidenced in our opinions for First Amendment rights reflects
concern for the public interest in a free flow of news and
commentary.

See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435

u.s.

765, 781-783

u.s.

843, 862-.863 (1974)

(1978)~

Saxbe v. Washington Post
(Powell, J., dissenting).

Co~,

417

On the

other hand, there also is a significant public interest in
according to civil litigants discovery of such matters as may
be genuinely relevant to their lawsuit.
of

wei~fiiRg

Although the process

or balancing these interests is hardly an exact

science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in
this and other areas of the law.

In performing this task trial

4.

judges - despite the heavy burdens most of them carry - should
recognize the "pressing need for judicial supervision."
Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op. at 7.

AFC

3

The Court today also emphasizes that the focus
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 must be
heeded, and that "district courts should not neglect their
power to restrict discovery" in the interest of justice or to
, >

protect the partf
23;

from undue burden or expense.

see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

~'

at 22,

I join the Court's

opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions,
the values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, should be
weighed carefully in striking a proper balance.

FN

1.

l.

See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task

Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-192 (1976);
Conference Recommendations:

W. Erickson, The Pound

A Blueprint for the Justice System

in the Twentieth Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288-290 (1978);
Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up:

G.

A Response from the

United States Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320, 329 (1978);
Powell, Reforms--

Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 458,

461-463 (1978).
~'

2.

See

at 21 n. 25.

3.

In some instances it might be appropriate for the

district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in hopes
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other
developments in discovery might reduce the need for the
material demanded.

It is pertinent to note that respondents

here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time
discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery
should be postponed until other issues on which liability
depend are resolved.
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BRAFT · GPINIGN
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
March 5, 1979

Mr; · Justice -Powell, concurring.
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I am not
entirely convinced that the question presented by this case is
limited to the existence of the editorial privilege claimed by
respondents.

I agree that with respect to pretrial discovery

in a civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of
editorial iudgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the
protection the First Amendment accords the product of this
judgment, namely published speech.

1

But although I also agree

that this protection does not extend to enforcement of the kind
of evidentiary privilege respondents assert, I do believe that
pretrial discovery must be conducted with First Amendment
concerns in mind.
As the Court notes, a district court in supervising
discovery possesses "what in fact and in law are ample powers •
.

. to prevent abuse."

Ante, at 22.

When demands for

discovery threaten interests protected by the First Amendment,

2.

the exercise of these powers becomes a duty.

The burden of

excessive and harassing discovery should not be permitted in
any litigation.

The burden is especially intolerable, however,

when added to the costs of discovery is a risk of reduction in
the flow of information necessary to informed public discussion
of qovernmental affairs.
Bellotti, 435
Post · Co~,

u.s.

See First -National -Bank of · Boston v.

765, 781-783 (1978);

417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974)

Saxbe v. Washington
(Powell, J.,

dissenting).
The initial inquiry in enforcement of any discovery
request is the question of relevance.

Too lenient a standard

allows the parties to saddle each other with excessive,
redundant, and unnecessary demands.

Whatever the standard of
2

relevance applicable in other circumstances,

when evaluating a

discovery demand that trenches on First Amendment interests a
district court should measure relevance by ascertaining the
actual need for the material sought in light of the
intrusiveness of the request.

Where the established need for

the material does not outweigh the First Amendment costs of
meeting the demand, enforcement should be denied.
v. Stanford - Daily, 436
concurrinq).

u.s.

547, 570 (1978)

Cf. Zurcher

(Powell, J.,

3

Beyond determining what demands should be honored, a

3.

district court has considerable discretion to decide when a
request for discovery must be complied with.

In many cases

careful management of the order of discovery can eliminate
conflicts such as that presented here.

Demands that might seem

relevant when made may appear less significant in light of
further discovery or the subsequent elimination of issues to be
tried.

In some cases it may be possible to avoid the conflict

altogether by disposing of the suit on a ground to which the

4
material sought to be discovered would be irrelevant.
These measures are illustrative of the kind of steps a
district court may take to safequard First Amendment interests.
Others can be developed by courts and litigants as problems
arise.

The presence of this power to accomodate First

Amendment concerns where they exist reinforces the Court's
decision not to create a new evidentiary privilege that would
add to the already considerable burdens a public-figure libel
plaintiff must bear without furthering substantially the values
the First Amendment is designed to protect.

1.

As the Court notes, the issue framed by

respondents' motion for permission to appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. S 1292 (b) was:

"What effect should be given to the

First Amendment protection of the press with · respect · to · its
exercise · of · editorial · iadgment in pretrial discovery in a libel
case governed by
(1964)?"

~,

2.

New · York · Times · eo~

v. Sullivan, 376

u.s.

254

at 3-4, n. 3 (emphasis supplied).

Among the proposed amendments to the Feneral Rules

of Civil Procedure are recommendations to restrict the scope of
discovery generally.

See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Practice

and Procedure, . Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, March 1978, at 6-11.
also Powell, Reforms-458, 461-463 (1978);

See

Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
ABA Section of Litigation, Report of the

Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, October 1977.
3.

The District Court held that the matters sought by

petitioner were "clearly relevant."
1977).

73 F.R.D. 387,

(SDNY

Although I agree with the Court that the District Court

properly understood the constitutional elements in a libel
suit, and that it would be inappropriate for this Court to
review the rulings on relevance, ante, at 23 n. 27, I do not

FN 2.

interpret the Court's opinion as barring review of these
rulings by the District Court in light of the views expressed
herein.
4.

I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that

discovery into the exchange of views among press employees
always must be postponed until a preliminary determination of
the falsity of the publication is made.

See post, at 16-17.
~

First, I am not persuaded that in all circumstances inquiry
into these exchanges will exert some impact on future
publications, and I do not believe newsroom conversations, like
any other conversation, enjoy any First Amendment protection
other than what is derived from that accorded published speech.
In addition, I do not believe the issues of falsity and belief
of falsity always will be separable.

Often a trier of fact

will have little or no objective evidence to assess the
accuracy of a published statement, but rather will have to
weigh the probative value of conflicting versions of events.
In assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of
fact would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the
author of one version was warned by a colleague familiar with
the underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous,
inconsistent, or unreasonable.

Denying a libel Plaintiff this

evidence would hobble unfairly his attempt to make a prima

FN 3.

facie showing of falsity.
It is pertinent to this case that respondents had not
sought summary judgment on any issue at the time

~iscovery

was

opposed, and have not argued that discovery should be postponed
until other issues on which liability depend. r are resolved.

lfp/ss
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No. 77-1105 Herbert v. Lando

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

~ltfioc9fi I join the opinion of the Court,

A~J

write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part
IV of

opinion .,..with respect- ..W.. d-iseov€-ry in

a First Amendme~t case of this kind}

~

I do not
I/

my

I •,.,.S

~~ilona:J- observations as inconsistent with thej court

~

opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional
c;

that, in

ex~rcisin§

s~pervisioA

of discovery in

a libel suit by a public figure ~ainst elements of the

medi~, a district court has a duty to consider First
""\.·~~
Amendment ~ as well as those of the plaintiff.
I agree with the Court that the explicit
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in
a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376

u.s.

254 (1964), should not be

expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. /\ This
holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

The Court notes, however, that

whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of

,1-<-J_ ~d ~'lv..

2.
discovery", as a nonconstitUtional matter, is not
before us under the question certified pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1292(b), ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that

lt { Cl
the

t~~l , will

continue and

decision~

wi ll have t e-e

will rev•C'-'.l

m~e

by the District

Court L~

the interrogatories and

questions which respondents declined to answer.
short, the

~ase

In

will return to that court for

completion of pretrial discovery.
I had occasion earlier this Term, in
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF
Industries, Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, No. 78-453,

January ~

, 1979, to comment
~

upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become
a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op . at 5.

,.

;

At the 1946 Term, just a few years

after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment".
Hickman

v~

Taylor, 329

u.s.

495.

The bar was not slow

in heeding his admonition, and indeed in exceeding all too often - the bounds of liberality.

The

situation has reached the point where there is serious
"concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery".

3.
Apte,; at 22.*

~P~:
Pick up some of the citations that I relied on
in my dissent from denial of cert in A~~ and also in my
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in a footnote here
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations.

4.

In view of the evident attention given discovery by the
District Judge in this case it cannot be said that the
process here was "uncontrolled".

But it certainly was

protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all
concerned.*

*See ante at 21
-

)

n. 25.

5.

Under present R ules the initial inquiry in
enforcement of any discovery request is one of
relevance.

Whatever standard of relevance may be

appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a

~
district court should measure relevance in light ofl the
~t-

private interests of the partie s , hearing in mine taat
important public interests

al~o

are implicated.

On the

one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the
solicitude evidenced in our opinions for First
Amendment rights reflects concern for the public
(

(

interest i n a free flow of news and commentary. A ~here
also is a significant public interest in according to
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be

(
genuinely relevant to theirlawsuit.

Although the

process of weighing or balancing these interests is

J

hardly an exact science,

~

is a function customarily

performed by judges in this and other areas of the law.

p-t
Tl.- k
In exe'fit isiCng this ..fnnct jon trial judges - despite the
heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the
"pressing need for judicial supervision."

\{ ......?:_ _ )
Industries, Inc., ~ supra \ a

I

AFC

6.
V\Nil \

Wherei First Amendment right '

A

are

aJQan~e

by

\

t~~resisting discovery, thej )fo urt should make
1-

sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to
specific elements of the demanding party's case.
Court~ opini ~

~st

The

today also emphasizes that the feetts

be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1

must be heeded, and that "district courts should not
neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the
interest of justice or to protect the party from undue
burden or expense.

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

--

--'---

at 22,

23.~join

Ante,

the Court's opinion on my

understanding that in heeding these admonitions,
t

.),L.,

~~I'

rv-c~~t:.t.ef.l-~

...... ~

Ameg(lment

l'i~l+i:,~ r though

entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of
this kind, should be weighed carefully in striking a
proper balance.

Note to Paul:

I have reframed your draft of the

concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the

7.
majority opinion to the extent possible.

I do not want

to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have
said previously in Brapzb.urg and Zur_sher.

I do view

this as basically a discovery case, once the
constitutional issue is put aside.
The above has been dictated even more
hurriedly than usual.

I therefore hold no brief for

its languageor structure, and will count on you to do
your customary careful editing and revising.

Also,

there may be meritorious aspects of your first draft
that I have omitted, and which you can work into a
consolidation of the best ideas of both.
Also, you will have to provide appropriate
footnotes.

lfp/ss
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No~

77-1105 -Herbert

v~

· Lando

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I
write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part
IV of the Court's opinion with respect to discovery in
a First Amendment case of this kind.

I do not view my

additonal observations as inconsistent with the Court's
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional
thought that, in exercising supervision of discovery in
a libel suit by a public figure against elements of the
media, a district court has a duty to consider First
Amendment rights as well as those of the plaintiff.
I agree with the Court that the explicit
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in
a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376

u.s.

254 (1964), should not be

expanded to create an evidentiary privilege.

This

holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

The Court notes, however, that

whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of

2.
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not
before us under the question certified pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1292(b),

~'

at 23. I assume, therefore, that

the trial will continue and decisions will have to be
made by the District Court on the interrogatories and
questions which respondents declined to answer.

In

short, the case will return to that court for
completion of pretrial discovery.
I had occasion earlier this Term, in
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF
Industfies, Inc, et al v. Equa! Employment Qpportugity
Commission, No. 78-453, January

, 1979, to comment

upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become
'

a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op. at 5.

At the 1946 Term, just a few years

after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment".
Hickma~ 1

v. Taylor, 329

u.s.

495.

The bar was not slow

in heeding his admonition, and indeed in exceeding all too often - the bounds of liberality.

The

situation has reached the point where there is serious
"concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery".

3.
Ante; at 22.*

*Paui: Pick up some ·of the citations that I relied on
in-my dissent from denial of cert in .______
ACF and also in my
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in a footnote here
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations.

4.

In view of the evident attention given discovery by the
District Judge in this case it cannot be said that the
process here was "uncontrolled".

But it certainly was

protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all
concerned.*

*see ante at 21, n. 25.

----------

s.

Under present Rrules the initial inquiry in
enforcement of any discovery request is one of
relevance.

Whatever standard of relevance may be

appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a
district court should measure relevance in light of the
private interests of the parties, bearing in mind that
important public interests also are implicated.

On the

one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the
solicitude evidenced in our opinions for First
Amendment rights reflects concern for the public
interestin a free flow of news and commentary.

There

also is a significant public interest in according to
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be
genuinely relevant to theirlawsuit.

Although the

process of weighing or balancing these interests is
hardly an exact science, this is a function customarily
performed by judges in this and other areas of the law.
In exercising this function trial judges - despite the
heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the
"pressing need for judicial supervision."
Industries, Inc., supra at

AFC

6.
Where First Amendment rights are advanced by
the party resisting discovery, the Court should make
sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to
specific elements of the demanding party's case.

The

Court's opinion today also emphasizes that the focus
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1
must be heeded, and that "district courts should not
neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the
interest of justice or to protect the party from undue
burden or expense.
at 22, 23.

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

Ante,

I join the Court's opinion on my

understanding that in heeding these admonitions,
properly asserted First Amendment rights, though
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of
this kind, should be weighed carefully in striking a
proper balance.

Nqte

~o

Pau!:

I have reframed your draft of the

concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the

7.
majority opinion to the extent possible.

I do not want

to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have
said previously in

~ranzbyrg

and ZuFcher.

I do view

this as basically a discovery case, once the
constitutional issue is put aside.
The above has been dictated even more
hurriedly than usual.

I therefore hold no brief for

its languageor structure, and will count on you to do
your customary careful editing and revising.

Also,

there may be meritorious aspects of your first draft
that I have omitted, and which you can work into a
consolidation of the best ideas of both.
Also, you will have to provide appropriate
footnotes.

lfp/ss
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No~

77-1105 Herbert v. Lando

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

Although I join the opinion of the Court, I
write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part
IV of the Court's opinion with respect to discovery in
a First Amendment case of this kind.

I do not view my

additonal observations as inconsistent with the Court's
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional

H.-f;

thought ~ in

exercising supervision of discovery in a

libel suit by a public figure against elements of the
media, a district court has a duty

toJ b~d tRa~

First Amendment rights as well as those of the
plaintiff, muot be consioeree,

I agree with the Court that the explicit ~~
1

protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this
kind

)

~articulated
1\

by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an
evidentiary privilege.

This holding requires a

reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The

~ urt notes, however, that
judge properly
us 4:-ft-

applied the rules of
of efis

~

a~Rea~ise ~

~

the question;

certified

~k

~de~

~

2.
28

u.s.c.

§1292(b), -ante,
at 23.
-'--

an interlocatery

app~

T.Awlii,

s~Ree

this, is

~~~

I assume that the trial will
.(

continue and decisions will have to be made by the

).k

.

District Court on Interrogatories and questions which
J\

~

respondents decline to answer.
A
In short, the case will

~retrial

discovery.

1\

I had occasion earlier this Term, in
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF
Industries, Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity
, 1979,

Commission, No. 78-453, January
~

f>~~ ~

the widespread abuse of discovery that has

become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil
litigation.

Slip op. at 5.

At the 1946 Term

~

tni€

)

re"onr±-, just a few years after adoption of the Federal

~eu..Awas stated "that the

Rules of Civil Procedure, i.t

""

deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment".
495.

Hickman v. Taylor, 329

u.s.

The bar was not slow in

~ee~

fhe

sit~tion

has reached the point where there

is serious "concern about undue and uncontrolled
discovery".

*Paul:

Ante, at 22.*

Pick up some of the citations that I relied on

3.
in my dissent from denial of cert in ACF and also in my
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in-a footnote here
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations.

4.

[~~----------~ In view of the evident attention given
discovery by the District Judge in this case it cannot
be said that the process here was "uncontrolled".
it

B

certainly#{ protracted

*see ante at 21, n. 25.

But

5.

Under present

~les

the initial inquiry in

is~~o~~

enforcement of any discovery request
relevance.

Whatever standard of relevance may be
i~

appropriate in other types of cases,

~

~

A

cJea~~~

~

•Lln:rt wneR BQar;.oe1!ifl§ a discovery demand

arguably

impinges on First Amendment rights a~istrict ~ourt

.

, (,~

.

should measure relevance 1n l1ght of theA coRzxletiHg

a:,.~
interests of the

parties ~ earing

in mind that
1\

~

~/~~~,

/'"-~ in teres~ ~- ~aolQlll ~-i·.rate in--ml'Ltlre.
as this Court has repeatedly

~

On the one hand,

recognized ~ the

solicitude

evidenced in our opinions for First Amendment rights

~t;&¥i'l

~~~~~~

reflects concern for the public interest

.

~

11

There also

~~ -

is a significant public interest in according to civil
litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely
relevant to

~

~ 9ive~

lawsuit.

Although the process of

"

weighing or balancing these interests is hardly an
exact

is a function

to limitin

.4~·""'-

6.
~CZ&Be ar:y at incrf ginal dj reo ~

~ ~ere First Amendment rights are advanced

tlae;'z

ar

by the party resisting discovery, the ¢ ourt should make

_?4f67?
sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to
specific elements of the demanding party's case.

The

Court's opinion today also emphasizes that the focus
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1
must be heeded, and that "district courts should not
\\

neglect their power to restrict discovery in the
interest of; fustice or to protect the party from undue
burden or expense.
at 22, 23.

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

Ante,

I join the Court's opinion on my

understanding that in heeding these admonitions}
properly asserted First Amendment rights, though
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of

eet.~r·~

this kind, should be weighed in striking a proper

\

balance.

Note to Paul:

I have reframed your draft of the

concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of

7.
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the
majority opinion to the extent possible.

I do not want

to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have
said previously in Branzparg and Zurcher.

I do view

this as basically a discovery case, once the
constitutional issue is put aside.
The above has been dictated even more
hurriedly than usual.

I therefore hold no brief for

~~~,
its

language~

and will count on you to do your

customary careful editing and revising.

Also, there

may be meritorious aspects of your first draft that I
have omitted, and which you can work into a
consolidation of the best ideas of both.
Also, you will have to provide appropriate
footnotes.
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TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

OPINION

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
March 9, 1979

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately
to elaborate on what is said in Part IV of the opinion.

I do

not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's
opinion;

rather, I write to emphasize the additional point

that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
figure ' a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment

interests . as well

~ ~ ~-;;:,~~.X
of the plaintiff.

asA~e

I agree with the Court that the explicit
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case
of this kind, as articulated by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an
evidentiary privilege.

With respect to pretrial discovery in a

civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of editorial
judgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the protection the
First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely
published speech.

This holding requires a reversal of the

2.

judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Court notes, however,

that whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us
under the question certified pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1292(b),

ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will
continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories
and questions which respondents declined to answer.

In short,

the case will return to that court for completion of pretrial
discovery.
occasion f arlier this Term, in
~

dissenting from the d nial of certiorari in ACF Industries,
Commission, No. 78-

Inc.
453

(Jan~

8, 1979), to comment upon the widespread abuse of

discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in
civil litigation.

Slip op. 1 at 5-7.

At the 1946 Term, just a

few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment".
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495.

The bar was not slow in

heeding this admonition, and indeed in exceeding - all too

,

~ac...~~~~
often- the bounds of ~liberality. A The situation has reached
the point where there is serious "concern about undue and
uncontrolled discovery".

Ante, at 22. 1

In view of the evident

attention given discovery by the District Judge in this case it
cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled".

But

it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for
all concerned.

2

Under present Rules the initial inquiry in
enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance.
Whatever standard e£

1!elev~lic ;ymay be appropriate in other

types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on
First Amendment rights a district court should measure
relevance in light of both the private needs of the parties and
the

~ott~

public concerns implicated.

On the one hand, as

this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude evidenced
in our opinions for First Amendment rights reflects concern for

"'~,;:;:]
the Apublic interest i n a free flow of news and commentary.

See

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435

u.s.

765, 781-

783 (1978):

u.s.

843, 862-

Saxbe v. washington Post Co., 417

863 ( 1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).

On the other hand, there

also is a significant public interest in according to civil
litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely
relevant to their lawsuit.

Although the process of balancing

these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function
customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of
the law.

In performing this task trial judges - despite the

4.

heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the
"pressing need for judicial supervision."

AFC Industries, Inc.

3

v. EEOC, supra, slip op. at 7.
1
The Court today also emphasizes that the focus
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 must be
heeded, and that "district courts should not neglect their
power to restrict discovery" in the interest of justice or to
protect the parties from undue burden or expense.
23;

see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

~'

at 22,

I join the Court's

opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions,
the district court must ensure that the values protected by the
First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege
in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a
proper balance.

FN 1.

1.

See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task

Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-192 (1976);
Conference Recommendations:

W. Erickson, The Pound

A Blueprint for the Justice System

in the Twentieth Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288-290 (1978);
Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up:

G.

A Response from the

United States Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320, 329 (1978);
Powell, Reforms--

Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 458,

461-463 (1978).
2.

See ante, at 21 n. 25.

3.

In some instances it might be appropriate for the

f.4

district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in~hope;
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other
developments in discovery might reduce the need for the
material demanded.

It is pertinent to note that respondents

here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time
discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery
should be postponed until other issues on which liability
depend are resolved.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105
March 13, 1979
As you can see, I have suggested that you add to page 1

a bit of the First Amendment discussion I had in my first draft.
All of my co-clerks felt it desirable to expand somewhat your
analysis of the First Amendment issue, in order to aid the
treatment of relevance on pages 2-3.

Briefly stated, the concern

was that lower courts be given guidance in identifying the First
Amendment interests to be weighed in assessing relevance.

I have

offered up some of my original language, as edited by my
colleagues.

If this meets with your approval, we can take this

to the print shop forthwith.

1.

I

~r~with Mr. Justice

eaRAnotA ~

Brennan that the

First Amendment requires that discovery into the exchange of
views among press employees

~

must be postponed until a

preliminary determination of the falsity of the publication is
made.

~rst ,

See post, at 16-17.

into these

conversations are like any other conversations, as they enjoy
no special First Amendment protection other than what they

~4~~~~~~

derive from that accorded to published speech.

·

"

~,I
~

·

do not believe the issues of falsity and belief of falsity
always will be separable.

Often a trier of fact will have

little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a
published statement, but rather will have to weigh the
probative value of conflicting versions of events.

In

assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of fact
would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the author of
one version was warned by a colleague familiar with the

~
underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous,

~

inconsistent, or unreasonable.

+at~~

11 evidence

Denying a libel plaintiff this

~~-~-~

would ~ &o~sl~fa i r~ h1s attempt

~~~4,~~~ ..,.,~,
~sh;;;;w:;i;:;ry-ef

falsie¥ .

~~/'tt..c...~.

()

~o:

The Chief Just1oe
Mr. Justice ar~nnan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Juat l ae ib1te
Mr. Just 1oa l!a rshall
Mr. Just 1 ee Bla/kmun
Mr. Jus t1 a H~ hnquist.

Mr.

Stevens

Ju sti~e

From: Mr. Just i ce Powell
Circulated: _______________

2nd DRAFT

28MAR1C': 1 r_l

No. 77-1105
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApBarry Lando et al.
peals for the Second Circuit.'
[March -, 1979]

MR.

PowELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to
elaborate on what is said in Part IVf.\oWhe. opini~ I do
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point
that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure,
a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiffs.
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as
articulated by New York Times ·,r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding,
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys
depends entirely on the protectiou the First Amendment
accords the product of this judgment, namely published
speech. As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents
claim is unnecessary to safeguard publis~d speech. 1 This
-1
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Amcndnwnt. require:; that discovery into the ex ange of views among
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holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether "the trial
judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us under the question certified
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume,
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which
respondents declined to answer.
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S.
/ 495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage
of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue
and uncontrolled discovery." Ante, at 22. 2 In view of the
belief of falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact wiii have
little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a published statement, but rather will have to weigh the probative value of conflicting
versions of events. In asse;:;sing the eredibility of the,;e versions, the trier
I ol' fact would br c•utitled to cou~ider evidence that, for example, the author
of onr version wa~ warned by a colleague familiar with the underlying fact:;
tlwt hi~ conclusion:; wrre dubiouo, incousistrnt, or unverified. Denying a
librl plaintiff the beurfit of thi::; typr of Pvidence would restrict unduly hi,;
uttPmpt to mc•et the ;dread~, high ~tandard of proof that New York Times
Co. nfford~ thr prPH>'.
2 See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74
F. H. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendat ions: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twentieth Cen-

·.

77-1105-CONCUR
HERBERT v. LANDO

3

evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled."
But it C<'rtainly was l)rotracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all concerned.~
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of
any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a
district court should measure the degree of relevance required
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public
concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has
repeatedly recognized. the solicitude for First Amendment
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the
important public interest in a free flow of news and commentary. See F'irst National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765. 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 862-863 (1974) (PowELL, J .. dissenting). On the other
hand. there also is a significant public interest in according to
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing
the "pressing need for judicial supervision:" AFC Industries,
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op., at·7. 1
tury, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bell, The Pound Conference
Follow-Up: A Respon~e from the United States Department of Justice,
76 F. R. D. 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 .Record
of N. Y. C. B. A. 458, 461-463 (1978).
3 See ante, at 21 n. 25.
~ In some in~tarJCes it might be appropriate for the · district court to
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of
issues through summary ji.1dgment or other developments in ·discovery
might reduce the need for the material dematlded. It is pertinent to note
that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any "jssue at

77-1105-CONCUR
HERBERT v. LANDO

The Court today emphasizes that the focus must be on
relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that "district courts
should not neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden
or expense. Ante, at 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c).
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~
ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed
carefully in striking .a proper ba1ance.

t he time discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should
be postponed un t il other issues on which liability depend are resolved.
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MR . .1t":'iTICE PowELL, eonc ul'ring.
T jom the op1nion of t lw Court, and write separately to
elaborate on what is said in Part TV of the opinion. I do
not see my obsPrvations as being inconsiste-nt with the Court's
opinion; ratiH'r. I write to emphasizf' the additional point
that, in superv1si ng discovery in a libel suit by a public figure,
a district court has a du ty to eonsider First Ameudment interests as well as the privat<' interests of the plaintiffs.
I agrPe with the Court that the explicit constitutional protectwn of First Amendme nt rights in a case of this kind, as
articulated by X e w 1·ork Times -.r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964) , '5hould JJot be Pxpanded to create an evidentiary privileg<'. With reRpect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding,
what<>ver protcctwu th t' "exNcisP of editorial judgment" ('njoys
d('JlPnds cntm,ly on the protection tlw :First Amendment
accords tlw product of this judgment, namely published
sp<'('Ch. As the Court makes clear. the privilege respondents
claim 1· unnecessary to ::;afeguard published speeeh.' This
1 I am not 111 :~grt'<'llH:'lll with ·: \fn ..Jtrt''l' It'E BHEKXAX th:~l the Fir~t
.\nwndnH•nt n•qtlln·~ that di~t·ov<·r~· uno t h<• <'X<'hangc• of \'if'w:< :tlllOil![
JliW~ PlllJll0.\'1'(':-< lllll:.:t I)(' postpmwd tiiJtil a prPliminar~· dPt<·nninntion ol'
ilw l'ai"Ity of ill!' publif'atiOn i,.. madl'. Sc•t• Jlu,~ l. at l(i-li . :\or am T
JH'r:<uadPd 1ha I c·otll't -:.:IIJWI'V I"t'd mqt11ry into t lw:.:p I'X<'hang;t•:< i" likd~· i o
l'XI'rl :1 :.: Igmfll':tll! pffpc•l on fu t nrc• pubhea I ion~.
:\ t·w~room t·onn·r"a tion~
an· llkt• an.' ol ht•r c·onn·r"a t ion~, ina~nJttch "" tJi p~· Pnju~ · no >'JH'<'ial Fir~t
.-\mc•IHlnwni proiPc·iwn oihc·r thau what th<'~ · clPrivt• from lhni II<'<'Ofdl'd 10
puloli:.:lwd ~l'<'<'<'h
\lot<·m·c·I. I do not br lie\'(' llw i:.:~ut •:.: of fal:<it~· nnd
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holding rt>quin'S a reversal of the judgnwnt of the Court of
Appt>als. ThP ( 'ourt notes. however. that whether "the trial
judge prop<•rly applied the rules of discovery.'' as a uonconstitutional mattN. is not before us under th!:' questi011 certified
pursuant to ~8 l'. S.C.~ 1:292(b), ante, at 23. r assume.
tlH'rc·fore, that the litigatiott will coutinuP and the District
Court will reviE-w tlw Interrogatories and questions which
respondents declitH'cl to answr1·.
Earli<'r this Term. in dissPnting from the denial of certiorari
in A CP Industries, l11c. v. Eq-ual b' rnployment Opportunity
Commission, ).io. 78-453 (Jan. 8. 197H). I had occasion to
cumnwnt upon th!:' widespread abuse of discovery that has
beconw a prillt<' cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op .. at 5-7. At the 1H46 Term . just a few years after
adoption of the Federal H ules of Civil Procedure. this Court
stated "that tlw deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment." H·i ckman Y. Taylor, 32g U.S.
405. Tlw bar and trial courts understandably responded
affirmatively. .\s tlw years have passed. discovery tech niq U<'S
aud tactiCS have h<'conw a highly developed litigation art-one
not infrequpntly <'xploited to the disadvantage of justice. As
the Court now JW•ognizt'S. tlw situation has reached the poiut
wherP tlwr<• IS ~enous "concerti about undue and uncontrollPd
rhscovery. · .-l11te, at 2:2." ln viP'v\' of tlw evident attention
hdu•l of f: d~tl~· alwa~·s will ])(' ,pparablP. Oft<'ll a tri<'l' of fatl will han·
11111(' or no ohJt>ttiv<· <'Vtd<'llt<' to """<'H~ lh<' a<·eura<·~· of :1 published statt·lll<'lll, hnl rallwr 1\'lll hav<' lo weigh t.lw probativr valur of eonflicting
I'('J'"lOll~ of ('\'Pill,., ln :L1<1<('""ing th1• (' I'PdibiJit~ · of t]H':-i(' V<'l'1<101lH, 1]1(' lrit•J'
of la<'l would IH' <'ntitiPd to <·vtdPIW<' that , for PxampiP, tlw author of otu·
1'(' 1'"1011 wa:.; warnpd IJ,I' a l'oill':tglt<' familiar with tlw umlPrlying fact~ thai
]u,- <·ouciu"JOII" ll'(' fP duhwu,, ineon;o<t,.;(pnt, or unv<•rifiPd. Drn~·ing a lil)('l
plamttff t]u, t~·p<· ol <'VtdPIH'<' would n•,.;l net undul~· hi,; attPmpt 10 mP<'t
th<· a lrPad~· !ugh ,.tandanl of woof th:il .\'ew fork Times C'o . :d'l'ord,
lht Jll'<'""
" :-iP<' ABA, H<•porl of Pound C'onfpn•ne<· Follow-Fp Ta;-;k Fore<·, 7-!
r H D. 159, 191-1!:12 (HI7uJ, W. Enrk~on, Tlw Pound Confprenc<' He<'oJmueiHiatwu" ,\ Bhwpnnt for tlw .Jn"ti<'r R~Al'm Ill tlw TwPntieth C'en-
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f!_J\'£'11 dJf-;('0\'C'I'Y hy thE' District .Jud~!;C' in this <·as<· it c·nrtrrol br
:-;nirl thnt thr proec•ss hPrc• 11·ns "tiiH'ontroll<·d... Hut it <·<·rtn i nly 11·as prot raetC'd and undouhkd l.v was <'.'\ p<'nsi ,.<. for ali
con CC' r nC'< 1.
rndC'r pn•sent Rul<·s thC' initial inquiry ir1 rnfor<·<·nwnt of
any discoVPry n•quest is one• of rC'kvaJtC<'. \\'hat<'VN standard
may I)(' appropriate in othPr typ<'S of case'S. wh<·n a discovC'ry
drmand arguably impinges ou First . \uwrHI IIH'n t rights a
distrirt <'OIIrt should nl('aSIII'<' th<' degn'<' of relC'vanc<• requirc'd
in light of both tlw prinltc• JIPC'ds of tlw partiPf' and thE' public
corw<'I'IIS 11nphratC'd. Or1 tlw OJH' hand. as this Court has
l'C'])('at<•dly J'<'eogrtiz('d, tlH' solieitudt' for First Amen<lm<•rt t
rights r\·idPJIC<'d in our opinions rl'fi<'cts conC<'I'Il for the
important public in t<'r<·st in a fret' flow of lll'WS and eolnnwntary. :-I<•<• First Yational Ua11k of Boston \'.Bellotti, 43;) r. S.
7(),), 7~1-7H3 I l!J7H); 8a.rue , .. Washinuton Post Co., 417 F. ~.
R4~. g()2-I·W:~ (1!174) (Pow ~:LL, J.. dissentin11;). On tbe other
hand. thc•rc· also is a significant public intt>n'st in aeconling to
civil litigants di:-.l·ovc·ry of such Jllatt~:·rs as may lw g<'JJUinely
rC'IPvant to tlwir la\Ysuit. \lthuu~!;h tlw procf'ss of weighing
tiH·se lllt<'n•sts is hardly :111 <·xact sci('llC<'. it is a fur1ction customarily carrie>d out by Jlld _g<·::> in this and other an'as of th('
law. In p<'rfonning this task trial judges-despite the heavy
burd('JIS most of tlwm carry-an• now increasingly r<>cognizinl!the "pressing nPed for Judicial supPrvision." A Ji'C Industries,
l11c. , .. h'EOC, supra, sli p op .. at 7. 1

'iti F H. D. '277, '2HR-::WO (197R): C:. H<'ll, Tlw Pound Confl'r<:'ll<'<'
FollO\\-l 'p: .-\ H<'SjlOI\~(' fmm th<• l'llltl'd Stat!':; .l)ppartnwnt or .Ju~tll'C,
iii F H. D. :t!O, :{'2!) (l!J'i.'·\): J'owl'll, Hl'fonn,.-Long (h-crdtt<', ;{;3 Hreord
tur~· ,

of~ .

Y. C . B. A.

45~">,

.J,til--lti;{

(107~) .

'' :-It·<· aute. :tl :..!J 11 25
' Itt :<onw ut~t:ttH·c·~ tt mtght lw :tppmpri:ti<' for the• di~triC'f roll!'( to
dt•lay <'llfor·emg :t dt,c·m·<·r~ · d<·mand, Ill th<• hop<' that t hl' rl'>'oluttort of
'~·' llr" through :<umnw r~· ,JIId!!;llH'ttt or otlwr d<'Yl'lopmrnt" 111 di~<·on•ry
ll•l~?;ht n•dtH'l' th<· tH·l'd for illl' m:ttPI'l:tl dl'maJHkd. It t~ JH•rtuH'nt to note
that l'l'~pondPtth hPJ'<' h:td not -<onght Rumm:tr~· judgm<'ttt on a ttY i~~ll<' ;tt
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The C'ourt today emphasizes that th<' focus must Of' on
relevancf', that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must be heeded. a11d that "district courts
should not neglect thf'il' power to restrict discovPry'' in the
interest of justice or to protect the parties from uudue burden
or expense. Ante, at 2:2. :2:3; see Fed. Rule C'iv. Proc. 26 (c).
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~
ing these admonitions, tlw district court must ensurf' that the
values protected by the First Amendnwnt. though Pntitlf'd to
no collstitutional privileg<' in a case of this kind, are wt-ighed
carefully in striking a proper balance,

tlH• i IIIH' di~cov<'r~· wa~ oppo~NI , and havt> not argu<'d that di~rowr~· ~hould
Le po~tpoued until ot lwr i~~u<·~ on which liability dcpc·nd are l'<"~olv<'d.
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring,
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to
elaborate on what is said in Part IV. M-the 9pinial\: I do
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point
that, in supPrvising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure,
a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiffs.
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as
articulated by New York Times ·,r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
( 1964), should not be expanded to create au evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding,
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys
depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment
accords the product of this judgment, namely pubtished
speech. As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents
claim is unnecessary to safeguard published speech. 1 This
1 I am not in agreement with MH. JusTICE BHENNAN that the First
Amendment requires that discovery into the exchange of views among
pres~ c-mployee:s mnHt br postponed until a preliminary determination of
thr fabity of t.hr· publication iH made. See po8t, at 16--17. Nor am I
per~uaded that court-supervi::;ecl inquiry into these exchang('ti is likely to
Pxert a Hignificant effect on futurE' publicationl:i. New~room conver:>a tions
arc like any othc·r ronvPr,;ation:;, ina::nnuch as they <>njoy no special Fir::;t
AmP11dmcnt protrction other than what they derive from that accorded to
publi~hed ~prech . :\lorcover, I do not. believe the j:;;;ueH of fal::;ity and

/
'Y

77-1105-CONCUR

2

HERBERT v. LANDO

holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether "the trial
judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us under the question certified
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume,
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which
respondents declined to answer.
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. 'Taylor, 329 U. S.
r 495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage
of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue
and uuco11trolled discovery." Ante, at 22.~ In view of the
belief of falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact will have
little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a published statement, but. mth<>r will have to weigh the probative value of conflicting
versions of ev<>nts. In asses~ing the eredibility of these versions, the trier
/of fad would bt> rntitled to con;,;idt>r evidenct• that, for example, the author
of onr vNsion waH warned by a colleague familiar with the underlying fact::;
that hi~ conclusion~ were dubiou:s, inconsistent, or unverified. Denying a
( libel plaint iff the bPnefit of this type of Pvidence would re:;trict unduly his
attempt to mPet the alrPad~· high ~tandard of proof that New York 'l'imes
Co . afford~ the pre,.;~.
2 See ABA, R<:>port of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74
F . R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976) ; W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations : A Blueprint for the .Tustice Sy~:;tem in the Twentieth Cen-
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cvi(lcnt attention given discovery by the District Judge in this
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled."
But it crrtainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all concerned. ~
Under present Rules the initial inquiry · in enforcement of
any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a
district court should measure the degt·ee of relevance required
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public
concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has
repeatedly recognized. the solicitude for First Amendment
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the
important public interest ill a free flow of news and commentary. See First National Bank nf Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765. 781- 783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843. 862- 863 (1974) (PowELL. J .. dissenting). On the other
hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing
the "pressing need for .i udicial supervision:" AFC!ndustties,
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op., at·7. 1
lury, 76 F . R D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bi>Il, The Pound Conference
Follow-Up: A Res pon~e from the United States Department of Justice,
76 F . R D . 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 Record
of N. Y. C. B. A. 458,461-463 (1978).
3 See ante, a.t 21 n. 25.
4 In some instances it might be appropriate for the · district court, to
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of
issurs through summary ji.1dgment or other developments in ·discovery
might reduce the need for the material demailded. It is pertinent to note
that respondent;; here had not sought summary judgment on :tny issue at
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The Court today emphasizes tha.t the focus must be on
relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that "district courts
should not neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden
or expense. Ante, a.t 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c).
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~
ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed
carefully in striking a proper balance.

the t ime discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should

be postponed un til other issnes on which liability depend. are resolved.
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MR. JrwrJCE PowELL, concurring.
'P~
1 ,10111 tlw opmion of tlw Court, and write separately to
elaborat<' on what is said in Part IV of the opinion. I do
not see my obs<>rvations as being inconsistent with the Court's t?Ju..5 ~
opinion; ratht'r. I write to emphasi~e the additional point
~
that, in su]wrv1sin~ discovery in a libel suit by a public figure,
a district court ha::; a duty to consider First Amendment interPsts as v,:ell as tlw privatl' ;nterests of the plaintiffs.
I agrPe '1\ith the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendnwnt rights in a case of this kind, as
articulated by Sew )'ork Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
( 1964). should not be expanded to create au evidentiary privilegr. \Yith respect to prPtrial discovery in a civil proceeding.
whatever protection thr "exercisP of editorial judgment'' rnjoys
clepPIHis ent1rrly on thr protection the Ji..,irst Amendment
accords tlw prod uet of this judgment, namely published
sp<'t>Ch. As the Court mak<'s clear. thP privilege respoll(leuts
C'laim u; unnecessary to safeguard published speeeh.' This

~

~~w-:

1 [ am not Ill a~l'<'Pilll-'lll w1t h

.\Tn .. J t ' ><'I'H't; BHt:Xx AX that the Fir~t
that rh:'('OV<'I'~· Ill tO tlw ('X('hangP of viPW>' alliOII!!
f). ~ ~
])(' postponPd 11111!1 a pn•liminary dl't1•rmination of
~
tlw lal~<lt~· of th<' pubiH'atwn ~~ mud1•. :::;e<· post. at ll)-.17 . :\or am I _ 1 .. . • .
~- ~
p<'r~uad!'d that r·ourt-~<ll]l!'fVI"('d inqulr~· into th<'"l' I'X<'hHIII!I'" i" likt'l~· fo -r ~
l'X!'I't a "l!l;lllhl'alll p[fr'l'l on fntlll'<' publH'ation~. :'\pw,.room I'OilV<'I'>'atlon~
an· lib· :111~ oth1•r r·onVI'I'"atioll", ina>'lllll<'h HH tb1·~· l'lljo,\' 110 "JX•eial Fir"t
.\!lii'IHinwnl prolt•l'tiOII oth1·r than what thp~· dPriv1• from that H('f'ordPd to
])llhiJ,.]H'cf ")'!'''''" \lon•owt , l do not hrJi('\'1' tlw i""ll('" of fal"ify and

l't'(!111f('~
pn·~, Plllplo~·~·p,.. lllll:'t
\mt'ndnH'Ill

'r•

'
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tf . . ,. .
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holding requires a rc•versal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The Court notes. however. that whether "tlw trial
judge properly applied the rules of discovery.'' as a uonconstitutional mattPr. is not before us under the q uestio11 certified
pursuant to 28 l'. ~. C. ~ 1:2!12 (b). ante, at 23. I assume.
therefore, that the litigatioii will con tiu ue and the District
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which
respondents declined to answer.
Earlier this Terlll, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari
iu A CF lnd-ustrws, Inc. v. E' qual E mploymeu t Opportunity
Cunumssion, ~o . 78-45:3 (Jan. 8, 1979). I had occasion to
comment upon tht' widespread abuse of discovery that has
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
;jlip op., at f)-7. At the 1D4ti Term. just a few years after
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and libPral treatment. '' Hickman Y. 'l'aylor, 329 U.S.
----~4'i"i~"J5..,Z ThP bar and trial courts uudcrstandably respond<><!
~lftirmatiwly. As th0 ypars have passed. discovery techuiqm·s
aud tactics have lwconw a highly developed litigation art-oJJe
not wfrequently exploited to tht> disadvantage of justice. As
the ( 'ourt now recognizes. the situation has reached the poiJlt
wherP there IS s0rious "concerll about uudue aud uncontrolled
discovery.'' Ante, at 22.~ ln viPw of t he <•vidcnt attentio11
lwlwt of fabtly alw11ys wtll bt· ·'~'JlHrablP. Often a trier of fact will hal'!'
!Jtllt• or no ohJeetJV<' t•vJdPntP to a~~<'s~ tlw a<·eurae~· of a publisbrd sta tt·lll<'ll t, but mtlwr will ha vt• 1o \n•igb t.ht> proba 1ive value of !'OIJHicting
Y!'l'~JOn,; of !'VP!ll~ .
ln a,.;~('~>'lllO' tlw <·rPdibility of th!'~<· wr,-iou,.; the tri1·r
ol tad would lw PHtiiiPd to r·vidPne!' that, or t-xamp <'. t w author of oJH·
\'Pr,:ion wa~ wamPd IJ_,. ;1 eoll!•Hg;IIP familwr wit.h thP undrrlyiug facts that
lu" t·oJJelu,.;iou~ wPr!' dubwu", lli!'On~t~tC'nt, or unv!'l'tfird. DC'n~·ing a libd
p amttfl tht~ t~·pp of PvtdPIIr!' would r!',.;tnet unduly ~a
o met•
th! alrPad~ · htgh "taudard of proof thai i\'eu· rork Times ('u . afford,·
llw pn'""
" :-i<'<' AHA , BPporl of Pound Confen•Jte<· Follow-lip Ta::;k Fore<·, ~~
F H. D 159, Hll- l!J:l ( 1\)71)) ; W. Em· bon, Tlw Pound Conferenee RPeflJlllll!'JJdatton" A Bht ~'Jil'lltl for tlw .Ju,.;til'r :-:;y~t!'lll lll tlw Twt•Jttieth C'en-
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rlu.;(•overy hy tlw District .Judp;C' in this <·asP it ('llllllol lH'
snirl ilHtt tiH' }H'O<'<'SS lwn• \\'HS "urH·orJtroll<"d." Bnt Jt <·c•rtniJdy \\'as protradC'd and urHioubtc•dl.v \\'as PXiH' JisiYc' for all
C011C<'I'll<'d.

"C'ndPr prN;t•nt Ru1Ps th<' initial inquiry in Pnfon•pnwnt of
nny discovf'ry r<'q u<•st u; onr of r<•lPvall<'<'. \Yhal<'V<'r standard
may be appropriate in otlwr typ<'S of easPs. wiH•n a discovery
d<•mand arguably imping<•s 011 First AllH'IHinl('nt rights a
district eonrt f'lhould nwasurc tiH' degrP<' of relrvanc<' required
in light of both tlw pnvat<' rre<'ds of tlw partiPs and th<' public
cOIH'<'l'llS 1mplicat<•d. On tiH• OlH' hand. as this Court has
n•lwatPdly n•cogniz<•d. tlw sol.ieituck for J;"irst Amendnwnt
rip;h ti'l f'\·idPnC('(l in om opinions rdkcts concPrJl for the
i111 portant public in t<•rt>st i11 a fr<:><' flo\\' of m•ws and comnwntary. 8<'<' fi'll'sl .\.at ional Hank of Boston \',Bellotti, 435 r. R.
7(i,). 7H1 - 7R:~ t 1\178); 8a.rln' \', Wash.inuton Post Co., 417 r.,.
84:~. 862-~(i:~ (1!J74) (Pow~:LL ..J.. diss<•ntinp;). On the other
hand. th<•n• alRo iR a signifiean t public in ten•st in according to
civil litigants dir-c()wry of such 1natters as may lw gPnuin<'ly
r·<>lcvant to tlwir lawsuit. .\ltl10ugh tlw process of weighing
thPSP Jllt<'r<'f'lts iR hardly 1111 t''\act scieneP. it is a function customarily carriPd out by Jltdg,t·::> in this and other areas of the
law. l11 p<'rforllling this task trial judges-despite the hea\'Y
burden~ most of tlwm earry-an· 110w increasingly recognizing
the "prrssing nePd for ,1udicial SUJ>Prvision." AF() Industries,
Inc.\'. EEOC', su1n·a. slip op .. at i.'
7(i F . H. D. '277 , 2i'o:I'-2\:JO (197~): <:. Bl.'ll, Thr Pound Confrrenl'r
Follow-! ' p. .\ Hp,.;poll,.;t• from t lw l 'mt t•rl ~~at P~ Dt>pa rtnwnt of .J n,.;fJee,
IIi F H. D . :~:.!0, :tm (HJ71,): l'owl'll. H<'form~-Lon~ (herdnt•, 3:3 Hc•eord
of X . Y. C. B. A. 451'\, -tfil - -tfi;{ ( l\J71-)
~ S<'<' antt·. at :.!1 n '21)
'In 'onw lll~talH't'~ If might ht• appropri;tf(' for ilw <h~triC't ronrt to
delay en forc·mg a dJ~c·oYPr~ d<•ma nd, 111 tht• hop<• that t lw t'l'~olntion of
,,.,.;up,. thron!!;h ~llllllll<!l'~ ' ,ltl(lgm<•nt or othl'r dt•vt•lopmrllt~ Ill dt~I'OY\'1')'
llllf);ht rPdtt<'<' the• n<·l'd for 1hP mat<'l'l<ti dt•mandt>d.
lt "' JWrtin<•nt to notP
lh:tt l'~'"'pond<•nt" hPn· had not "<lltght summary ,1udgment on any b,;ut• ;It
lm~ · ,

rt "',-.
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The Court today emphasilles that the focus must be on
relevancf'. that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must br heeded. and that "district courts
should not neglect their power to restrict discovPry'' in the
interest of justice or to protect the parties from u11due burden
or expense. Ante, at 22. 2:3; seP Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c).
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that i11 heed~
ing these admonitions. the district court must ensure that th~'
values protected by tlw First Amendment. though entitled to
no constitutional privilegP in a case of this kind, are w~ighed
carefully in striking a proper balance,

tlw I inw di~l·ov<·r~· wa,; O]l[)(l~Pd , and havt> not argut>d tlwt diHrovt>r~· ~<houlcl
be po~tpoued until otlwr i~~'llt'~' on which Jiabilily depend are re~olved .
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part.
R espondents are representatives of the news media. They
are defendants in a libel action brought by petition er, Lieu..
tenant Colonel Anthony Herbert (U. S. Army , R et.) , who is .t
concededly a public figure. The Court today rejects respond- .
ents' claim that an "editorial privil ege" shields from discovery
information that would reveal respondents' editorial processes.
I agree with the Court that no such privilege in sulates factual
matters that may be sought during discovery, and that such a
privilege should not shield respondents' "mental processes."
568 F. 2d 974, 995 (CA2 1977) (Oakes, j.). I would hold ,
however, that the First Amendment requires predecisional
communication among editors to be protected by an editorial
privilege, but that this privil ege must yield if a public figure
plaintiff is able to demonstrate to the prima faci e satisfaction
of a trial judge that the libel in question con stitutes defama;.
tory falsehood .
I
The Court of Appeals below stated that "the issue presented
by this case is whether, and to what extent, inquiry into the
editorial process, conducted during discovery in a New York
Times v. Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the
work of reporters and broadcast€rs." 568 F. 2d , at 979
(Kaufman , C. J .). The Court grouped the discovery inquiries
·objected to by respondents into five categories:
" 1. Lando 's conclusions during his research and investi·
gations regarding people or ·leads to be pursued, or

~

.a;4~.
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310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). Respondent is concededly a public
figure; "[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press
to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in
public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of
'public officials.'" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S.
130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). To the
extent coverage of such figures becomes fearful and inhibited,
to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of
such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by
the First Amendment suffer abridgment.
I find compelling these justifications for the existence o{ an
editorial privilege. The values at issue are sufficiently important to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary
material.'' The Court today concedes the accuracy of the
underlying rationale for such a privilege, stating that " [ w] e
do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and
discussion on the one hand and sound decisions on the J
)Jy Brother PowELL writ('~ ,.;eparlliely to Pmpha,;izP th111 di~tri<"i
must c·nrefully WPigh ""th r valuP~ protertrd by thr Fir~t Amr•JHInwnt ,. in dc' t rrminilll!; t he• relrv:llll'l' uf di~ro\·r r~· n•<.jur~t s. A11t e. at -t .
\-.
At the· ~anw timr. how<>vrr, he· conr·ludr·~ that tlwn• ~hould 110t lw nn l'\'i~ '('f-1\~r dc·utiar~· priYilegP which protrc·t~ the rditorial procr><~ lH"c::au><r lw i~
I
unpc•r><uadPd ""t hat C'Ourt-~uprn·i~rd iuquir~· into I Pditmiall c->xrh:mgt'::< i~
vfC. ~~ ·
like]~· tu rxc·n a ><lgnific::ant pffrrt on fHTmr public:il!Oil::',·' nnd bec·au;,;e
- 0
" rnlrwsroom ronve•r,.;ation:; . . . r•njoy uo sprcial Fin,;t Anwndnwnt pro-- L~ l<,
J
trrtion other ~.
•t,!.an what thry dc·rivr from thn1 ar('urded to publi~bed
} "'r
.,...
~wrch.'' I d .. :11 1 n. 1. But if the Pxpo ·ure of pn·c.IPci~ionaJ f'dit urial di~'. oJtl ~ f1IIV'II
t·n~~ion,; will not atft>ct tlw nature· of ><lllJ~e<.juent publicntion,:, I havt' diJtiUJ~
-ts.ulty 1!lldt>nnnnding rxaetl~· what Fir"t Amf'nchnrnt YaluP~ m~· Brothrr·
~~
~ POWELL expect~ district tourt~ to piHce in thr balance. He may be <>Ug1... ~~lA'
ge~t i.ng that Fir,;t Amrndnwnt value~ arr impain·d. mrrrl~· h~· re~1.1iring
~ r•v\\
J,,,
lll!'dla df'frndan1 S to re:;pond to dJ>iCO\'f'r~· n•qur:;t" hkr ~m~· other htJg:ant.
tp ~ ··. !But rven if di,;trict conrt<' wrrr to nppl~· l'tricter ><tandanl>< of rf'lt>vaiH'f' in
-J~
~ ca:;P~ invoh·ing mrdia defr·ndants. thr hurdt•n of pretrial di><cover~· would
,....~
,
lw on]~· marginall~· dec·rrased, nnd it dors not HPem ju~tifird to a~~ume~
~
"6~~
ih<1t thi,.; J:P>illlt \\'Ollld. "e.WI't a ::;ignificant effect Qll future• l)U.lJJicatiilllS..".
1'
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April 11, 1979

I am not sure anything in note 1 is necessary anymore.
I think the point that objective falsity and awareness of falsity
are intertwined should be obvious, and Justice Marshall at 6 n.5
does indicate the relevancy of the kind of information requested.
At the same time, I am not sure than some elaboration on the
point that the First Amendment affords no special protection for
unpublished conversation would be unwarranted.

If nothing else,

I think you should go on record in an attempt to clarify the
meaning of Tornillo.
I propose deleting note 1 as it exists and substituting
a new note 1, attached to the previous sentence (ending "namely
published speech.")

The note would read:

Miami~Herald·~oblishing~eo;

v. Tornillo, 418

eolombia~Broadcasting·System;·Inc;

eommittee;·Inc:, 412

u.s.

"Our decisions in

v.

u.s.

241

(1974), and

~emocratic·National

94 (1973), provide no support for the

theory that the pre-publication editorial process enjoys a
special status under the First Amendment.

Rather, these

decisions rest on the fundamental principle that the coerced

.
•,

2.

publication of particular views, as much as their suppression,
violates the freedom of speech."
If this or some variant is not satisfactory, I would
propose deleting the note altogether.

'to: !~e Ch1af Just1~
b4r. Ju.st1oe Bra~Wi&8
ijr; Justice Ste~
~r. Juat1oe Wbite
t.lr. JUI:ltioe '!5,a·r sb:all

Mr. Justice
Ur. Justice

Bl~o~

Rebnqu~st

Mr. Justioe Stevena
From : Ur. Justioe Powl\
3rrJ DRAFT
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No. 77-1105
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals for the ·Second Circuit.
Barry Lando ~t al.
[March -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to
· ssi 6 ,v
1
elaborate on what is said in Part IV. I do not see my obser- 1otrl
vations as being inconsistent with the Court's opinion; rather,
I write to emphasize the additional point that, in supervising
discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a district court
has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as
the private interests of the plaintiffs.
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as
articulated by New York Times -;. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
( 1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding,
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys
depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment
accords the product of this judgment, namely published
speech. 1 As the Court makes clear. the privilege respondents
claim is mmecessary to safeguard published speech. This
holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether '·' the trial
Our d ec i s ion~ in Miami Herald P'Ublishiug Co. v. Tornillo, 41R U. S.
241 (1974), and Col'Utnbia Broadcasting System, Inc . v. Democratic National Committee. Inc., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) , provide no JSUp]Jort for the
i heory that the prepublication editorial prorPHs rnjoy~ a special Htatu~·
under the FirHt Amendmf•nt. Rathe~deci ::;ion::; re:st on the fundament·al
principle that the coerced publication of 11artirular view:>, as murh a;; their
::~uppre"'s ion, violates the freedom of speech.
1

..

1979
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judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us under the question certified
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume,
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which
respondents declined to answer.
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S.
495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art--one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage
of justice. As the Court now recognizes. the situation has
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue
and uncontrolled discovery." Ante, at 22." In view of the
evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled."
But it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all concerned. 3
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of
2
See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74
F. R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twentieth Century, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bell, The Pound Conference
Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice,
76 F. R. D. 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 ~ecorq
()f N.Y. C. B. A. 458,461-463 (1978).
3 See ante, at 21 n. 25.
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any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a
district court should measure the degree of relevance required
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public
concerns implicated. On the one ha.nd. as this Court has
repeatedly recognized, the solicitude for First Amendment
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the
important public interest in a free flow of news and commentary. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
165, 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 862-863 (1974) (PowELL, J .. dissenting). On the other
hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing ·
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of .the
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing
the "pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC. Industries,
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op.. at 7, 4
The Court today emphasizes that the focus must. be on
relevance. that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal,Rule of
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that ~'district courts
should not neglect their power to restrict . discovery" in the
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden
or expense. Ante, a.t 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c).
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed4 In some instances it might be appropriate for the district court to
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of
issues through summary_ judgment or other developments in discovery
might reduce the need for the material demanded. It is pertinent to note
that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at
the time discovei:y was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should
be postponed until other issues on which liability depend are resolved..

'·
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ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed
carefully in striking a proper balance.
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courts.an
..·..d. th. e.p:ress
·
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·.

WASHINGTON
. ·,
.
' ··
1

t.

to place the press and the
·• contention and dividing
·· ~. tlon, rumor and intuition. Otherwise,
commonnaturalpursuitof
., · they would probably never have pubThough the Supreme Court
- tween )he right to a-fair trial and
falsebood'but
malice" on the ,-t.:_.··--'- ·
lished the Pentagon Papers or the dis- ·
6-3 on this latest case on the rights
freedom of the press. This will ~ve to ~.'rJ. part of the publisher~ that the news- . · .,··<. · •
·• .
·
·
· •
•
·
. . , as~ers of Vietnam, or exposed the · public official in a libel case, it is
be settled in the courts and the eon-.H~ paper or radio or television s~tion had ' .. .
. . . ~ , ,
.
. .. . . • . .•
cnminal acts and constitutional violanificant that only one member of
· gress, but maybe something should be', .:--;·made ~ the charge · public ·· with' the - -- ~ ...,.\.~ J v · ,·,·
By James Reston
.
~
:·
tions of Watergate.
... Supreme Court, Justice M~ball~~ OCI
said for~.a little more understanding ¥:~knowledge that it was false or with ":'
·
• . Even so, the press has a lot to ~- 4 • . fended the unlimited fight of the
,·, between >judges >and · edi~rs on theirl:!J;~ recklesa disregard whether · it ·was '·Ui.'.
· 1·
•
.
aider in this dilemma about doing its
to avoid questioning undu the
~ different~ibilities . and common I,.,J, false or not:•. · · ·: V~-..~:~,..n k•:.
'
· ;;_.., led to the decision to publish or broad- · that in a libel suit a defendant must ;. job within the sensible limits ofthela~
Amendment. .
• purposes.e'iorn ?-1 t h.orl;; f)'fi syqH~< Gf'lf;_.: ; Thls:was b~led at the time as a tri- ifl cast . . l . :· 1: . ·' ,, '
·'
prove "actual mali~e" unless he has
and the rights of individuals to a fair
The result of this probably does
They don!t talk' ~gether .very p~ ~ umph f<n; the freedom 'of the press, but ' (,;:.; The press of this country is more .: the right to question our procedures ..f..c. trial. Some of us, for example, think
justify the outcries of the presa.
abouphe <practical' ~roblema :of:~eir~was e9ndemned bY, many jurists and f!!:!l di~ded than it appears. The spokes- -~,. and even the thoughts that led to our : , our colleagues have been goi~g too. far • ., Supreme Court's support of the
work.!·'IbeJjudges tend to thlnk,~wtthf.lipoliticians and many in ,the universi-<'f men for the media were predictably . publishedchargesagainsthim?
~;; lnpublisbingthepreliminary,private, : 4 to invade newspaper offices for
some,.reason; that the press is demand.tn~~ ties
a hunting license for the press~;;.l outraged. But if I h~r the younger re- "
It is interesting that in the courts we " unsubs
~. in .- dence in the Stanford Dally case
· 'ing too much freedom. at;the~ expense.1f\; gainstpubllc officials. i.t, •:<! •. :1 •·· " ,• porters and ·editors accurately, they
hear very little dissent from the young ··
jury p~~:.. •.. _ ..
an outrage. But its latest declsloaa;
' of individual-freedom. And th~;press;~t~ The reaction has now set in. The Su;. ,.. are aQc>ut as divided as the Supreme '\ on the other side. Unlike the young re- ' .. Even more important, the broad·
while hard on the expectatioas of
· with c equal ~anxiecy,:l feels that' the 1it,~ preme Court, in the
of Herbert v. t~• Court -two-thirds for the majority · .. porters, the young lawyers do not
casting by ABC of the Supreme Court's ' press, have made reporters and
courts are. interfering more and more .K\>-Lando, has said a very simple but very :• ~f. decision to question bow editorial deCi- ·' ~ seem to be challenging the assump.
decisions .in this latest case - before ' 1 tors think about their responaibWtlel
: with the dutj'of the press to·publlsh the t,~fr different thing:· If a public official has !''fltj sions were made under the circum- · " tions of the judges. Newspapers, radio .
the Court made it public - obviously f as well as their rights.
, ne~ and expose corruption:· (\' •: ,~o • <!i) •.f. to prove !'actual malice" in a libel sutt'~V stances, and one-third against.
· and TV also have a problem. It is not
sen:es .no public interest and is a drop
against the old assumption
. · Unf~rtunately:·· these >1 bonest ! cOh.~.-_2 against a newspaper or radio or televi~ '__Yn How; these younger members. of the '.· quite fair to insist that they be judged
of poison in the whole democratic pro-/
First Amendment guarantee
h. fllcts come•doWn to the point of deci·~~'l sion station, as command~ by the Su-'1p:·f reporting profession ask, couldwepoS:. · by whether or not they printed ''the
cess.
·
,
L : domofthepress was beyondchallenasion in the SUp~me.Court.in>very hardif'!:,:Preme Court, .then he .must have the )t1• sibly a,rgue in the press for protection · truth." They are not courts of justice.
t is this sort of thing, which
in- ~ .and had the support of the people ~
cases. In•~964, the ,COurt ruled (New ~N right to question the thoughts, the mo-··~~i- against "a .reckfess disregard for the
They have no power to command eviourt more
the courts; but this is obviousl_nea
York~•~<J~~~~l!"t?~ ~~ '~ .~~~t~~~~es -~~ ~r ~to~~,.P~ t!!&t'~ .truth'?,,:.,H~W." can w~ . possibl; ~ist
~ence f~m :"1tnesses. They cannot
than they dare admit, that is tending
longer true. .
.
• ,, .
1

t.:· .:·~ ··· -~
. fussing with one another again a~yt '~ hischaracterorflnanciallnterests,his ,f. :,·
;~· the confiict in the Constitution be.~... . suit for damages had to prove not only . , ·>• .''(.
courtsandthepresslnthiscountryare~ against a publlc·officialihat damaged ·••..:
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CRYING 'WO&FI'
GEORGE F. WILL

~

Last week's controversy boiled like
...,. surf around the Supreme Court,
~ which did something contrary to the
~ wishes of the nation's most articulate
t:n interest group. The Court affirmed a
~ limitation on the privileges of the most
~ privileged profession. Ruling 6 to 3, it
...,. held that a plaintiff in a libel suit can
Z compel journalists to answer questions about what their "state of mind" was
when preparing the story at issue. Some of
the press's tartest critics will say that to
explore a journalist's mind is to trespass on
a wilderness area, and there are, indeed,
logicatlbraroples and tangles in the minds of
some journalistS who are denouncing the
Court. They cannot abide a four-word
phrase that appears in Justice Lewis
Powell's concurring opinion:
" ... The solicitude for First Amendment
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects
concern for the important public intere.st in
a free flow of news and commentary. On the
other hand ... "
On the other hand, Powell says, there is a
"significant public interest" in the right of
litigants, such as plaintiffs in libel actions,
to seek important evidence, even from
journalists. Journalists enjoy reading about
the "important public interest" in their
rights; they do not enjoy then reading, "on
the other hand ... "
VICTORY: In 1969, Anthony Herbert, a
Vietnam veteran, accused the Army of
suppressing evidence of war crimes. He has
sued CBS, claiming that in 1973 "60 Minutes" falsely and maliciously portrayed him
as a liar. He concedes he was then a "public
figure." He knows that in 1964 the Court
ruled that comment about public figures is
protected, except falsehood disseminated
with "malice," meaning "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."
Journalists rightly regarded that ruling as
a sweeping victory. It erected a wall of
protection around a vast field of privilege.
But a wall protecting a pasture, however
vast the pasture, defines the limits of that
pasture. And any definition of a right, however sweeping, sets limits to that right. The
ruling in the Herbert case only makes explicit a limit inherent in the Warren Court ruling
of fifteen years ago: the right to penalize
malicious journalism implies the right directly to seek from journalists evidence of a
malicious "state of mind." To grant journalists a privilege not to ·mswer questions about
motives, intentions and similar relevant aspects of the editorial process would place
104

important evidence beyond the reach of a
plaintiff; it would undermine the narrow but
vital right of public figures to act against
malicious defamation. Hearing journalists
complain about even this denial of a privilege recalls Lincoln's story of the farmer
who said, "I'm not greedy about land-I
only want what joins mine."
Critics of the decision will quote, approvingly, Elizabeth I: "I will not make windows
into men's souls." (She did, of course, have
men pulled apart on racks to encourage
them to volunteer what was in their minds.)
But there is nothing inherently wrong with
the law requiring testimony about a "state of
mind." Justice could not be done without
testimony about premeditation in homicide
cases; or motives in some fraud cases; or
intentions in civil-rights suits about allegedly discriminatory actions.

The Constitution
is not 11 mere
11ppend11ge
to the
First Amendment.
It is said that the right oflibel plaintiffs to
require testimony about "states of mind"
will have a "chilling effect" on certain kinds
of editorial processes. Quite right: it is
supposed to induce self-censorship of malicious and injurious falsehood, which (in the
words of Justice Byron White's opinion for
the Court's majority) "carries no First
Amendment credentials."
Some journalists are accusing the Court
of "judicial Agnewism" and of• chopping
"ruinous swaths through the First Amendment." But the burden of proof on Herbert
in his suit against CBS is still heavy; the
construction of the First Amendment has
not been changed, and no injury has been
done to any constitutional value by not
pushing beyond the horizon the boundaries
of editorial privilege. Why, then, the alarm?
One explanation is the remarkable resilience
of a wrong idea, the theory of "absolute"
First Amendment rights.
Physiology requires mankind to sleep
about a third of the time, and psychology
inclines mankind to dogmatic slumbers the
rest of the time. The "absolute" construction of the First Amendment is an excuse
not to think. It "answers" all questions
about journalists' rights, and about much
more: the sweep of First Amendment rights

cannot be limited by any of the many
conflicting values enshrined in the Constitution. But the Constitution is not a mere
appendage to the First Amendment. As
Powell writes, that amendment's values do
not always enjoy "constitutional privilege,"
and must be "weighed" for proper "balance" with other values. As Edmund Burke
wrote, "Political reason is a computing
principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying,
and dividing . . . true moral denominations." As Alexander Bickel of Yale taught,
"There are no absolutes that a complex
society can live with in its law. There is
only the computing principle that Burke
spoke of ...
"A very broad freedom to print, and a
very considerable freedom to ferret out
information by all manner of means ought
to be, and substantially has been, one of the
chief denominations computed in our calculus as constitutional policy. But there are
other denominations as well. It is the most
enduring instinct of our legal order ... to
resist the assertion of absolute claims and,
therefore, a waste of breath to make them
... Better to recognize from the first that
the computing principle is all there is, ought
to be, or can be."
Journalists are well-remunerated, especially in the coin of prestige. They derive
psychic income from the fact that the Republic's fundamental law accords their profession special privileges and immunities.
But the public is becoming less deferential
toward the elites on which it is, resentfulJy,
dependent. Elites include lawyers, doctors,
scientists, politicians. And journalists.
Journalists are doubly resented because
people feel they must depend on them to
watch all the other distrusted elites. It is not
prudent for journalists to provoke the public by waxing indignant whenever, out near
the horizon, one of the sweeping extensions
of their privileges is limited to accommodate another of the public's interests.
DANGER: The public's confidence in journalists is jeopardized by their overwrought
reactions to every small limit on their expansive privileges. The danger is not that
the press by crying "Wolf!" when there are
no wolves in sight will be ignored should
wolves appear. Rather, the danger is that by
crying "Wolf!" whenever the law nibbles
like a hamster at the edge of privileges the
press claims, the press seems immoderate,
irrational, self-regarding and antisocial.
And the public may come to think that
perhaps the press should be gnawe~ into
shape by a wolf or two.
APRIL 30, 1979
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U. S. SUPREME COURT DISPELS MYTH OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH

INTERNA~!~ M

USSR
UNITED STATES & CANADA

J

LD20ll38 Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT 19 Apr 79 LD
[Text] Washington, April 19, TASS--The u.s. Supreme Court has passed a decision , under
which the judicial authorities have been given the right to search editorial boards and
look through notebooks of reporters, and request from telephone companies information
about the telephone conversations of journalists . The investigating bodies can now
demand from a journalist an answer to the question why he adheres to some or other viewpoint.
The reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has declared against the arbitrary rule
of ·the U. S. authorities. The committee evaluated the decision of the Supreme Court as a
crying violation of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This decision has
finally dispelled the myth of the freedom of speech in the United States .
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SpecialtotbeNewYOik~ ~"1~
··~~. . Mr. O'Brien .reported that the Justices'
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WASHINGTON, May 28 .... Recen unauthorized disclosures of Supreme Court
. decisi':'thandhi~· fu~ CourtseQ.lrity rest~
tlons
w
e
respon
have further strained an already tense
relationship between the Court and the
reporters w~ cover It and have provoked
something of a. th
press room
debate
t
lbl about
f
• bow the Court • e 1eas access e o "'"
, tionallnstitutions,should~covered. •
Wbile poll tiel~ apd the reporters who
chronicle their activities trade in premature disclosures the way commodity dealers swap potato futures, that bas never
been the case at the· Supreme ,Court.
Breaches in Court security do' ~ pn
occasion,• but they invariably infuriate
the Justlcee, .- wbo believe that confidentialltyis essential t9theirwork·. • . . _
Wben Tim O'Brien, a 35-year-old con-&.
·spondent for til!' ABC television network
reported last month on two pending decl:
&ions the event ~k on an importance far
out proportion to the S!Jbstance of what
1
Mr. O'Brien disclosed.
..,., ' ·
~.
ErredAboutJustk:e~t~~ •. - r.':~·, He reported; correctly,- that tlle Court
. Was about to reverse a lower court dec!,· sion and rule that jQUI'Jlali.Jts wbo are defendants in libel suits may be req~ to
answer pretrial questions .about their
, "stateofiillnd." '
. ·'·, ···~
· ~.
But be b,.d Associate Justice John Paul
St~ dissenting .w~ Juatice Steyens

oi

,

·J\i· .

closed-session debate on the case was so
heated that Supreme Court police came
rwming' to the. conference room to see
what the trouble was, · an account that
those in a position to know dismissed as
fanciful.
·, , ' \· ,
. ·
Mr; Q'Brien subsequently reported•
that the' Court would reverse a lower
c ourt · 1decision that
.
granted various
procedural safeguards to inmates facing
parole •boards. And last weekend; he~
ported that -the Justices would affirm a
New York- ruling that allows judges to
close pretrial hearings to the press at the
request of any of the parties Neither of
those decisions has yet come down
_•
>
•
• 1
· ,.~ '· BuildblgCioses.at4:30

t

.,

L444~ · ~

P.M.' ;,··,
1

·

Chief Justice Warren, E. Burger has responded to' the disclosures by ordering a
printer, a $23,000-a-year Government
Printing Office employee named John
Tucci, transferred out of the Court's print
shop. He also ordered that a police offlcei\
be stationed in ~e ground Door lobby of
the Supreme Court Building, with a direct
_ viewofthepress~mdownthehall. . ·
1be officer assum~ his post when the
building closes to the public at 4:30P.M.
Until the change wu made, officers patroled the halls after closing time, but the
only fixed stations were at the building's
entrances.
, . ,
I
Some days later, word spread that the
press room itself 'Was to.be closed at 4:30,

--.-~

¢lt Supreme ·court :,.---

with reporters bB.fred 'from th~ entire NBC News, both la'Wyers; as is ·Mr.
ger
building a«er hours and on weekends.
Brien, do no~ ·agree with their chief com- I
·
p1e11
Reporters who cover the Court were petitor. ·
,
'! !'
wherE
concerned beca\lSe the Supreme Court's
"It's of questionable value," Mr. ·
press room Is the only place where they Graham said in discussing premature ~
can read the briefs and petitions that disclosure of Court decisions\ "You're not i
make up much of their weekly workload. telling the public much they're not going 1
Reporters are almost always in the press· to find out soon enough, and there's such 1
room after4:30 P.M. and frequently work a great chance that you'll tum out to be
on weekends · '/' ·
.
wrong."
. Aft er two reporters
•·
d lscussed th e Issue . . . , Reports Termed 'Valueless'
·
with the Chief Justice, the Court decided
.
last week to give reporters access to the
Mr. Stern expressed his opinion on the
press room area from 8 A.M. to 10 p.M. s~bject in a letter to Broadcasting Magaseven days a week, with additional hours zme, which had published ~ gene;ally_
to be arranged on Individual request.
laudatory article about Mr. 0 Brien s re;-.
·
.
.
.
porting.
While this schedule 1s unlikely to !neonMr. stern termed the · reports "valuevenlence anyone, It does represent at less and degrading" and said that he and
least a symbo!lc change from the 24-hour other reporters at the Court did not, as
open-door pol!cy of the past. And the Su- the article stated, "heartily approve" of
preme Court library, where Mr. O'Brien what Mr. Stern called "the journallstl~as seen after closmg hours on one occa- cally unprincipled use of unverified, pe,., ~.~
s1on, has been declared off-limits to re- ripheral sources to claim knowledge of
porters for the first time. Reporters will the Court's deliberations."
now have to ask permission to use the liPromotional efforts undertaken in Mr.
brary llfld will be "escorted" there by O'Brien's behalf by his network and by
Court employees.
Lee Landesberg, a 30-year-old Washingl •
Mr. O'Brien has refused to say whether ton lawyer, have added to the general at~e printer who was transferred was his mosphere of Ill will. Both ABC officials
source. He is vigorous, however, In de- and Mr. Landesberg have ~lied other · ~
fenseofhls reporting.
,
news ?rg~tlons urging art1cles about
FILM-O·MA
86th S!ree
"There are only. three questions to Mr. 0 Bnen.
ask," he said recently. "First, .'Is It
Mr. O'B.r ien said Mr. Landes berg was
right?' It was. Second, 'Is It news?' It not authorized to make such calls, adding
•~r·l:l:r.Ji
was. And third, 'Is there any compelling ~at he and Mr. Landesberg had simply
reason not to \lSe It?' There wasn't."
discussed efforts to line up some lecture
CAMERAS'
Fred Grah~~ .O.f. CBS ~d C_ar~~t~l'!lof a~pearances.
Stores throug h
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